This article calls for a paradigm shift in the language, theory and practice of human rights: it calls for human rights to be reconceptualized as sentient rights. It argues that human rights are not qualitatively distinct from the basic entitlements of other sentient creatures, and that attempts to differentiate human rights by appealing to something distinctive about humanity, their unique political function or their universality ultimately fail. Finally, the article claims that moving to sentient rights will not lead to intractable (...) conflicts between rights, but to a more inclusive, fair and rationally defensible normative enterprise. (shrink)

Margaret Kohn argues for a reappraisal of early twentieth-century left-republican French political theory, known as ‘solidarism’. Solidarism recognises private property as legitimate, but at the same time argues that the collective nature of economic production gives rise to a claim to social property. It is social property that should underlie the case for social justice and social rights, not the standard liberal claims to individual autonomy. This paper provides an appraisal of Kohn’s recovery of solidarism, taking as its main theme (...) the relation between property and social justice. The paper first offers a typology of four theories of justice (right- and left-libertarianism, luck and relational egalitarianism) and discusses the relation of each of these to the concept of property. Then it argues that solidarism is akin to left-libertarianism in the way it formulates justice as a claim to social property. Finally, it argues that solidarists cannot escape grounding their theory in a non-property based fundamental principle, which makes the theory much less distinctive from egalitarian theories of justice than may appear at first sight. (shrink)

What does it mean to defend moral cosmopolitanism in terms of human rights? I outline ‘human rights cosmopolitanism’, explain the role of equality in giving content to this conception, and defend the liberal view of human rights against the restricted view by considering – and responding to – several arguments for remaining neutral between a range of cultural and ideological perspectives on the demands of social justice and political legitimacy. I defend the liberal view that a conception of human rights (...) should not remain neutral on controversial questions of justice and legitimacy. (shrink)

This article discusses a procedural, minimalist approach to justice in terms of fair hearing applicable to value conflicts at impasse in politics. This approach may be summarized in the Adversary Argumentation Principle (AAP): the idea that each side in a conflict should be heard. I engage with Stuart Hampshire’s efforts to justify the AAP and argue that those efforts have failed to provide normatively cogent foundations for it. I suggest deriving such foundations from a basic idea of procedural equality (all (...) parties in a conflict should be granted an equal chance to have a say) which all conflicting parties could be thought to endorse. But what happens once all parties have been heard if no agreement is reached? Borrowing a distinction well known to scholars of peace studies, but surprisingly neglected by justice-driven political philosophers, I claim that although the AAP might be inconclusive with regard to resolving a conflict, it is a promising principle for managing value conflicts justly. The AAP is thus considered anew through the lens of conflict management: as a principle of justice to characterize normatively the way conflicting parties should interact for their interaction to be morally justifiable to such parties with a view to changing antagonistic conflict dynamics into cooperative ones. (shrink)

Contemporary argumentation theory has developed an impressive array of norms, goals and virtues applicable to ideal argument. But what is the moral status of these prescriptions? Is an interlocutor who fails to live up to these norms guilty of a moral failing as well as an epistemic or cognitive error? If so, why? In answering these questions, I argue that deliberation’s epistemic and cognitive goods attach to important ethical goods, and that respect for others’ rationality, the ethics of joint action, (...) and the importance of consensus join forces with these goods to provide strong reasons for cleaving to high standards of argument. I sketch an illustrative continuum of argument practices of different deliberative-cum-ethical standards, and consider how one should ethically respond when faced with an interlocutor employing less than ideal standards. (shrink)

How can codes of ethics acquire legitimacy—that is, how can they lay down obligations that will be seen by their subjects as morally binding? There are many answers to this question, reflecting the fact that moral agents have a host of different bases on which they may acknowledge code duties as ethically binding—or, alternatively, may reject those duties as morally irrelevant or actively corrupt. Drawing on a wide literature on legitimacy in other practical fields, this paper develops a multidimensional legitimacy (...) framework, describing ten distinct sources of legitimacy. It illustrates how these sources can be seized, not only by the code’s content, but by opportunities presented in the main stages of code development, adoption and implementation. In so doing, it aims to provide practical resources for code developers and ethics reformers in organizations and industries to avoid critical missteps, and to maximize the impact and efficacy of their work. (shrink)

Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to (...) provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’ political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious partisanship. (shrink)

Democracy and human rights have long been strongly connected in international covenants. In documents such as 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, democracy is justified both intrinsically in terms of popular sovereignty and instrumentally as the best way to “foster the full realization of all human rights.” Yet, even though they are human and thus universal rights, political rights are often surprisingly specific. In the Covenant, for example, “the (...) right to take part in the conduct of public affairs” is equated with “the right to vote and to be elected.” More often then not, their realization is left to states and their constitutions, as for example in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. Political rights have a “peculiar” status among enumerated human rights, and this difficulty has to do with deep assumptions about the nature and scope of democracy and political community that remain unexamined by the drafters of these important declarations. (shrink)

We seek to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic normative political theories. To that aim, we show that the conception of democracy underlying a prominent Islamic political model is procedural. We distinguish proceduralism from a liberal conception of democracy. Then, we explain how bringing together Islamic political theory and democracy alters the meaning of the latter. In other words, we show that democracy within Islam often means democracy within Islamic limits.

Scholars disagree about the proper justification of human rights and which rights qualify as human rights. While some argue for a very limited set of human rights, others defend more comprehensive accounts. In this paper I suggest that a defence of a comprehensive set of human rights can be strengthened by combining constructivist deontological and well-being based teleological justifications. To this end, I discuss two prominent proponents of constructivism and the well-being approach: Rainer Forst and Simon Caney. Forst criticises teleological (...) justifications for grounding human rights in non-universalizable conceptions of the good, such as autonomy, that can reasonably be rejected by others. Constructivism, in contrast, does not rest on any particular idea of the good life and thus allows for greater ethical plurality. I reject this specific criticism, arguing that Caney’s approach ultimately allows for the same plurality. I also highlight that constructivism on its own cannot justify rights of people who are not (yet) able to reason. The well-being approach provides substantive arguments for the rights of these individuals. However, these arguments are made with the framework provided by constructivism. I hold, contra Caney, that Forst’s right to justification is primary in that it is the unavoidable basis from which justice issues can be dealt with in a reasonable way and that the main function of human rights is to protect the equal moral status of persons. I conclude that Forst’s constructivist and Caney’s well-being approach are complementary rather than rivalrous: when combined they provide a more robust justification for a comprehensive set of human rights than considered separately. (shrink)

Most significant policy issues facing humanity reach across national borders. Consequential political decisions with cross-national effects are frequently made by states, non-state organisations, and corporations. Under these circumstances, it is widely acknowledged that it is important to conduct deliberation at the global level. Below this shallow agreement, however, lies deep disagreement about a crucial question: how, if at all, is it morally permissible for deliberation to result in a set of international laws and rules that are imposed on a world (...) population which is deeply pluralistic in its moral and political attitudes? When the equivalent question is asked within the confines of a political community, one prominent answer is by reference to a standard of public reason. While there is a large literature about public reason at the domestic level, the literature on global public reason is comparatively underdeveloped. The paper addresses this lacuna in two ways. First, it motivates the global public reason project, and conceptualises the nature of the challenge that accounts of global public reason face. Second, it demonstrates that, by their own evaluative standards, existing accounts of global public reason are unable to satisfy both desiderata simultaneously, being either too ‘thick’ or too ‘thin’. (shrink)

