I first attempt a taxonomy of meditation in traditional Indian Buddhism. Based on the main psychological or somatic function at which the meditative effort is directed, the following classes can be distinguished: (1) emotion-centered meditation (coinciding with the traditional samatha approach); (2) consciousness-centered meditation (with two subclasses: consciousness reduction/elimination and ideation obliteration); (3) reflection-centered meditation (with two subtypes: morality-directed reflection and reality-directed observation, the latter corresponding to the vipassanā method); (4) visualization-centered meditation; and (5) physiology-centered meditation. In the second part (...) of the essay I tackle the problem of the epistemic validity and happiness-engendering value of Buddhist meditation. In my highly conjectural view, the claim that meditation represents an infallible tool for realizing the (Supreme) Truth as well as a universally valid method for attaining the highest forms of happiness is largely based on the crēdō effect, that is, a placebolike process. I do not deny that meditation may have some positive effects on mental and physical health or that its practice may bring changes to the mind. Meditation may be a valuable alternative approach in life and clinical treatment, but it is far from being a must or a panacea. (shrink)

Contemplative scholarship has recently reoriented attention towards the neuroscientific study of the soteriological ambition of Buddhist practice, 'awakening'. This article evaluates the project of seeking neural correlates for awakening. Key definitional and operational issues are identified demonstrating that: the nature of awakening is highly contested both within and across Buddhist traditions; the meaning of awakening is both context- and concept-dependent; and awakening may be non-conceptual and ineffable. It is demonstrated that operationalized secular conceptions of awakening, divorced from soteriological and cultural (...) factors, have little relationship to traditional Buddhist construct(s) of awakening. This article identifies methodological issues for secular conceptions of awakening concerning introspection and neuroimaging yet demonstrates also the value of recent advancements in empirical first-person phenomenology for attenuating introspective bias. Overall, it is contended that significant problems arise when decontextualizing awakening and placing it within a scientific naturalistic framework. Careful attention to the definitional, operational, and methodological neuroscientific obstacles identified herein is required in the responsible approach to the investigation of awakening states. (shrink)

Dependent-origination, possibly the most fundamental Buddhist philosophical principle, is generally understood as a description of all that exists. Mental as well as physical phenomena are believed to come into being only in relation to, and conditioned by, other phenomena. This paper argues that such an understanding of pratītya-samutpāda is mistaken with regard to the earlier meanings of the concept. Rather than relating to all that exists, dependent-origination related originally only to processes of mental conditioning. It was an analysis of the (...) self, not of reality, embedded in the Upaniṣadic search for the ātman. The teaching also possessed important ontological implications regarding the nature of the relation between consciousness and reality. These implications suggest that rather than things being conditioned by other things, they are actually conditioned by consciousness. (shrink)

This paper evaluates several recent efforts to interpret the work of Nāgārjuna through the lens of modern symbolic logic. An attempt is made to uncover the premises that justify the use of symbolic logic for this purpose. This is accomplished through a discussion of (1) the historical origins of those premises in the Indian and Tibetan traditions, and (2) how such assumptions prejudice our understanding of Nāgā rjuna’s insistence that he has no “proposition” (pratijñā). Finally, the paper sets forth an (...) alternative interpretation that takes into account the literary dimensions of Nāgārjuna’s writing. (shrink)

In the Indian philosophical debate, the relationship between the structure of knowledge and external reality has been a persistent issue. This debate has been particularly prominent in Buddhism, as evidenced by the earliest Buddhist attestations in the Pāli canon, where reality is described as a perceptual defection. The world (loka) is perceived through cognition (citta), and the theme of designation (paññatti) is central to the analysis of the Abhidhamma. Buddhism can be viewed as navigating between nominalism and cognitive normativism, as (...) it deconstructs language, which is seen as an obfuscating element that separates the subject from the world. In this article, we explore these issues through a philosophical dialogue between Early Buddhism, Abhidhamma, and Madhyamaka, utilizing methodological tools from Western philosophical traditions, both ancient and modern. We engage in a clash between nihilism and absolutism, in search of the substantiality of entities, which, behind the emptiness of conventional designations, conceals a complex fractal network of pansematism. (shrink)

