Does neo-Rawlsian political philosophy offer an adequate account of the social conditions of capitalism? In this paper, I present two arguments for thinking that it does not. First, I develop a historicist critique of liberal egalitarianism, arguing that it provides a vision of social reality that is intimately connected to the historical and ideological constellation that I call postwar liberalism, and as such cannot account for social reality since the neoliberal revolutions of the late twentieth century. Second, I explore arguments (...) in Marxist and critical social theory that cast liberal egalitarianism as partial, on account of its inadequate portrait of capitalist society. In surveying responses to these critiques, I argue that merely extending liberal egalitarianism into new domains to account for how contemporary circumstances have changed since the mid-twentieth century cannot address the problem of its partial view of the social world. Taking seriously the insights of critical social theory and the study of capitalism should lead to a challenge to liberal egalitarianism, not an extension of it. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

A citizens’ movement in Berlin advocates for the expropriation of housing corporations and has won a significant majority in a popular referendum in September 2021. Building on this proposal, this paper develops a general account of expropriation as a measure for corporate reform and thereby contributes to the ongoing debate on the democratic accountability of business corporations. It argues that expropriation is a valuable tool for intervention in a dire situation in some economic sector to enable a re-structuring of the (...) governance of the assets in question. Compared with other tools available, expropriation is a more forward-looking, genuinely political measure that does not depend on the legal assignment of guilt but rather proceeds in a pragmatic and problem-oriented manner. It also allows us to reconsider in how far the market mechanism should be employed in the administration of assets. Objections from private property rights against expropriation fail as corporations generally are privileged, quasi-public institutions that can justifiably be subject to democratic interventions. Expropriation is thus an important addition to the arsenal of corporate reform proposals, especially for those concerned with a broad democratization of the corporation. (shrink)

O artigo explora diferentes sentidos da privacidade e sua relação com o modelo discursivo de democracia radical desenvolvido por Jürgen Habermas em Facticidade e validade (1992), dedicando-se a pensá-la não apenas como componente normativo de uma concepção exigente de Estado democrático de direito, mas também como instrumento voltado à identificação e crítica de patologias democráticas contemporâneas.

This conceptual paper contributes to the critique of a body of literature that will be named ‘deliberative corporate governance’ by defending non-deliberative acts performed by stakeholders. It first argues that this literature introduces to the corporation a decision-making process where it does not belong, given the corporation's economic role. This leads to an ‘efficiency constraint’ on any attempt to justify deliberation – deliberative governance theorists must show that it is the most efficient and cost-effective way to address the issues that (...) concern them. A real case example where deliberation would have been counter-productive in that regard will show that this is not the case. Building on this example, the paper uses the theory of democratic agonism to argue that non-deliberative acts should be part of governance. A sketch of managerial duties vis-à-vis such acts is attempted as well. The paper does not seek to reject deliberative corporate governance entirely, but rather to defend the importance of non-deliberative practices in addressing its theoretical concern. It makes a conceptual contribution to corporate governance theory, from which it draws practical implications for stakeholders-oriented management. (shrink)

This paper argues that instituting Citizen Boards of Governance (CBGs) is the optimal strategy to democratically contain Big Tech’s algorithmic powers in the digital public sphere. CBGs are bodies of randomly selected citizens that are authorized to govern the algorithmic infrastructure of Big Tech platforms. The main advantage of CBGs is to tackle the concentrated powers of private tech corporations without giving too much power to governments. I show why this is a better approach than ordinary state regulation or relying (...) on market mechanisms. My proposal follows from the critique of Big Tech’s concentrated powers, and explains how this justifies democratizing algorithms in the digital public sphere. My approach thus speaks to a core commitment in democratic theory: enhancing the autonomy of the public sphere from the centers of powers in modern societies, be it corporations or governments. (shrink)