School and education can be seen as an extension of the home as Hannah Arendt stresses, where children are protected in a space in which they can learn and grow, a space that is not yet public. This distinction of education as “not yet public” can be seen in contrast to John Dewey who explores notions of democracy as a process in education, where education and school is regarded as a mini society. This paper explores several challenges with progressive education (...) and, specifically, of human rights education, through the work of Arendt and Dewey on the notions of responsibility and children’s human rights. Where do we as educators draw the distinction between taking responsibility of raising awareness of global injustices and human rights violations with the next generation without falling pray to dissolution that the gap between political imaginary and reality faces us with, or risking violating children’s “safe space” in school that according to Arendt should be a space that is neither private nor public, but a free zone for thinking and learning with others? Do we bring into the classroom discrimination and segregation by drawing on social categorizations with the pretext of questioning the same on the basis of “equal rights”? If ethical and relational dimensions of education are to be taken seriously then human rights education is a risky practice since it involves children’s sense of being and it raises questions that may not be dealt with properly or solvable for the children exposed. (shrink)

Despite being a seemingly straightforward moral concept (that all humans have certain rights by virtue of their humanity), human rights is a contested concept in theory and practice. Theorists debate (among other things) the meaning of “rights,” the priority of rights, whether collective rights are universal, the foundations of rights, and whether there are universal human rights at all. These debates are of relatively greater interest to theorists; however, a given meaning of “human rights” implies a corresponding theory of change (...) and through that can be an important guide to the practice of human rights activists and their funders. In practice, any organization can describe their work as “rights based.” This article clarifies the practices of human rights activists and their funders that are consistent with a theory of human rights as (1) universal, (2) interdependent across groups and categories of people, (3) indivisible across issue areas and claims, and (4) measured by the enjoyment of rights. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine global public reason as a method of justifying a global state. Ultimately, I conclude that global public reason fails to justify a global state. This is the case, because global public reason faces an unwinnable dilemma. The global public reason theorist must endorse either a hypothetical theory of consent or an actual theory of consent; if she endorses a theory of hypothetical consent, then she fails to justify her principles; and if she endorses a theory (...) of actual consent, her theory will lead to a highly unstable political system. On either side of the dilemma, global public reason faces untenable implications. Although similar criticisms have been advanced against domestic public reason, my argument is not repeating points made before me. My argument is new, in that it raises these objections specifically against global public reason, and in that it shows how, due to increased diversity of belief in the global arena, these problems are more pressing for global public reason than they are for domestic public reason. (shrink)

Recently, most of the discussions in Confucian political theory have concentrated on whether Confucianism is compatible with local political practices, such as liberal democracy. The question of how Confucians view global distributive justice has not yet received critical attention. This essay aims to fill this gap. I will first describe a contractualist methodology, which aims at deriving substantial political principles from a formal conception of the person. Then I will discuss what conception of the person Confucianism assumes. Finally, I will (...) use the contractualist methodology to derive three principles of global distributive justice. These three principles form a distinctive conception based on ideas that are usually ignored in the current discussions of global justice, such as virtues, community, and rituals. (shrink)

Cultural differences pose a serious challenge to the ethics and governance of artificial intelligence from a global perspective. Cultural differences may enable malignant actors to disregard the demand of important ethical values or even to justify the violation of them through deference to the local culture, either by affirming the local culture lacks specific ethical values, e.g., privacy, or by asserting the local culture upholds conflicting values, e.g., state intervention is good. One response to this challenge is the human rights (...) approach to AI governance, which is intended to be a universal and globally enforceable framework. The proponents of the approach, however, have so far neglected the challenge from cultural differences or left out the implications of cultural diversity in their works. This is surprising because human rights theorists have long recognized the significance of cultural pluralism for human rights. Accordingly, the approach may not be straightforwardly applicable in “non-Western” contexts because of cultural differences, and it may also be critiqued as philosophically incomplete insofar as the approach does not account for the role of culture. This commentary examines the human rights approach to AI governance with an emphasis on cultural values and the role of culture. Particularly, I show that the consideration of cultural values is essential to the human rights approach for both philosophical and instrumental reasons. (shrink)

