ABSTRACT Relatively little work brings together Foucault and epistemic injustice. This article works through Miranda Fricker’s attempt to position herself between Marx and Foucault. Foucault repeatedly emphasizes the importance of beginning with “structures” rather than “subjects.” Reading Foucault’s critique of Marxism shows that Fricker’s account comes very close to the standpoint theories it tries to avoid. Foucault’s emphasis on structures explains some of the gaps in Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice, especially the need to emphasize the embeddedness of epistemic practices (...) in institutions, and their resulting irreducibly political nature. In both cases, this article offers contemporary examples taken from data and privacy regulations. (shrink)

Period-tracking software applications or ‘menstruapps’ have witnessed a surge in popularity in recent years. At the same time, many of them are a part of the adtech industry, using business models that create revenue by selling users’ personal and intimate data. This exploratory article brings menstruapps into a feminist legal debate. It investigates the supranational European legal standards on intimate and sensitive data processing, particularly the General Data Protection Regulation. Scrutinising explicit consent according to GDPR Article 9, this paper, through (...) empirical examples, claims that current legal standards are not enforced. The standards are, furthermore, theoretically insufficient to fully safeguard data subjects’ integrity and autonomy. Instead of abandoning the concept, the article reimagines consent, using a contextual and communicative model where power relations are taken into consideration, building on the feminist concept of freedom to negotiate. (shrink)

In projects concerning big data, ethical questions need to be answered during the design process. In this paper the Value Sensitive Design method is applied in the context of data-driven health services aimed at disease prevention. It shows how Value Sensitive Design, with the use of a moral dialogue and an ethical matrix, can support the identification and operationalization of moral values that are at stake in the design of such services. It also shows that using this method can support (...) meeting the requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation. (shrink)

A growing number of consumer technology companies are aiming to convince older people that humanoid robots make helpful tools to support aging-in-place. As hybrid devices, socially assistive robots (SARs) are situated between health monitoring tools, familiar digital assistants, security aids, and more advanced AI-powered devices. Consequently, they implicate older people’s privacy in complex ways. Such devices are marketed to perform functions common to smart speakers (e.g., Amazon Echo) and smart home platforms (e.g., Google Home), while other functions are more specific (...) to older people, including health and safety monitoring and serving as companions to mitigate loneliness. Privacy is a key value central to debates about the ethics of using SARs in aged care, yet there has been very little interchange between these debates and the robust theoretical discussion in the legal literature about the future of privacy and AI governance. Drawing on two qualitative studies of older people’s views on consumer SARs, the paper contributes novel findings about older people’s thinking on privacy and data governance at the intersection of their experiences with present day digital technologies and projections for future AI systems, and places their views in dialogue with debates about the future of privacy protection and AI governance. (shrink)