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  1. Nash meets Samuelson: the comparative-statics interpretation of Nash equilibrium.Marek Hudik - 2022 - Journal of Economic Methodology 30 (2):122-134.
    This paper suggests that Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a conceptual tool for addressing comparative-statics issues on an aggregate level. Together with additional assumptions, Nash equilibrium helps generate testable predictions about changes or differences of behavior induced by changes or differences of exogenous variables. However, Nash-equilibrium behavior, as such, is not subject to empirical testing. Instead, widespread and persistent behavior is modeled as a Nash equilibrium by assumption. The paper argues that this interpretation is in line with the traditional (...)
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  • Cooperation, fairness and team reasoning.Hein Duijf - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (3):413-440.
    This paper examines two strands of literature regarding economic models of cooperation. First, payoff transformation theories assume that people may not be exclusively motivated by self-interest, but also care about equality and fairness. Second, team reasoning theorists assume that people might reason from the perspective of the team, rather than an individualistic perspective. Can these two theories be unified? In contrast to the consensus among team reasoning theorists, I argue that team reasoning can be viewed as a particular type of (...)
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  • Social Preferences and Context Sensitivity.Jelle De Boer - 2017 - Games 8.
    This paper is a partial review of the literature on ‘social preferences'. There are empirical findings that convincingly demonstrate the existence of social preferences, but there are also studies that indicate their fragility. So how robust are social preferences, and how exactly are they context dependent? One of the most promising insights from the literature, in my view, is an equilibrium explanation of mutually referring conditional social preferences and expectations. I use this concept of equilibrium, summarized by means of a (...)
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  • Strategic Reasoning: Building Cognitive Models from Logical Formulas.Sujata Ghosh, Ben Meijering & Rineke Verbrugge - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (1):1-29.
    This paper presents an attempt to bridge the gap between logical and cognitive treatments of strategic reasoning in games. There have been extensive formal debates about the merits of the principle of backward induction among game theorists and logicians. Experimental economists and psychologists have shown that human subjects, perhaps due to their bounded resources, do not always follow the backward induction strategy, leading to unexpected outcomes. Recently, based on an eye-tracking study, it has turned out that even human subjects who (...)
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  • Initiating coordination.Paul Weirich - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):790-801.
    How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player's utility maximization among his strategies does not suffice. This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts generates coordination yielding a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium. ‡I thank the audience at my paper's presentation at the 2006 PSA meeting for many insightful points. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy Department, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211; e-mail: [email protected].
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  • Social heuristics that make us smarter.Susan Hurley - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):585 – 612.
    I argue that an ecologically distributed conception of instrumental rationality can and should be extended to a socially distributed conception of instrumental rationality in social environments. The argument proceeds by showing that the assumption of exogenously fixed units of activity cannot be justified; different units of activity are possible and some are better means to independently given ends than others, in various circumstances. An important social heuristic, the mirror heuristic, enables the flexible formation of units of activity in game theoretic (...)
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  • A strawson–lewis defence of social preferences.Jelle de Boer - 2012 - Economics and Philosophy 28 (3):291-310.
    This paper examines a special kind of social preference, namely a preference to do one's part in a mixed-motive setting because the other party expects one to do so. I understand this expectation-based preference as a basic reactive attitude. Given this, and the fact that expectations in these circumstances are likely to be based on other people's preferences, I argue that in cooperation a special kind of equilibrium ensues, which I call a loop, with people's preferences and expectations mutually cross-referring. (...)
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  • Rationality and the Unit of Action.Christopher Woodard - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):261-277.
    This paper examines the idea of an extended unit of action, which is the idea that the reasons for or against an individual action can depend on the qualities of a larger pattern of action of which it is a part. One concept of joint action is that the unit of action can be extended in this sense. But the idea of an extended unit of action is surprisingly minimal in its commitments. The paper argues for this conclusion by examining (...)
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  • (2 other versions)The paradox of social interaction: Shared intentionality, we-reasoning, and virtual bargaining.Nick Chater, Hossam Zeitoun & Tigran Melkonyan - 2022 - Psychological Review 129 (3):415-437.
    Social interaction is both ubiquitous and central to understanding human behavior. Such interactions depend, we argue, on shared intentionality: the parties must form a common understanding of an ambiguous interaction. Yet how can shared intentionality arise? Many well-known accounts of social cognition, including those involving “mind-reading,” typically fall into circularity and/or regress. For example, A’s beliefs and behavior may depend on her prediction of B’s beliefs and behavior, but B’s beliefs and behavior depend in turn on her prediction of A’s (...)
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  • Interdisciplinary benefits of a theory of cultural evolution centered at the group-level: The emergence of macro-neuroeconomics and social evolutionary game theory.Tobias A. Mattei - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):264-265.
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  • Perspective-Taking and Depth of Theory-of-Mind Reasoning in Sequential-Move Games.Jun Zhang, Trey Hedden & Adrian Chia - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (3):560-573.
    Theory-of-mind (ToM) involves modeling an individual’s mental states to plan one’s action and to anticipate others’ actions through recursive reasoning that may be myopic (with limited recursion) or predictive (with full recursion). ToM recursion was examined using a series of two-player, sequential-move matrix games with a maximum of three steps. Participants were assigned the role of Player I, controlling the initial and the last step, or of Player II, controlling the second step. Appropriate for the assigned role, participants either anticipated (...)
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  • Revisiting the form and function of conflict: Neurobiological, psychological, and cultural mechanisms for attack and defense within and between groups.Carsten K. W. De Dreu & Jörg Gross - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42:e116.
    Conflict can profoundly affect individuals and their groups. Oftentimes, conflict involves a clash between one side seeking change and increased gains through victory and the other side defending the status quo and protecting against loss and defeat. However, theory and empirical research largely neglected these conflicts between attackers and defenders, and the strategic, social, and psychological consequences of attack and defense remain poorly understood. To fill this void, we model (1) the clashing of attack and defense as games of strategy (...)
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  • Testing Theories about Ethnic Markers.Niels Holm Jensen, Michael Bang Petersen, Henrik Høgh-Olesen & Michael Ejstrup - 2015 - Human Nature 26 (2):210-234.
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  • Team reasoning cannot be viewed as a payoff transformation.Andrew M. Colman - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):1-11.
    In a recent article in this journal, Duijf claims to have proved that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation. His formalization mimics team reasoning but ignores its essential agency switch. The possibility of such a payoff transformation was never in doubt, does not imply that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation, and makes no sense in a game in which payoffs represent players’ utilities. A theorem is proved here that a simpler and more intuitive (...)
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  • Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective.Wynn C. Stirling & Teppo Felin - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):279-308.
    Satisficing is a central concept in both individual and social multiagent decision making. In this paper we first extend the notion of satisficing by formally modeling the tradeoff between costs and decision failure. Second, we extend this notion of “neo”-satisficing into the context of social or multiagent decision making and interaction, and model the social conditioning of preferences in a satisficing framework.
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  • Overmathematisation in game theory: pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme against the Epistemic Programme.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.
    The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme. The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the twentieth century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate solution concept for any normal form and extensive game. The paper explains this in terms (...)
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  • Developing Organizational Competences for Conflict Management: The Use of the Prisoner's Dilemma in Higher Education.Andreina Bruno, Giuseppina Dell'Aversana & Gloria Guidetti - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Both your intention and mine are reflected in the kinematics of my reach-to-grasp movement.Cristina Becchio, Luisa Sartori, Maria Bulgheroni & Umberto Castiello - 2008 - Cognition 106 (2):894-912.
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