Ordinary arguments from authority have the following structure: A says p; A is authoritative on such things; so p. Legal actors use such arguments whenever they ground their decisions on the sheer “say-so” of legislators, judges, scholars, expert witnesses, and so on. This paper focuses on arguments appealing to the authority of scholars, “doctrinal” or “dogmatic” legal scholars in particular. Appeal to doctrinal authority is a puzzling feature of legal argumentation. In what sense are doctrinal scholars “authorities”? Is p, as (...) advanced by a scholar, descriptive or prescriptive? Is scholarly authority grounded on expertise or something different? The paper addresses these questions. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that many arguments from expert opinion are strong arguments. Therefore, in many cases it is rational to rely on experts since in many cases the fact that an expert says that p makes it highly likely that p is true. I will defend this claim by providing 5 arguments that illuminate and elaborate on 5 crucial claims about expertise. In this way, I aim to undermine recent attempts to establish a rampant scepticism about arguments from (...) expert opinion. (shrink)

John Locke, long associated with the “standard” approach to fallacies and the “logical” approach to valid inference, had both logical and dialectical reasons for favoring certain proofs and denigrating others. While the logical approach to argumentation stands forth in Locke’s philosophical writings, a dialectical approach can be found in his contributions to public controversies regarding religion and toleration. Understanding Locke’s dialectical approach to argumentation not only makes his work more relevant to the contemporary discipline of informal logic, but this understanding (...) also prompts a reconsideration of Locke’s rhetorical purpose. He approached argumentation dialectically because he wanted to appeal to a universal audience of free rational subjects, people not unlike the real historical audience whom Locke addressed: radical Whigs, latitudinarian Anglicans, early-Enlightenment philosophes. (shrink)

Debunking arguments are arguments that seek to undermine a belief or doctrine by exposing its causal origins. Two prominent proponents of such arguments are the utilitarians Joshua Greene and Peter Singer. They draw on evidence from moral psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory in an effort to show that there is something wrong with how deontological judgments are typically formed and with where our deontological intuitions come from. They offer debunking explanations of our emotion-driven deontological intuitions and dismiss complex deontological theories (...) as products of confabulatory post hoc rationalization. Through my discussion of Greene and Singer’s empirically informed debunking of deontology, I introduce the distinction between two different types of debunking arguments. The first type of debunking argument operates through regular undercutting defeat, whereas the second type relies on higher-order evidence. I argue that the latter type of debunking argument, of which the argument from confabulation is an example, is objectionably sloppy and therefore inadmissible in academic discussion. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to continue the analysis of the appeal to authority begun at the last OSSA conference. I proceed by examining the well-documented use of the appeal made by the ancient Roman advocate, Cicero. The fact that Cicero expressed his opinion was expectably sufficient to give his auditors--responsible citizens all--reason to do as he desired. But why? The resolution of this puzzle points to a strong sense in which arguments can be called rhetorical , for the rational (...) force of Cicero's authority depends necessarily on what he says. (shrink)

An argument developed by Michael Huemer raises doubts about the epistemic responsibility of taking a ‘critical thinking’ approach to belief formation. This paper takes issue with Huemer’s depiction of critical thinking as an approach that rejects all reliance on the intellectual authority of others, and it offers a more realistic depiction. The paper ultimately contends that Huemer’s argument fails because it rests on an impoverished and unaccountably individualistic notion of epistemic responsibility.

My real position is that logic is a mere sub-branch of rhetoric, but in this paper I only try to show an area of overlap. Certain usages in logical work are metaphorical, and I argue that this has pernicious effects in a discipline assumed strictly literal. Among these pernicious effects are the bizarre and fruitless focus of philosophy of mathematics on the pseudo-problems of foundations and objects. I mostly examine the locution 'logical construction' and a range of associated metaphors. Some (...) sketchy remarks on the history of rhetoric are offered in explanation. (shrink)

If we think of fallacies as violations of the preconditions governing the products, processes, and procedures of argumentation, we see that fallacies do not merely weaken arguments, but rather undermine the possibility of argument itself. This approac h recommends itself on several counts. First, it accounts for diversity in fallacy analysis. Second, it makes possible investigations into new kinds of fallacies. Third, it provides new applications for ongoing developments in fallacy theory.