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Failure of hypothesis evaluation as a factor in delusional belief

Max Coltheart & Martin Davies

Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 26 (4): 213-230 (2021)

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In Defense of Introspective Affordances.David Miguel Gray - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.details Psychological and philosophical studies have extended J. J. Gibson’s notion of affordances. Affordances are possibilities for bodily action presented to us by the objects of our perception. Recent work has argued that we should extend the actions afforded by perception to mental action. I argue that we can extend the notion of affordance itself. What I call ‘Introspective Affordances’ are possibilities for mental action presented to us by introspectively accessible states. While there are some prima facie worries concerning the non-perceptual (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Revisiting Maher’s one-factor theory of delusion.Chenwei Nie - 2023 - Neuroethics 16 (2):1-16.details How many factors, i.e. departures from normality, are necessary to explain a delusion? Maher’s classic one-factor theory argues that the only factor is the patient’s anomalous experience, and a delusion arises as a normal explanation of this experience. The more recent two-factor theory, on the other hand, contends that a second factor is also needed, with reasoning abnormality being a potential candidate, and a delusion arises as an abnormal explanation of the anomalous experience. In the past few years, although there (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
One-factor versus two-factor theory of delusion: Replies to Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof.Chenwei Nie - forthcoming - Neuroethics.details I would like to thank Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof for their stimulating comments on my 2023 paper in Neuroethics. In this reply, I will (1) articulate some deeper disagreements that may underpin our disagreement on the nature of delusion, (2) clarify their misrepresentation of my arguments as a defence of the two-factor theory in particular, and (3) finally conduct a comparison between the Maherian one-factor theory and the two-factor theory, showing that the two-factor theory is better supported by evidence. Download Export citation Bookmark
Revisiting Maher’s One-Factor Theory of Delusion, Again.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2024 - Neuroethics 17 (1):1-8.details Chenwei Nie ([22]) argues against a Maherian one-factor approach to explaining delusion. We argue that his objections fail. They are largely based on a mistaken understanding of the approach (as committed to the claim that anomalous experience is sufficient for delusion). Where they are not so based, they instead rest on misinterpretation of recent defences of the position, and an underestimation of the resources available to the one-factor theory. Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Understanding Delusions: Evidence, Reason, and Experience.Chenwei Nie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Warwickdetails This thesis develops a novel framework for explaining delusions. In Chapter 1, I introduce the two fundamental challenges posed by delusions: the evidence challenge lies in explaining the flagrant ways delusions flout evidence; and the specificity challenge lies in explaining the fact that patients’ delusions are often about a few specific themes, and patients rarely have a wide range of delusional or odd beliefs. In Chapter 2, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of current theories of delusions, which typically appeal (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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