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Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory 1

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:1-36 (2012)

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Unifying Moral Methodology.Tristram Mcpherson - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):523-549.details This article argues that the best way to pursue systematic normative ethical theorizing involves metaethical enquiry. My argument builds upon two central claims. First, I argue that plausible metaethical accounts can have implications that can help to resolve the methodological controversies facing normative ethics. Second, I argue that metaethical research is at least roughly as well supported as normative ethical research. I conclude by examining the implications of my thesis. Inter alia, it shows that the common practice of engaging in (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 10 citations
Why Reflective Equilibrium? III: Reflective Equilibrium as a Heuristic Tool.Svein Eng - 2014 - Ratio Juris 27 (3):440-459.details In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Intuitions, Rationalizations, and Justification: A Defense of Sentimental Rationalism.Frank Hindriks - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):195-216.details People sometimes make moral judgments on the basis of brief emotional episodes. I follow the widely established practice of referring to such affective responses as intuitions (Haidt 2001, 2012; Bedke 2012, Copp 2012). Recently, a number of moral psychologists have argued that moral judgments are never more than emotion- or intuition-based pronouncements on what is right or wrong (Haidt 2001, Nichols 2004, Prinz 2007). A wide variety of empirical findings seem to support this claim. For example, some argue that arbitrary (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

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