This paper argues that the idea of “self-recognition” is fruitful for a critical theory of recognition like the one found in Axel Honneth’s work. Yet, it has repeatedly been ignored both by Honneth himself and by the secondary literature. By contrast, I submit that it can productively contribute to a better approach to some of the problems and paradoxes present in this author’s model, particularly those derived from an excessively intersubjective, psychologistic perspective. There are several phenomena that, to my mind, (...) could be better explained by means of the idea of “self-recognition”, among them, the origin of recognition struggles, the distinction between justified and unjustified demands for recognition, and the normativity of our practical self-relation. Although I do not intend to develop a complete taxonomy, I propose that “self-recognition” is relevant for a critical theory of recognition (and for social theory in general) in at least two senses: as “normative self-understanding” of the subject and as “knowing oneself in the other”, where the “other” is either a material object, person or social institution. (shrink)