In the paper a comparative analysis of Chan Buddhist meditation and the early Buddhist meditation has been conducted. In the first part the meditational instructions present in Zuochan yi and the corresponding texts of Chinese Buddhism have been demonstrated. Subsequently, based on those texts, the ideal type of Chan Buddhist meditation is created. The second part consists of the analysis of Aṭṭhaka‑vagga with the corresponding motifs from the other Pali Canon Suttas. The last part consists of a comparative analysis of (...) the ideal type of Chan Buddhist meditation and meditation as shown in Aṭṭhaka‑vagga. The whole of the analysis aims at demonstrating the topos common for the early Buddhist tradition and Chan Buddhism. (shrink)

El objetivo principal del ensayo es intentar entender el significado del silencio del Buddha ante las diez proposiciones sin declarar. Si se consideran como di††hi, las preguntas sin declarar son simplemente un conjunto de proposiciones conceptualmente distorsionadas. El trabajo se ha dividido en cinco secciones. En las dos primeras se presenta la explicación del Buddha de su propio silencio. Tienen un alcance meramente expositivo con el objeto de situar la discusión en los términos en que fue originariamente planteada. La tercera (...) parte explica los mecanismos mentales que intervienen en la generación mental de patrones mentales distorsionados. El papel que desempeña papañca en el desarrollo de las tendencias subyacentes y la aparición de efluvios mentales se ha desarrollado en la cuarta parte. Finalmente, se presenta el silencio del Buddha como la respuesta que es consistente con el conjunto de principios doctrinales que él mismo declaró. (shrink)

Norman in 1969 emphasised a linguistic difference between the Vedic compound yogakṣema- interpreted as a dvandva and the widely distributed Early Buddhist compound yogakkhema-, analysed as a tatpuruṣa “rest from exertion”. On the basis of our analysis of the relevant Pali sources and of the more ancient Vedic occurrences—some of which are quite far from the earliest denotation of the two cyclic phases of the assumed semi-nomadic Indo-Āryan life—we have undertaken a classification of the several meanings of this compound, in (...) order to distinguish their different facets and to enable us to easily bring about the comparison proposed by Norman in 1969 and in 1993 [1991]. Unlike Norman, we eventually postulated a common reading of this compound as a tatpuruṣa originally denoting an almost material target of welfare, from which both the Brāhmaṇic and the Buddhist usages, whose meaning is predominantly immaterial, might have developed. (shrink)

In this article I look at the Buddha's refusal to answer certain questions in light of the dynamics of ancient Indian debate. Doing so foregrounds a dimension of the Buddha's interaction with his interlocutors that is central for understanding the problem of what are known as the Undetermined or Unanswered Questions: namely, the Buddha's knowledge and authority vis-à-vis rival teachers.

A close reading of the three Bhavanakramah texts, written by Kamalasila, reveals that their author was aware of two competing concepts of meditation prevalent in Tibet at the time of their composition. The two concepts of meditation,associated with the Sanskrit words bhavana and dhyana, can be related respectively to the Indian and Chinese sides of the well-known debates at bSam yas. The account of the Mahayana path outlined in these texts implies an acceptance of the precedence of bhavana over dhyana. (...) In this paper I argue that Kamalasila advocated bhavana – a conception of meditation which encompasses non-conceptual dhyana, but which also includes a discernment of reality that is conceptual in nature. Such conceptual discernment should not be understood simply as a process of ordinary rational understanding but rather as constituting a special kind of meditative wisdom. A failure to recognize the subtle differences between Kamalasila’s employment of the terms dhyana and bhavana, along with his advocacy of the latter, could easily lead to mistranslation and, with this, a basic misunderstanding of his position. In particular, it could lead to a conception of insight that is overly intellectual in nature. Given the historically important role that these texts played in the formation of Tibetan Buddhism, the implications of such a misconception could be far-reaching. This paper attempts to clarify the key meditation terminology found in the Bhavanakramas as well as demonstrate the rationale for using ‘meditation’ as the default translation for bhavana. (shrink)

