This paper explores a neglected normative dimension of algorithmic opacity in the workplace and the labor market. It argues that explanations of algorithms and algorithmic decisions are of noninstrumental value. That is because explanations of the structure and function of parts of the social world form the basis for reflective clarification of our practical orientation toward the institutions that play a central role in our life. Using this account of the noninstrumental value of explanations, the paper diagnoses distinctive normative defects (...) in the workplace and economic institutions which a reliance on AI can encourage, and which lead to alienation. (shrink)

Prima facie there is confusion in that part of Marx's theory which deals with religion and revolution. On the basis of Marx's scattered statements on religion one can construct two views of the relationship between revolutionary action and the abolition of the religious mentality. One view is that the exploited class can come to atheism prior to the creation of communist society, and, indeed, must attain a secular consciousness if it is to be the agency of revolution. The other view (...) is that the power of religion cannot be broken until after the communist revolution because only a new economic order can remove the material conditions which sustain religion as a mass phenomenon.In the face of these conflicting views we are left with two alternatives. Either we can take one of the constructions as the authentic one, or, we can conclude that Marx's position is incoherent. Seeking the best in both worlds, my approach involves showing why the charge of incoherence appears plausible while arguing for a resolution in the direction of the first construction. (shrink)

Criticism and sarcasm are interspersed with description and analysis throughout Marx's work. Most of the criticism is aimed at one or another side of a single target: what Marx sees as capitalism's pretensions of freedom, equality, and prosperity in the face of exploitation and recurrent crises. But the remarks on commodity fetishism in the first volume of Capital seem to be directed at a different target. Here Marx tells us that a commodity is ‘a queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties (...) and theological niceties.’ But instead of going on to reveal the nature of commodites-the task that occupies him for the preceding 30 and subsequent 700 pages-Marx takes the opportunity to explore their ‘mystical’ character. The passage repays careful consideration. It is one of the few places in his mature writings in which Marx returns to the tone of his youthful works. It is also the passage in which commentators have claimed to find grounds for attributing a doctrine of ‘false consciousness’ to Marx. (shrink)

La présente contribution interroge le parcours intellectuel de Gerald A. Cohen, à la fois unifié par son objectif d’émancipation et marqué par des ruptures théoriques. Alors que le livre de Nicolas Vrousalis, The Political Philosophy of G. A. Cohen. Back to Socialist Basics (Bloomsbury, 2015) vise à présenter la construction intellectuelle de Cohen dans son caractère à la fois complet et cohérent, en vue d’affirmer l’unité de sa pensée politique autour d’un projet d’émancipation, établit très clairement les étapes décisives de (...) l’évolution intellectuelle, il nous apparaît qu’il met trop peu l’accent sur les ruptures dans la pensée de Cohen. Nous estimons que si son unité tient à la fois à sa méthode et à l’objectif qu’il a affiché, elle a sensiblement évolué à tel point que certains éléments de son parcours nous paraissent, au moins en partie, incompatibles entre eux. Vrousalis ne parvient pas à saisir pleinement ceci, au sens où il accorde peu d’importance aux phases de transition dans l’évolution de la pensée de Cohen. La présente contribution présente le livre de Vrousalis dans un premier temps et propose dans un deuxième temps une approche complémentaire voire alternative à celle de Vrousalis. Classification JEL : A13, B51, P20. (shrink)

Le philosophe Gerald A. Cohen est décédé le 5 août 2009. Sa contribution s’est d’abord articulée autour de la pensée de Marx. Elle émergea sur la scène intellectuelle en 1978 avec la parution de Karl Marx’s Theory of History : A Defence, qui impulsa la constitution du marxisme analytique. Par la suite, Cohen tendit à se détacher progressivement de la théorie de Marx. Il participa à la discussion sur le concept libertarien de propriété de soi en vue de l’associer à (...) une approche marxiste, avant d’intégrer pleinement le débat normatif autour des problématiques de justice sociale, autour de la Théorie de la justice de John Rawls. Fondée sur la philosophie kantienne, sa critique de la théorie de Rawls lui reproche de ne pas accorder suffisamment d’autonomie aux choix individuels. Le présent article discute la pertinence du voyage intellectuel de Jerry Cohen dans son rapport à l’œuvre de Marx. (shrink)

In his seminal The Poverty of Historicism Sir Karl Popper deployed a number of arguments to prick the pretensions of those who thought that they were, or could come to be, in possession of knowledge of the future. These ‘historicists’ assumed that they could lay bare the law of evolution of a society, and that their possession of knowledge of such a law justified political action which had the aim of removing obstacles to the progress of history. In arguing against (...) historicism Popper was clearly motivated by his interest in removing the intellectual backing for such revolutionary political practice. My first reading of PH was in the company of people who were extremely dismissive of the anti-revolutionary message, and who tended to argue that if that was the conclusion of Popper's theoretical argument, then obviously the argument was flawed. Within their context, that of the implementation of apartheid policy in South Africa, there was much to be said for this attitude. There is no doubt that Popper's message was insufficiently contextualised, or rather that he did not signpost very clearly whether he intended the anti-revolutionary political prescription to have limited or universal application. In this paper I want to reconsider some of these issues, particularly whether the truth of anti-historicism, in the sense intended by Popper, has such conservative consequences for political action. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt to piece together the elements of G. A. Cohen’s thought on the theory of socialism during his long intellectual voyage from Marxism to political philosophy. It begins from his theory of the maldistribution of freedom under capitalism, moves onto his critique of libertarian property rights, to his diagnosis of the “deep inegalitarian” structure of John Rawls’ theory and concludes with his rejection of the “cheap” fraternity promulgated by liberal egalitarianism. The paper’s exegetical contention is that (...) Cohen’s work in political philosophy is best understood in the background of lifelong commitment to a form of democratic, non-market, socialism realizing the values of freedom, equality and community, as he conceived them. The first part of the essay is therefore an attempt to retrieve core socialism-related arguments by chronologically examining the development of Cohen’s views, using his books as thematic signposts. The second part brings these arguments together with an eye to reconstructing his vision of socialism. It turns out that Cohen’s political philosophy offers a rich conception of objective and subjective freedom, an original understanding of justice as satisfaction of genuine need, and a substantive ideal of fraternity as justificatory community with others. If properly united, these values can suggest a full-bloodied account of the just polity, and give us a glimpse into what it means, for Cohen, to treat people as equals. (shrink)