In “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” John Rawls suggests an approach to a public conception of justice that eschews any dependence on metaphysical conceptions of justice in favor of a political conception of justice. This means that if there is a metaphysical conception of justice that actually obtains, then Rawls’ theory would not be sensitive to it. Rawls himself admitted in Political Liberalism that “the political conception does without the truth.” Similarly, in Law of Peoples, Rawls endorses a political (...) conception of justice to govern the society of peoples that is not concerned with truth, but instead concerned with being sufficiently neutral so as to avoid conflict with any reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The odd result is that this neutrality excludes any conception of truth at all. Therefore, in times of crisis that demand incisive decision making based on scientific, economic or moral considerations, public reason will stall because it can contain no coherent conception of truth. (shrink)

The connection between health and human rights continues to play a prominent role within global health law. In particular, a number of theorists rely on the claim that there is a relation of interdependence between health and human rights. The nature and extent of this relation, however, is rarely defined, developed or defended in a conceptually robust way. This paper seeks to explore the source, scope and strength of this putative relation and what role it might play in developing a (...) global health law framework. (shrink)

Brock argues that states’ rights of border control should be understood to be conditional on states’ protecting human rights internally as well as on states’ appropriately contributing to the human rights conditions of migrants internationally. I discuss these requirements in turn. I first argue that Brock needs further to specify how internal human rights failures affect the legitimacy of states’ border control rights. I then outline some considerations that I believe would strengthen Brock’s proposal for better international cooperation on migrants’ (...) human rights. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to contribute to the elaboration of a deliberative approach to global institutional design. A deliberative approach aims to embed processes of mutual reason-giving at the heart of international relations and global decision-making. The theoretical framework that orientates this discussion is the liberal approach to international law developed by John Rawls. It may seem strange to invoke this model: after all, Rawls does not specifically discuss the issue of global institutional design and indeed has been (...) widely criticized for neglecting this topic. In fact, in its account of global public reason, Rawls's approach can be shown to contain important and surprisingly neglected resources for constructing a dynamic and inclusive theory of global deliberative politics. (shrink)

An important objection to political liberalism is that it provides no means by which to decide conflicts between public and non-public reasons. This article develops John Rawls' idea of `reasoning from conjecture' as one way to argue for a commitment to public reason. Reasoning from conjecture is a form of non-public justification that allows political liberals to reason from within the comprehensive views of at least some unreasonable citizens. After laying out the basic features of this form of non-public justification, (...) this article responds to three objections based on concerns about insincerity, cultural imperialism, and the epistemic authority of those who reason from conjecture. (shrink)

Abstract Two features of human?rights discourse are often targeted for criticism: its universalism and its individualism. Both features, it is usually claimed, illegitimately overlook the significance of cultural diversity. In this essay I argue that individualism is incompatible with universalism and compatible with cultural diversity. Thus I defend the view that human rights are individualistically justified, and I argue that it follows from this that human rights are in an important sense non?universal. I go on to show how my non?universalist (...) conclusion can provide the basis for a retort to those who appeal to facts about cultural diversity in order to criticise human rights discourse. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

In recent developments in political and legal philosophy, there is a tendency to endorse minimalist lists of human rights which do not include a right to political participation. Against such tendencies, I shall argue that the right to political participation, understood as distinct from a right to democracy, should have a place even on minimalist lists. In addition, I shall defend the need to extend the right to political participation to include participation not just in national, but also in international (...) and global governance processes. The argument will be based on a cosmopolitan conception of political legitimacy and on a political conception of human rights that is normatively anchored in legitimacy. The central claim of my paper is that a right to political participation is necessary – but not sufficient – for political legitimacy in the global realm. (shrink)

