This article sets out by distinguishing Wittgenstein’s own views in the philosophy of religion from a school of thought in the philosophy of religion that relies on later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. After a survey of distinguishing features of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, the third section explores Wittgenstein’s treatment of Frazer’s account of magic among primitive peoples. The following section offers an account of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, including the use of the notions of a language game and superstition. I conclude (...) by criticizing a very influential argument of Wittgenstein’s to the effect that the meaning of words like ‘belief’ and ‘object’ varies from context to context without having any one thing in common. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's remarks on religion suggest a provocative and nuanced account of what makes rituals meaningful — and why some living rituals might have little or no meaning despite their hold on congregants. Wittgenstein's view has been obscured, I argue, in part by the consistent misinterpretation of his controversial 'scapegoat remark', which has been taken to be a comment on the internal incoherence of the ancient Jewish scapegoat rite. In fact, Wittgenstein's point is that the scapegoat ritual is particularly easy to (...) misinterpret, and so reflection on it helps illustrate the sort of confusion that plagues much thinking about religion and ritual. (shrink)

In a secularized society all metaphysical issues seem to be refused in name of a scientific approach that rejects any other interpretations of reality. Purely technical measures and instruments, albeit important, cannot substitute for an integral approach to the human development, whose primary and unifying factor is human dignity in a rich interdependence with anthropological and religious elements. In a context of intercultural and interreligious relations, a rediscovery of our common nature can be a first step to-wards a better mutual (...) understanding and a sound encounter. On this basis, dialogue plays a fundamental role and it can be developed in the light of trust, shared values and respon-sibilities. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s writings on religious and magical beliefs, especially the “Lectures on Religious Belief” and “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough” are taken to imply semantic incommensurability and inaccessibility by the Wittgensteinian Fideism and, in part, the expressivist interpretation. According to these interpretations, religious and non-religious discourses are self-contained, closed, and not intertranslatable. Wittgenstein is taken to deny mutual understanding between believers and non-believers with respect to religious and magical discourse. I argue against such interpretations and support readings by Kusch, Schroeder, and (...) Tripodi that are optimistic of the possibility of mutual understanding. Nevertheless, there is a danger of scepticism for such optimistic readings when they refer to a special attitude that is needed to understand religious belief and speech. I offer a reply to this problem and suggest to see Wittgenstein’s stance on understanding religious discourse in a greater proximity to his general views about language in his later writings. Then, however, any fideist view of the religious form of life as self-contained and isolated from the non-religious has to be repudiated. (shrink)

This article argues that wittgenstein's account of religious belief is fundamentally defective because he treats religion as a language-Game and holds that language-Games arise spontaneously from prelinguistic (or primitive) reactions, And yet such reactions as wittgenstein postulates are a philosophical myth. It is further argued that his treatment of several other philosophical issues, Such as induction, Are infected with the same mistake. Wittgenstein's view of language, It is argued, Is basically behavioristic. Defenses of wittgenstein's account of religious belief by peter (...) winch and d z phillips are given particular attention. (shrink)