In [HKL00] (henceforth HKL), Hamm, Kamp and van Lambalgen declare ‘‘there is no opposition between formal and cognitive semantics,’’ notwithstanding the realist/mentalist divide. That divide separates two sides Jackendo¤ has (in [Jac96], following Chomsky) labeled E(xternalized)-semantics, relating language to a reality independent of speakers, and I(nternalized)-semantics, revolving around mental representations and thought. Although formal semanticists have (following David Lewis) traditionally leaned towards E-semantics, it is reasonable to apply formal methods also to I-semantics. This point is made clear in HKL via (...) two computational approaches to natural language semantics, Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, [KR93]) and the Event Calculus (EC) presented in [LH05]. In this short note, I wish to raise certain questions about EC that can be traced to the applicability of formal methods to E-semantics and I-semantics alike. These opposing orientations suggest di¤erent notions of time, event and representation. (shrink)

In a recent paper Asher and Pustejovsky propose a type theoretical approach to account for cases of copredication which had motivated Pustejovsky to introduce dot types in the Generative Lexicon. In this paper I will propose an alternative treatment to that given by Asher and Pustejovsky using type theory with records. I will suggest that using record types not only gives us a simple and intuitive account of dot types but also makes an important connection between copredication and the use (...) of hypothetical contexts in dynamic generalized quantifiers I have proposed in earlier work. More generally it allows us to preserve the intuitive feature structure based accounts of lexical analysis proposed in Pustejovsky’s original work on the Generative Lexicon while at the same time introducing functions and binding in the way that is necessary for giving formal accounts of compositional semantics. (shrink)

Paulina Sliwa (2015) argues that knowing why p is necessary and sufficient for understanding why p. She tries to rebut recent attacks against the necessity and sufficiency claims, and explains the gradability of understanding why in terms of knowledge. I argue that her attempts do not succeed, but I indicate more promising ways to defend reductionism about understanding why throughout the discussion.

In formal semantics based on modern type theories, some sentences may be interpreted as judgements and some as logical propositions. When interpreting composite sentences, one may want to turn a judgemental interpretation or an ill-typed semantic interpretation into a proposition in order to obtain an intended semantics. For instance, an incorrect judgement $$a:A$$ may be turned into its propositional form $$\textsc {is}(A,a)$$ and an ill-typed application p(a) into $$\textsc {do}(p,a)$$, so that the propositional forms can take part in logical compositions (...) that interpret composite sentences, especially those that involve negations and conditionals.In this paper, we propose an operator not that facilitates such a transformation. Introducing not axiomatically, with five axiomatic laws to govern its behaviour, we shall use it to define $$\textsc {is}$$ and $$\textsc {do}$$ and give examples to illustrate its use in semantic interpretation. The introduction of not into type theories is logically consistent – this is justified by showing that not can be defined by means of the heterogeneous equality $$\textrm{JMeq}$$ so that all of the axiomatic laws for not become provable. Therefore, since the extension with $$\textrm{JMeq}$$ preserves logical consistency, so does the extension with not. We shall also study conditions under which $$\textsc {is}$$ and $$\textsc {do}$$ operators can be used safely without the risk of over-generation. (shrink)

Despite the incremental nature of Dynamic Syntax, the semantic grounding of it remains that of predicate logic, itself grounded in set theory, so is poorly suited to expressing the rampantly context-relative nature of word meaning, and related phenomena such as incremental judgements of similarity needed for the modelling of disambiguation. Here, we show how DS can be assigned a compositional distributional semantics which enables such judgements and makes it possible to incrementally disambiguate language constructs using vector space semantics. Building on (...) a proposal in our previous work, we implement and evaluate our model on real data, showing that it outperforms a commonly used additive baseline. In conclusion, we argue that these results set the ground for an account of the non-determinism of lexical content, in which the nature of word meaning is its dependence on surrounding context for its construal. (shrink)

Dynamic Syntax (DS: Kempson et al. 2001; Cann et al. 2005) is an action-based grammar formalism which models the process of natural language understanding as monotonic tree growth. This paper presents an introduction to the notions of incrementality and underspecification and update, drawing on the assumptions made by DS. It lays out the tools of the theoretical framework that are necessary to understand the accounts developed in the other contributions to the Special Issue. It also represents an up-to-date account of (...) the framework, combining the developments that have previously remained distributed in a diverse body of literature. (shrink)

Feedback such as backchannels and clarification requests often occurs subsententially, demonstrating the incremental nature of grounding in dialogue. However, although such feedback can occur at any point within an utterance, it typically does not do so, tending to occur at Feedback Relevance Spaces. We present a corpus study of acknowledgements and clarification requests in British English, and describe how our low-level, semantic processing model in Dynamic Syntax accounts for this feedback. The model trivially accounts for the 85% of cases where (...) feedback occurs at FRSs, but we also describe how it can be integrated or interpreted at non-FRSs using the predictive, incremental and interactive nature of the formalism. This model shows how feedback serves to continually realign processing contexts and thus manage the characteristic divergence and convergence that is key to moving dialogue forward. (shrink)

Situations serving as worlds as well as events in linguistic semantics are formulated as strings recording observations over discrete time. This formulation is applied to a linear temporal logic, in line with L. Schubert’s distinction between described and characterized situations. The distinction is developed topologically and computationally, and linked to the opposition between truth-conditional and proof-conditional semantics. For a finitary handle on quantification, strings are associated with situations not only on the basis of observation but also through derivation and constraint (...) satisfaction. The constraints specified lead to an implementation simpler than the derivations given. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Wright holds that the following two theses are jointly incoherent: Rules determine correct language use. These rules are discoverable via internal reflection on language use. I argue that incoherence is derivable from alone and examine two types of probabilistic accounts that model a modification of, one in terms of inexact knowledge, the other in terms of viewing semantic rules as reasons for linguistic actions. Both accommodate tolerance by breaking the link between justified assertion and truth, but incoherence threatens their conception (...) of justified assertion. I argue that the rules-as-reasons approach can relocate sharp boundaries to a place where they are not only more tolerable, but to be expected. (shrink)

In this paper we treat humorous situations as a series of events underpinned by topoi, principles of reasoning recognised within a socio-cultural community. We claim that humorous effect in jokes and other discourse is often created by the juxtaposition of topoi evoked. A prerequisite for this is that there is a shift where the interpreter of the discourse updates their information state with regard to a second topos being evoked. This view of humour is consistent with an incremental analysis of (...) dialogue, and we therefore argue that interaction is central both for humour creation and interpretation. We point out some different ways in which topoi are juxtaposed in humorous dialogues as well as in jokes published in social media or in joke books, and take jokes from the coronavirus pandemic as an example because this makes lots of new topoi available and therefore offers the opportunity of creating novel jokes based on the juxtaposition of the new and existing topoi. We explore how the mechanisms of inference in dialogue can be applied to humour through the four elements from our title: old, new, borrowed and taboo. (shrink)