In his most recent book, National Responsibility and Global Justice, David Miller presents an account of human rights grounded on the idea of basic human needs. Miller argues that his account can overcome what he regards as a central problem for human rights theory: the need to provide a ‘non-sectarian’ justification for human rights, one that does not rely on reasons that people from non-liberal societies should find objectionable. The list of human rights that Miller’s account generates is, however, minimal (...) when compared to those found in human rights documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. This article argues that contrary to what Miller claims, his account is ‘sectarian’, since it relies on reasons that some non-liberals should find objectionable given their divergent values. It goes on to question whether ‘sectarianism’, as Miller defines it, is, in any case, a problem for human rights theory. The article concludes that Miller provides us with no reason to abandon commitment to a more extensive list of human rights. (shrink)

La visión imperante en el derecho internacional actual concibe los derechos humanos como normas relativas al trato que los Estados brindan a su propia población. Esta posición, que se conoce como la “perspectiva estatista” sobre los derechos humanos, es actualmente resistida por varios autores. En este artículo intentaré defender la perspectiva estatista contra una serie de críticas recientemente formuladas por Cristina Lafont en Isegoría y en otras importantes revistas especializadas. En particular, trataré de probar que, contrariamente a lo que Lafont (...) argumenta, esta perspectiva captura adecuadamente la razón de ser de la práctica contemporánea de los derechos humanos y dispone de recursos para resguardar los intereses de los seres humanos de las nuevas amenazas surgidas en un mundo globalizado. (shrink)

A branch of political philosophy treats human rights as the output of democratic deliberations by a certain kind of polity. This school, represented by theorists like Benhabib and Besson, do not see detailed human rights as constraints on legitimacy but rather as the specification of abstract human rights (such as the "right to have rights") in terms of obligations and the distribution of burdens. This paper argues that the position is untenable as the notion of democratic decision-making depends on sufficiently (...) clear and specified human rights standards and the political respect they guarantee. Furthermore, the form that any democratic deliberation will take must express respect and reasonableness towards both rights recipients and burden-bearers. To do so, a clear sense of human rights must exist as a threshold, as must standards of societal justice and fairness. Human rights must come first, as a background condition of democracy. (shrink)

The debate over the applicability of the concept of (distributive) justice to the international sphere appears to focus on practicalities in the agent of redistribution. The agency objection says there is no appropriate agent of (the equivalent of societal distributive) justice and its aims for the international sphere. A common response is that the agency question is merely a matter of practicality, the concepts of justice and injustice can apply to circumstances in which distributive justice may not currently be practically (...) achievable. The paper argues that this response is based on a particular and contentious (in the debate) understanding of distributive justice as focused on outcomes rather than treatment by specific types of agents. A number of problems with that concept of justice are adduced and the alternative concept set out. Rejecting the agency objection based on an assumed concept of justice to which those making it would not obviously subscribed begs the question against them. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes between the concepts of justification and legitimation with a view to offering a normative standard for global justice compatible with cultural pluralism. According to this distinction, justification is presented as an idealized, substantive and top-down enterprise rooted in the moral and metaphysical substrate of a specific culture. On the other hand, legitimation has a procedural and factual connotation and derives its strength from the success of some culturally independent but historically situated practice (bottom-up approach). Building on this (...) distinction, I argue that justification and legitimation should be made complementary for the sake of cross-cultural dialogue. (shrink)

En este ensayo analizo algunas dificultades conceptuales asociadas a la exigencia de que las instituciones globales adquieran un grado mayor de legitimidad democrática. En ausencia de un Estado mundial, puede parecer inconsistente exigir que las instituciones globales sean responsables ante todos los que han de acatar sus decisiones y al mismo tiempo insistir en que los miembros de dichas instituciones, en tanto que representantes de sus respectivos Estados, mantengan las responsabilidades especiales que tienen con los ciudadanos de sus propios países. (...) Esta dificultad parece insuperable a la luz de la extendida aceptación de la concepción de los derechos humanos centrada en el Estado, según la cual los Estados, y sólo ellos, son los responsables principales de proteger los derechos de sus ciudadanos. Contra esta concepción, defiendo la plausibilidad de una concepción alternativa, pluralista de las obligaciones derivadas de los derechos humanos. Para ello argumento que, si se tiene en cuenta la distinción tripartita entre la obligación de respetar, proteger y realizar los derechos humanos, no hay ninguna dificultad conceptual en exigir que tanto los Estados como los actores no estatales se responsabilicen por sus respectivas obligaciones en materia de derechos humanos. (shrink)

