Ulrika Carlsson has argued that it its justified to harbor non-moral resentment towards a person with whom one is unrequitedly in love. Anca Gheaus has rejected this with convincing arguments. This text explores the question of whether Gheaus’ verdict changes if the person being loved has previously flirted with the loving person. For this, it is first relevant what flirting actually is and how it relates to falling in love and love. On this basis, it is argued here that in (...) the case of flirting, the non-moral resentment of the loved person defended by Carlsson is appropriate. By flirting, he or she has contributed to the unrequited love, even if he or she cannot be held responsible for it in a moral sense. (shrink)

Discussions around progress, that have always been at the core of critical social and political philosophy, have lately become particularly thorny, exposing a sort of double bind: arguments in favour of progress are unable to avoid positions that undermine progress itself, but rejection of progress risks giving in to reactionary, cynic or melancholic positions.In this paper, I formulate the hypothesis that the double bind depends on a sort of unhealthy “obsession” with normative criteria of progress. As a corrective, I propose (...) to think of moral, social and political changes in the terms of what I call troubled normativity – a normative reflection, namely, that embraces conflicts, ambivalences, uncertainty. I discuss in this regard two recent perspectives on progress, Rahel Jaeggi’s pragmatist and Amy Allen’s genealogical-psychoanalytical ones. I further articulate their insights by taking into consideration the affective dimension of social transformations. I concentrate in particular on two emotional constellations, anger and hope, by drawing upon María Lugones’ and Jonathan Lear’s work. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 4, April 2022.

In order for the concept, 'recognition', to play a critical role in social theory, it must be possible to draw a distinction between due recognition and failures of recognition. Some recognition theorists, including Axel Honneth, argue that this distinction can be preserved only if we presuppose that due recognition involves a rational response to "evaluative qualities" that can be rightly perceived in the context of social interaction. This paper points out a problem facing recent defenses of this "perception model" and (...) proposes a solution. I begin by making explicit three criteria broadly shared by recognition theorists: an adequate theory of recognition must be (a) critical, capable of drawing a distinction between due recognition and recognitive failure; (b) minimally idealist, able to accommodate the mediating role of subjectivity in human receptivity to value; and (c) historicist, should not rule out a priori that the values involved in recognitive practice are historically emergent. I then argue that Honneth's version of the perception model cannot fulfill these criteria simultaneously. Drawing upon an Aristotelian notion of evaluative perception and working through an example from Zadie Smith's On Beauty, I defend an alternative view that is, I argue, better equipped to meet these three criteria. (shrink)