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  1. Compressed Environments: Unbounded Optimizers Should Sometimes Ignore Information. [REVIEW]Nathan Berg & Ulrich Hoffrage - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (2):259-275.
    Given free information and unlimited processing power, should decision algorithms use as much information as possible? A formal model of the decision-making environment is developed to address this question and provide conditions under which informationally frugal algorithms, without any information or processing costs whatsoever, are optimal. One cause of compression that allows optimal algorithms to rationally ignore information is inverse movement of payoffs and probabilities (e.g., high payoffs occur with low probably and low payoffs occur with high probability). If inversely (...)
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  • Decision theory, intelligent planning and counterfactuals.Michael John Shaffer - 2008 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):61-92.
    The ontology of decision theory has been subject to considerable debate in the past, and discussion of just how we ought to view decision problems has revealed more than one interesting problem, as well as suggested some novel modifications of classical decision theory. In this paper it will be argued that Bayesian, or evidential, decision-theoretic characterizations of decision situations fail to adequately account for knowledge concerning the causal connections between acts, states, and outcomes in decision situations, and so they are (...)
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  • Satisficing revisited.Michael A. Goodrich, Wynn C. Stirling & Erwin R. Boer - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (1):79-109.
    In the debate between simple inference heuristics and complex decision mechanisms, we take a position squarely in the middle. A decision making process that extends to both naturalistic and novel settings should extend beyond the confines of this debate; both simple heuristics and complex mechanisms are cognitive skills adapted to and appropriate for some circumstances but not for others. Rather than ask `Which skill is better?'' it is often more important to ask `When is a skill justified?'' The selection and (...)
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  • Simple inference heuristics versus complex decision machines.Peter M. Todd - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (4):461-477.
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  • Made to measure: Ecological rationality in structured environments. [REVIEW]Seth Bullock & Peter M. Todd - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (4):497-541.
    A working assumption that processes of natural and cultural evolution have tailored the mind to fit the demands and structure of its environment begs the question: how are we to characterize the structure of cognitive environments? Decision problems faced by real organisms are not like simple multiple-choice examination papers. For example, some individual problems may occur much more frequently than others, whilst some may carry much more weight than others. Such considerations are not taken into account when (i) the performance (...)
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