Buddhist account of consciousness provides a new way of looking into contemplation, where absorption into meditation does not only bring in changes in the neural level but in the very personality of the individual, turning him into a good human being. The Buddhists recommend the practice of vipassanā, literally meaning insight but actually standing for the realization of the supreme enlightenment breaking off all the internal fetters through the practice of seven different types of purity, such as purity of morals, (...) mind, views, and insight, etc. In early and later Buddhist literature, it has been categorically emphasized that one should not practice solitary mindfulness but should practice enriching the higher qualities of the mind such as compassion, friendliness, etc. The point is that the contemplated individual, the Bodhisattva, should possess the perfection of wisdom and be equipped with the skill of upāyas. The practice of these upāyas, however, will not create any new bondage for the contemplative mind. When the individual is able to attain this broad outlook, he will be said to achieve the highest contemplation – this is the ultimate objective of Buddhist meditation. Meditation is needed for this change of outlook – transition from “I” to “we”. This is the only way to bring peace of mind and peace to the whole world. (shrink)

It is widely believed, that the Buddha practiced the most radical forms of asceticism and self‑mortification prior to his awakening. A critical analysis of the suttas depicting that crucial period of his life shows, however, that the only text which portrays the bodhisatta as a foremost ascetic is the Māhasīhanāda Sutta. The aim of this paper is to examine the issue of the authenticity of this text and thus to answer the question as to whether there is enough ground to (...) claim that the Buddha was an ascetic at all. Through a comparative analysis, I show that the structure and content of the Māhasīhanāda Sutta cannot be reconciled with other suttas from the MajjhimaNikāya, which describe the bodhisatta’s path to awakening. I point out certain late features of the Māhasīhanāda Sutta. Then, through a comparative analysis I try to show that some parts of the Buddhist text may have been borrowed from the Jain yāraṃga Sutta. Next, I attempt to reinterpret the term attakilamathānuyogo from the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta in such a way which will not pertain to asceticism. In the final part of the paper, I try to explain how the view that the Buddha was a foremost ascetic prior to his awakening could have arisen. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to examine the meditation practices of Chinese Buddhists during the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on their motivation and activities, and the health benefits derived from meditation. Initially, the article delves into the motivations driving Chinese Buddhists to practise meditation. Subsequently, it explores the meditation-related activities undertaken by Chinese Buddhists. The article also investigates the role of faith in fostering resilience within the Chinese Buddhist community by exploring the medical benefits of meditation, with special emphasis (...) on its effectiveness in alleviating health issues stemming from the COVID-19 outbreak. This article reveals that the motivation for practising meditation arises from the aspiration to attain enlightenment in accordance with Buddhist teachings and that the meditation-related activities not only spread across major Chinese Buddhist communities worldwide but also serve as a source of solace for followers grappling with the challenges posed by the pandemic. Additionally, the article provides strong evidence to support that meditation-based interventions have positive effects on mental and physical health problems caused by the pandemic. (shrink)

The relation of the meditative state of jhāna to the development of insight and liberating knowledge is one of the most controversial issues in studies on early Buddhism. In the Suttapitaka and later Buddhist meditative texts, one can find discrepancies which are difficult to reconcile. In this paper, I propose a new model of meditative insight using an interdisciplinary approach based both on critical philological studies of the Suttapitaka and the results of the dynamically developing cognitive science. I also highlight (...) and examine the difficulties related to the traditional Buddhist model of insight. In order to propose a plausible model of insight as an element organically linked to jhāna, I refer to several new developments in the field of cognitive science. (shrink)