RésuméJ'ai soutenu dans un article de 1985 que s'il y avait des miracles, cela parlerait contre l'existence du Dieu judéo-chrétien. Dans son livre de 1988 sur le concept de miracle, Robert Larmer propose une critique de mes arguments. J'évalue ici la force de cette critique. Je montre que la redéfinition de «miracle» que propose Larmer est circulaire; que sa distinction est spécieuse entre violer une hi naturelle et la surmonter grâce à la création ou la destruction d'énergie par Dieu; et (...) que sa tentative de montrer que les miracles sont le produit d'un être rationnel, bienfaisant et tout-puissant est inadéquate. (shrink)

In "Miracles as Evidence Against the Existence of God," (’Southern Journal of Philosophy’, 1985) Christine Overall argued that the occurrence of miracles would constitute evidence against the existence of God, on the grounds that miracles are violations of natural law or permanently inexplicable events and, as such, would be inconsistent with the supposed purposes of God. In ’Water Into Wine?’ (MacGill-Queen’s, 1988), I argued that her argument fails once a more adequate definition of miracle is adopted. In "Miracles and God: (...) A Reply to Robert A.H. Larmer" (’Dialogue’ 1997), Overall attempted to reply to my specific criticisms and to attack central theses of ’Water Into Wine?’. I argue that she is successful in neither endeavor. (shrink)

IN HIS RECENT ARTICLE "AGAINST MIRACLES" ("DIALOGUE" 25, 349-352, SUMMER 1986) JOHN COLLIER CRITICIZES MY CLAIM THAT MIRACLES, I.E., OVERRIDINGS OF NATURE BY A TRANSCENDENT AGENT, CAN TAKE PLACE IN A WORLD WHICH BEHAVES COMPLETELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF NATURE ("MIRACLES AND THE LAWS OF NATURE," "DIALOGUE" 24, SUMMER 1985). THE TWO GROUNDS HE GIVES FOR REJECTING MY VIEW ARE (1) THAT I MISUNDERSTAND HUME, AND (2) THAT I MISUNDERSTAND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSERVATION OF ENERGY. IN REPLY, I (...) ARGUE THAT BOTH HIS OBJECTIONS ARE MISTAKEN AND HE HAS NOT, THEREFORE, REFUTED MY ORIGINAL CLAIM. (shrink)

We respond to Stephen T. Davis’ criticism of our earlier essay, “Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis.” We argue that the Standard Model of physics is relevant and decisive in establishing the implausibility and low explanatory power of the Resurrection hypothesis. We also argue that the laws of physics have entailments regarding God and the supernatural and, against Alvin Plantinga, that these same laws lack the proviso “no agent supernaturally interferes.” Finally, we offer Bayesian arguments for the Legend hypothesis and against the (...) Resurrection hypothesis. (shrink)