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  1. The Centrality of Problem‐Solving.John Kekes - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):405 – 421.
    The aim of this paper is to provide the beginnings of a theory of justification. This theory is an alternative to the two currently available and unsatisfactory options: foundationalism and coherentism. Both of these theories, as well as the decisive sceptical objections to them, are committed to the assumption that there is only one context of justification and only one standard of justification. This assumption is mistaken. There are two contexts of justification, each with a standard peculiar to it. The (...)
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  • Axiological Foundationalism.Robert Audi - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):163 - 183.
    Epistemological foundationalism has typically been thought to hold that in order to account for human knowledge we must countenance the direct Justification of some specific kind of beliefs, such as one's beliefs to the effect that one is having a certain sensation. How else, it may be thought, can one analyse Justification without confronting an infinite regress or a vicious circle? I believe that this conception of foundationalism has been so influential that most foundationalists and nearly all their critics have (...)
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  • Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.
    What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: conceptual arguments from incompleteness, conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of "infinitism" consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.
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  • Prospects for skeptical foundationalism.Scott F. Aikin - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):578-590.
    Properly understood, foundationalism as a meta‐epistemic theory is consistent with skepticism. This article outlines five possible points of overlap between the two views, and shows that arguments against foundationalism posited on its inability to refute skepticism are improperly framed.
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  • Chisholm's approach to scepticism.Douglas Odegard - 1981 - Metaphilosophy 12 (1):7–12.
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  • Chisholm's Approach to Scepticism.Douglas Odegard - 1981 - Metaphilosophy 12 (1):7-12.
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