ABSTRACT This article maintains that in Stoicism physics depends epistemologically on ethics because the theological theses (which are part of stoic physics) about that the gods are beneficial and care about human beings depend on knowledge of the ethical realm of philosophy to be sustained or established forcefully. It is possible appreciate that dependence in the response Stoics would have given to the criticism of other philosophical schools to some of the Stoic theological theses. This is not a minor issue, (...) because the question about whether there are foundational relationships between ethics and physics or not depends on it. The proposal in this article intends to support the negative answer to this question under discussion in contemporary studies on Stoicism. (shrink)

The rediscovery of Hellenistic philosophy in the English-speaking world over the last thirty years has rejuvenated the study of ancient philosophy, and reinforced its significance for contemporary philosophy. Rather than being dim reflections of Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics and skeptics—and perhaps less often, the Epicureans—have turned out to be brilliant critics, giving us, for example, nominalism, propostional logic, a cognitivist account of the emotions, a causal theory of knowledge, a sophisticated form of skepticism, and several more refined versions of (...) eudaimonistic virtue ethics. The two works under review, both collections of essays from the 1970s to the 1990s, represent a selection of the major contributions to this rediscovery by two of its initiators. (shrink)

For thirty years now there has been considerable debate concerning the foundations of modern natural law theory, with Richard Tuck emphasising the role self-preservation plays in anchoring Grotius's system and his critics pointing to the contribution of a principle of sociability. With reference to recent contributions in the literature on Stoicism from Julia Annas, A. A. Long and Tad Brennan, I argue that Grotius's use of the outline of Stoic ethics from Book III of Cicero's De finibus is crucial for (...) understanding the nature of his argument. Drawing on Cicero's presentation of the Stoics' oikeiosis helps Grotius to generate an argument which issues not in any demand for altruism, charity or mutual aid, but rather for organising justice around very strong protections for private property. The argument remains one about human sociability, however, and ought not to be mistaken for an account of self-interest, nor for a doctrine with substantially Epicurean roots. (shrink)