A recently developed view in political theory holds that only political agents, particularly states, can be primary bearers of human-rights duties. Problematically, this so-called ‘political view’ appears unable to account for the human-rights responsibilities of powerful non-state actors, such as transnational corporations (TNCs). Can a recognizably political view respond to this concern? I show that, once the moral underpinnings of the political view are made explicit, it can. I suggest that, on the political view, what makes states primary bearers of (...) human-rights duties is their possession of both (i) the capacity to fulfill human right and (ii) what I call the ‘authority-plus-sovereignty package’. Building on the existing literature on the moral responsibilities of TNCs, I argue that some TNCs—especially in areas of weak governance—meet these two conditions. I thus conclude that they count as bearers of primary human-rights responsibilities even from within a political perspective on human rights. (shrink)

Committees multiply in firms, whether stakeholder boards or committees, multi-stakeholder initiatives, ethics committees, or oversight boards. These arrangements aim to organise and legitimise the social and political activities of corporations. This article raises the question of the appropriate form of such governance structures. The examples above illustrate three possible ways of legitimising corporate quasi-public social and political activities: deliberation within the company, deliberation outside, and an approach we label _corporate constitutionalism_. While the first two models have been tested in practice (...) and assessed in theory, the third one is comparatively more recent, both in practice and in theory. This article focuses on the latter model and asks whether corporate constitutionalism offers a suitable addition, or alternative, to deliberation (with or within firms) for legitimising corporate quasi-public social and political activities. It examines the respective merits of the three models and argues that a corporate constitutional court may mitigate some of the limits of deliberative practices alone. It argues the court is needed in weak regulatory environments, whether they are failing or inherently limited. (shrink)

El arte, la literatura o el patrimonio –la Cultura– son afectados de manera específica por la actividad empresarial. Se propone que, más allá del mecenazgo y el patrocinio, la Responsabilidad Cultural Empresarial –rce– abarca las distintas acciones que las empresas realizan para responder a las demandas culturales de sus grupos de interés y a los impactos generados en la Cultura. El artículo aborda la justificación normativa de la rce defendiendo, por una parte, que las empresas pueden alterar la vida cultural (...) de la sociedad no solo escogiendo la Cultura como su actividad de negocio sino también mediante sus acciones de Responsabilidad Social Empresarial. Por otra parte, se argumenta que las empresas tienen responsabilidades específicas en la promoción y protección de los bienes culturales dado su carácter público o cuasi público, y dado el rol social y político de las propias empresas.Arts, literature or heritage –Culture– are influenced by business activities in a specific way. It is argued that the Corporate Cultural Responsibility –CCE– goes beyond patronage and sponsorship comprising the variety of business initiatives to meet the cultural demands of the company stakeholders and to address its impacts on Culture. The paper addresses the normative justification of CCE defending, on the one hand, that firms may alter the cultural life of a community not only through its business operations but also through actions of Corporate Social Responsibility. On the other hand, it is argued that companies have specific responsibilities regarding the promotion and protection of cultural goods since these goods are public or quasi-public goods, and because of the social and political role of companies. (shrink)

This article asks whether firms should exempt employees when they object to elements of their work that go against their conscience. Fairness requires that we follow the rules of an organization we have joined voluntarily only if these rules express mutual advantage. In corporations, I argue that subordination and exemption provides for mutual advantage better than subordination plus right of exit. This is because agents want to protect their conscientious convictions, even in hierarchical organizations geared towards efficient preference satisfaction. Thus (...) exemptions should be granted in unforeseeable circumstances, provided the costs are limited. (shrink)