Abstract This article seeks to determine if Buddhism can best be understood as primarily a functionalist tradition. In pursuing this, some analogies arise with various Western strands?particularly James? ?pragmatism?, Dewey's ?instrumentalism?, Braithwaite's ?empiricism?, Wittgenstein's ?language games?, and process thinkers like Hartshorne and Jacobson. Within the Buddhist setting, the traditional Therav?da framework of sila (ethics/precepts), sam?dhi (meditation) and pañña (wisdom) are examined, together with Therav?da rituals. Despite some ?correspondence? approaches with regard to truth claim statements, e.g. vipassan? ?insight? and Abhidharma analysis, (...) a more profound functionalism seems present. This is even more clear with the Mah?y?na. Apart from the basic and explicit Mah?y?na underpinning of up?ya, the M?dhyamika, Tantras and Ch'an (Zen) schools are clearly functionalist. Moreover, despite initially seeming more ?absolutist? in their positions, other strands like the Pure Land and Nichiren faith traditions, and Dharmakirti's Vijñ?nav?da epistemology can also be tied into this functionalist setting. (shrink)

In many philosophical traditions, it is held that reality is non-dual. Of course, to be non-dual, as opposed to dual, is itself to partake of a certain duality. If reality really is non-dual, it must transcend this duality too. But what could this mean? Can one make coherent sense of it? To keep the discussion focussed, I will locate it in one specific tradition: the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition. The idea that ultimate reality is non-dual goes back to the earliest Mahāyāna (...) sūtras at the turn of the Common Era. Thereafter, the question of what it means to transcend duality plays a central role in Buddhist philosophy. The point that reality must transcend even the duality between duality and non-duality plays a significant role in the Chinese Sanlun philosopher Jizang (, 549–623). His discussion points the way to an answer to our problem which may be articulated with the techniques of contemporary paraconsistent logic, as we will see. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDaoism, especially classical Daoism, is often constructed as a ‘philosophy,’ ‘set of ideas,’ or ‘system of thought.’ This is particularly the case in studies of Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy. The present article draws attention to the central importance of clarity and stillness as a Daoist form of meditative practice, contemplative experience, and way of being. Examining historical precedents in classical Daoism, the article gives particular attention to the Tang dynasty ‘Clarity-and-Stillness Literature,’ specifically the eighth-century Qingjing jing 清靜經. In the (...) process, one finds that qingjing is one of the major connective strands throughout the Daoist tradition, a connective strand that reveals the central importance of embodied, experiential, and applied dimensions of human being from a Daoist perspective. (shrink)

The Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra criticizes the traditional practice of dwelling in an isolated place for self-cultivation and advocates returning to the human realm with a liberated mind and compassionate engagement. This new theory of detachment aims at defining the Bodhisattva, a new ideal character, for the rising Mahāyāna movement. In his theory of eremitism at court, Guo Xiang 郭象 describes a sage image of governing the empire with a detached mind. This image is invested with the concept of self-liberation from (...) reality and defines a new ideal character that actively engages in sociopolitical affairs while becoming freed from personal concerns. Guo Xiang’s sage image is similar to the Bodhisattva image in several aspects, and textual and historical evidence shows that Guo likely read the two early translations of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā and other Buddhist texts and was influenced by them to a certain extent. With the influence of Buddhist ideas, Guo completed the Mysterious Learning’s mission of harmonizing the teaching of names with spontaneity. (shrink)

Seeing of emptiness and mystical experience — the case of Madhyamaka: The problem of Buddhist religiosity is one of the most classic problems of Buddhist studies. A particular version of this issue is the search for mystical experience in Buddhism. This is due to the conviction that mystical experience is the essence of religious experience itself. The discovery of such an alleged experience fuels comparative speculations between Buddhism and the philosophical and religious traditions of the Mediterranean area. Madhyamaka is the (...) Buddhist tradition which many researchers saw as the fulfillment of such mystical aspirations in Buddhism. In this paper I specify the standard parameters of mystical experience (non‑conceptuality, ineffability, paradoxicality, silence, oneness, fullness) and I conclude that they either cannot be applied to Madhyamaka or that the application is only illusory. (shrink)

Mahāyāna sūtras are obviously texts in the conventional sense of the word, but how they work as texts, the purposes they serve, and the manner in which they are constructed have so far attracted comparatively little sustained theoretical attention of the sort that goes beyond specific examples. This paper addresses itself to two well-known formal features of this voluminous genre which have yet to receive the critical reflection they deserve. The first is a pervasive self-referentiality, taking various forms, some of (...) them fairly straightforward, even banal, others highly challenging and paradoxical in their effect. The second feature is the use of formulas and lists, not singly, but in combination, in a way which expands a theme along two or more axes or vectors concurrently. These two features, while by no means exhaustive of all the things that make Mahāyāna sūtras the distinctive type of scripture they are, provide evidence of a passion for complexity which seems to be part of their DNA. Intensely generative of ever greater amounts of text, these features blur and even erase the boundaries between the creators of texts, the writers and speakers, and their consumers, the readers and hearers. In this paper they are explored with special reference to a small number of sūtras, some of which are demonstrably early productions of the Mahāyāna movement. (shrink)

This work will argue that Mahāyāna philosophy need not result in endorsement of some cosmic Absolute in the vein of the Advaitin ātman-Brahman. Scholars such as Bhattacharya, Albahari and Murti argue that the Buddha at no point denied the existence of a cosmic ātman, and instead only denied a localised, individual ātman (what amounts to a jīva). The idea behind this, then, is that the Buddha was in effect an Advaitin, analysing experience and advocating liberation in an Advaitin sense: through (...) a rejection of the individual ātman and knowledge (jñāna) of and immersion into the universal ātman-Brahman. I will explore how different religious traditions define and shape the Absolute according to their own religious convictions, illustrating a divergence in conception from the very start, before exploring key differences between the Advaitin conception of the Absolute as put forth by Śaṅkara and as defended by Bhattacharya in The Ātman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism. I then challenge Bhattacharya’s claims that prajñāpāramitā literature necessarily endorses the ātman-Brahman and that Mahāyāna philosophies reorientate Buddhists towards the truth of the ātman-Brahman. I do this by arguing that there are viable interpretations of Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra and Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka that do not advocate such a belief, that prajñāpāramitā literature can be viewed as a project in episteme rather than ontology, and that we need not find a ground of the same sort as the ātman-Brahman in the Buddhist flux of experience. I conclude by showing that whilst Absolutism is a theme in some schools of Buddhism, it need not be – contra Bhattacharya – the conclusion of two major Mahāyāna philosophies. (shrink)

Western scholarship and culture usually ignore the contributions from other civilizations, in the field of education even more clearly than anywhere else. While the advocates of integral education, for instance, pay attention to the Western pedagogues only, there has been a profound educational philosophy in other contexts such as the Indian or the Buddhist. This paper tries to open the Western educational scenario to the Buddhist tradition in particular, outlining some achievements like the Buddhist university of Nalanda that can certainly (...) inspire and enrich the educational world, in Asia or in the West. Hence, this introductory paper wishes to contribute to the needed intercultural dialogue in Western education and scholarship. (shrink)