Common sense takes the physical world to be populated by mind-independent particulars. Why and with what right do we hold this view? Early phenomenologists argue that the common sense view is our natural starting point because we experience objects as mind-independent. While it seems unsurprising that one can perceive an object being red or square, the claim that one can experience an object as mind-independent is controversial. In this paper I will articulate and defend the claim that we can experience (...) mind-independence by mainly drawing on the work of the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker who, in turn, built on Husserl’s work. In the development of this claim the notion of a limit – either a maximum or minimum – of perception will play an important role. (shrink)

This dissertation engages in a critical analysis of the work of Adolf Reinach in the theory of knowledge and legal philosophy. Reinach had trained as a lawyer and brought that perspective and experience to bear in his phenomenological work on problems in evidence and legal philosophy. His contributions to phenomenology in the early 20th century provide a window into the earliest phases of the development of the phenomenological movement, prior to World War I. This dissertation locates this work in the (...) European intellectual context of the era and finds analogies with key philosophical dilemmas and developments in England during the same period, arguably ones with shared intellectual roots. Valued for his talent as an inspiring university lecturer, Reinach was a central figure in the circle of young scholars who practiced phenomenology in the spirit of the "early" "pre-Ideen" phase of phenomenology. The dissertation Appendices include translations of selected excerpts from the Nachlass. My translation of the obituary Edmund Husserl wrote and published following Adolf Reinach's death in WWI is published separately. Professor Raymond Klibansky was my supervisor and mentor throughout. (shrink)

The special importance of the system of Hedwig Conrad-Martius lies in that she takes up the ideas of her teacher Husserl and pursues them on an independent path of phenomenology carefully anchored in the history of philosophy. This above all made possible the philosophical grasping of the then revolutionary findings in the modern natural sciences, especially in physics and medicine. The question concerning the border between the natural sciences and philosophy is today still debated with just as much urgency—indeed, ethically (...) with even more urgency—as it was in her time. By virtue of this alone, her ideas can be of great help to us. The natural scientific progress made since her time does not, however, present a barrier; rather it corresponds to the spirit of phenomenology: not to produce results with rigid intellectual frameworks, but to make available a tool with which the world in its diversity—and thus also for its modern, ever-changing issues—can be disclosed ever anew. The essay will consist of an overview of the life of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, an introduction to the essential ideas of her work: her concept of essence and her formulation of phenomenological ideation [Wesensschau], a brief sketch of her epistemology and an exposition of her ontological conception of “real ontology” [Realontologie]. (shrink)

Although the connections of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ ontological phenomenology, what she called, “realontology,” to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology were constant concerns that usually remained in the background of her work, on occasion they became foreground. Similarly the problems surrounding the individuation of the person and spirit were persistent but rather marginal in her writings. In this paper I want first to review some of the issues as they are connected to ontological and transcendental phenomenology. Then I want to relate them to the (...) cosmological and theological issues that were no less important for Conrad-Martius. (shrink)