Theories of global justice have moved from issues relating to crimes against humanity and war crimes or, furthermore, ?negative duties? with respect to non-citizens, towards problems of distributive justice and global inequality. Thomas Nagel's Storrs Lectures from 2005, exemplifying Rawlsian internationalism, argue that liberal requirements concerning duties of distributive justice apply exclusively within a single nation-state, and do not extend to duties of this nature between rich and poor countries. Nagel even argues that the demand for global equality is not (...) a demand of justice at all. In the present article I will try to offer a normative basis for the criticism of such a view. Following Kant and more recently Philip Pettit, I locate this normative basis on political freedom conceived as non-domination. Such a conception opens up the possibility of a political cosmopolitanism, which is based not on an empirical interdependence among people at a global level, but on a normative interdependence. Subsequent cosmopolitan duties extend both to the elimination of domination everywhere in the world and to the equal enjoyment of non-dominated choice. Thus, it will be argued that modern republicanism is falsely identified with a particular, bounded community, but supports a political, not simply a moral, cosmopolitanism. This kind of cosmopolitanism conceives of sovereign states neither as useless constructions, nor as mere instruments for realizing the pre-institutional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is what gives the value of justice its application. Cosmopolitanism is not after all about the abolishment of all boundaries, but about the essential capacity to draw and redraw them infinitely under conditions of global justice. (shrink)

This paper is a critical examination of a widely accepted method of human rights justification. The method defends the universality of human rights by appeal to diverse worldviews that converge on human rights norms. By showing that the norms can be justified from the perspective of diverse worldviews, human rights theorists suggest that there is reason to believe that human rights are universal norms that should govern the institutions of all societies. This paper argues that the evidence of plural foundations (...) of human rights fails to increase our confidence in the universality of human rights. The paper defends the following claims: (1) the convergence on human rights is better explained as an accidental outcome than as an indicator of the universality of human rights, (2) the plurality of human rights justification is superfluous to the explanation of why human rights apply to all societies, (3) the aggregation of justifications decreases rather than increases the reliability of the universality belief, and (4) the reasonable disagreement among conflicting justifications generates an epistemic dilemma. (shrink)

Peremptory norms of general international law are universally binding prohibitions that override any consideration for non-compliance. The question is how nonconsensual norms emerge from a consensual international legal order. It appears that either the peremptoriness of jus cogens renders consent superfluous to the norm’s binding force or consent divests jus cogens of its peremptory status. The goal of this paper is to resolve the dilemma by explaining why jus cogens is exempt from the general requirement of consent that binds states (...) to the rules of international law. The paper provides an impartiality-based account of enforcement that explains why a state’s refusal to give consent to jus cogens may be overridden in a consensual legal order. (shrink)

Development ethicists see reducing intrahousehold gender inequality as an important policy aim. However, it is unclear that a minimalist cross-cultural consensus can be formed around this goal. Inequality on its own may not bring women beneath a minimal welfare threshold. Further, adherents of complementarian metaphysical doctrines may view attempts to reduce intrahousehold inequality as attacks on their worldviews. Complicating the justificatory task is the fact that familiar arguments against intrahousehold inequality, including those from agency and self-esteem, depart from premises that (...) complementarians reject—premises about the value of independence or the moral irrelevance of gender. I propose that development ethicists should offer complementarianism-compatible arguments against the norms and practices constitutive of intrahousehold inequality. I develop arguments against two intrahousehold inequality-supportive practices that depart from complementarian premises. Specifically, I argue that patriarchal risk and gender schemas that devalue women's labor prevent men from discharging complementarian duties to promote women's welfare. (shrink)