A common theme of libertarians is that there is a conflict between the values of liberty and equality. Achieving equality, so libertarians often argue, would require frequent interference in individuals’ lives, creating constraints on freedom and obstacles to the development of individuality. Although not himself endorsing a libertarian conception of liberty, Oxford philosopher G.A. Cohen recently has advanced the surprising thesis that there is a tension in Marxist normative thought that in an interesting way parallels the often heard libertarian challenge (...) to egalitarianism. (shrink)

Libertarian self-ownership views have traditionally maintained that we enjoy very powerful deontological protections against any infringement upon our property. This stringency yields very counter-intuitive results when we consider trivial infringements such as very mildly toxic pollution or trivial risks such having planes fly overhead. Maintaining that other people's rights against all infringements are very powerful threatens to undermine our liberty, as Nozick saw. In this paper I consider the most sophisticated attempts to rectify this problem within a libertarian self-ownership framework. (...) I argue that all of these responses are significantly flawed. (shrink)

Le philosophe Gerald A. Cohen est décédé le 5 août 2009. Sa contribution s’est d’abord articulée autour de la pensée de Marx. Elle émergea sur la scène intellectuelle en 1978 avec la parution de Karl Marx’s Theory of History : A Defence, qui impulsa la constitution du marxisme analytique. Par la suite, Cohen tendit à se détacher progressivement de la théorie de Marx. Il participa à la discussion sur le concept libertarien de propriété de soi en vue de l’associer à (...) une approche marxiste, avant d’intégrer pleinement le débat normatif autour des problématiques de justice sociale, autour de la Théorie de la justice de John Rawls. Fondée sur la philosophie kantienne, sa critique de la théorie de Rawls lui reproche de ne pas accorder suffisamment d’autonomie aux choix individuels. Le présent article discute la pertinence du voyage intellectuel de Jerry Cohen dans son rapport à l’œuvre de Marx. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer an original interpretation of Marx's conception of unalienated labor, which I frame as a response to Aristotle's view of work, or technē. Both Aristotle and Marx share a particular conception of freedom as “normative self-determination,” according to which an activity is free insofar as it does not depend for its value on externally valuable things. For instance, when my activity is a mere means for satisfying some need separate from it, it comes to depend for (...) its value on the externally valuable effect—the “needs-meeting”—it achieves. Or, when my activity is only causally—but not normatively—enabled by the cooperative contributions of others, it comes to depend for its value on those externally valuable contributions. On Aristotle's view, work is unleisurely (ascholos) and servile (doulos) because it is normatively dependent in both of these ways. For Marx, by contrast, work possesses the capacity to “internalize” these external determinants of its value. Unalienated work does this, first, by satisfying “internal” needs, or needs whose satisfaction does not constitute a normatively external effect of the work that satisfies them. The satisfaction of internal needs is valuable because of the manner or way in which they are satisfied. Second, unalienated work would not only be causally, but also normatively, enabled by the contributions of others, in that those contributions would help to make it the distinctively valuable act that it is. Unalienated work would be valuable because, and not despite, its cooperative character. In both of these respects, then, cooperation is essential to make work fully free. (shrink)

A partir de las críticas que el igualitarismo fraternal lanzó contra el igualitarismo de la suerte, G. A. Cohen propuso un compromiso a través del denominado modelo de campamento. Puesto que dicho trade-off no quedó formalizado, en este artículo se intenta aportar algunos elementos en tal dirección. En concreto, se argumenta: a) que Cohen tiende un primer puente hacia el igualitarismo fraternal al distinguir los aspectos de equidad y legitimidad en una concepción de lo justo, conjuntamente con la afirmación de (...) que la suerte en las opciones nunca preserva la justicia; b) que los principios igualitario y comunitario, que Cohen postula como deseables para el socialismo, operan sobre la base de la distinción equidad-legitimidad, de modo que las desigualdades generadas por elecciones genuinas y mala suerte en las opciones son justas en tanto resultan legítimas pero no son justas en términos de equidad y, en consecuencia, las desigualdades que rasgan el tejido social son causalmente fundamentales mientras que el principio comunitario es normativamente fundamental; y c) que los elementos comunitarios que impulsan el compromiso de Cohen ya están presentes en sus nociones de igualdad voluntaria, ethos igualitario, lectura estricta del Principio de Diferencia rawlsiano y comunidad justificatoria. (shrink)

G.A. Cohen y John Rawls atribuyen a Karl Marx haberse adherido al principio libertarista de autopropiedad y una plena confianza en la abundancia ilimitada como solución a los defectos distributivos del socialismo. Asimismo, consideran que el comunismo marxiano está, en cierto sentido, más allá de la justicia. Contra estas posiciones, veremos que Marx rechaza la autopropiedad en términos normativos, que la predicción de plenitud material no es estrictamente marxiana, y que la doble valoración del comunismo —a la vez justo y (...) más allá de la justicia— no es totalmente consistente. (shrink)