Kant’s criticism of democracy has been traditionally defused with the consideration that Kant’s aversion is not to democracy per se, but to direct democracy. However, what Kant says – ‘to prevent the republican constitution from being confused with the democratic one, as commonly happens’ (ZeF, 8: 351) – appears to count not only against direct democracy, but also against conceptions of democracy closer to the ones we are accustomed to. By offering a new account of what Kant sees as the (...) real problem of democracy (direct or not), the article unpacks a lesson about the limits of democracy that has gone largely unnoticed among political theorists and Kant specialists. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Because Rousseau identifies popular sovereignty with the enactment of fundamental laws, he seems to conflate popular sovereignty with constituent power: the people are sovereign because they constitute the state, without actually ruling it. However, he assigns the lawgiver, or (‘legislator’) an antecedent task that has a more obviously ‘constituent’ character – the task of constituting the people itself, as a political subject and political unity. Thus Rousseau’s lawgiver offers a template for understanding the relationship between popular sovereignty and constituent (...) power. Accordingly, I make three arguments concerning the ‘constituent’ role of the lawgiver. Firstly, I argue that Rousseau’s lawgiver belongs within a ‘realist’ tradition of constituent power, which understands the people not as the bearer of constituent power, but as its product. Secondly, since the lawgiver’s task is to alchemise peoplehood by bequeathing the people a ritual life, this helps us understand how constituent power remains ‘live’ within the social life of the republic. And thirdly, since the lawgiver effects a rupture in political time of which Rousseau judges the people itself incapable, its role is to compensate not only for the people’s incapacity to reason, but more importantly, its incapacity to act. (shrink)

Modern thinking about democracy is largely governed by the concept of constituent power. Some versions of the concept of constituent power, however, remain haunted by the spectre of totalitarianism. In this article, I outline an alternative view of the identity of the people whose constituent power generates democratic authority. Broadly speaking, constituent power signifies the idea that all political authority, including that of the constitution, must find its source in some idea of ‘the people’, whose authority is never exhausted by (...) constituted power. The deficiency I seek to address is that of asking who the people is to whom any claim of authority refers, while avoiding the pitfalls of totalitarianism. I show the most famous totalitarian view of constituent power – advanced by Carl Schmitt – to be not only politically unsavoury but also ontologically unjustified. To outline my alternative view, I draw on Jacques Derrida’s concept of just decisions to argue that the undecidable inaugurates collective responsibility by demanding a response. This suggests a view of ‘the people’ as a doing rather than a being. I conclude by showing how this avoids totalitarian views of popular sovereignty by demonstrating its congruency with Claude Lefort’s democratic theory as opposed to totalitarianism. (shrink)