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  1. Against a Minimum Voting Age.Philip Cook - 2013 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (3):439-458.
    A minimum voting age is defended as the most effective and least disrespectful means of ensuring all members of an electorate are sufficiently competent to vote. Whilst it may be reasonable to require competency from voters, a minimum voting age should be rejected because its view of competence is unreasonably controversial, it is incapable of defining a clear threshold of sufficiency and an alternative test is available which treats children more respectfully. This alternative is a procedural test for minimum electoral (...)
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  • Does epistemic proceduralism justify the disenfranchisement of children?Jakob Hinze - 2019 - Journal of Global Ethics 15 (3):287-305.
    Most laypersons and political theorists endorse the claims that all adults should be enfranchised and all children should be disenfranchised. The first claim rejects epistocracy; the second...
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  • Why the voting age should be lowered to 16.Tommy Peto - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (3):277-297.
    This article examines whether the voting age should be lowered to 16. The dominant view in the literature is that 16-year-olds in the United Kingdom are not politically mature enough to vote since they lack political knowledge, political interest and stable political preferences. I reject this conclusion and instead argue that the voting age should be lowered to 16. First, I look at Chan and Clayton’s empirical claims and show that these features of 16- and 17-year-olds are in fact created (...)
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  • Citizenship, competence and profound disability.John Vorhaus - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 39 (3):461–475.
    In this paper I argue that reflection on competence and enfranchisement in relation to profound disability forces re-examination of the grounds of citizenship, with implications for theories of distributive justice in education. The primary purpose is less to point up that some people are disenfranchised without injustice; it is more to advance the view that, since enfranchisement is not an option for some profoundly disabled people, we require a conception of citizenship that is more sensitive to their distinctive needs and (...)
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