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  1. Disability, Humanity, and Personhood: A Survey of Moral Concepts.D. Christopher Ralston & Justin Ho - 2007 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 32 (6):619 – 633.
    Three of the articles included in this issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy - Ron Amundson and Shari Tresky's "On a Bioethical Challenge to Disability Rights"; Rachel Cooper's "Can It Be a Good Thing to Be Deaf?"; and Mark T. Brown's "The Potential of the Human Embryo" - interact (in various ways) with the concepts of disability, humanity, and personhood and their normative dimensions. As one peruses these articles, it becomes apparent that terms like "disability," "human being," and (...)
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  • Are Culture-Bound Syndromes as Real as Universally-Occurring Disorders?Rachel Cooper - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 41 (4):325-332.
    This paper asks what it means to say that a disorder is a “real” disorder and then considers whether culture-bound syndromes are real disorders. Following J.L. Austin I note that when we ask whether some supposed culture-bound syndrome is a real disorder we should start by specifying what possible alternatives we have in mind. We might be asking whether the reported behaviours genuinely occur, that is, whether the culture-bound syndrome is a genuine phenomenon as opposed to a myth. We might (...)
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  • Cultura bioética y conceptos de enfermedad: el caso House.Antonio Casado da Rocha & Cristian Saborido - 2010 - Isegoría 42:279-295.
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  • Tolerance and Illness: The Politics of Medical and Psychiatric Classification.S. N. Glackin - 2010 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (4):449-465.
    In this paper, I explore the links between liberal political theory and the evaluative nature of medical classification, arguing for stronger recognition of those links in a liberal model of medical practice. All judgments of medical or psychiatric "dysfunction," I argue, are fundamentally evaluative, reflecting our collective willingness or reluctance to tolerate and/or accommodate the conditions in question. Illness, then, is "socially constructed." But the relativist worries that this loaded phrase evokes are unfounded; patients, doctors, and communities will agree in (...)
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