While knowledge represents a valuable commodity, not all forms of knowledge are afforded equal status. The politics of knowledge, which entails the privileging of particular ways of knowing through linkages between the producers of knowledge and other bearers of authority or influence, represents a powerful force driving knowledge development. Within the health research and practice community, biomedical knowledge (i.e. knowledge pertaining to the biological factors influencing health) has been afforded a privileged position, shaping the health research and practice community's view (...) of health, illness and appropriate intervention. The aim of this study is to spark critical reflection and dialogue surrounding the ways in which the politics of knowledge have constrained progress in addressing mental health and illness, one of today's leading public health issues. I argue that the hegemony of biological knowledge represents an ethical issue as it limits the breadth of knowledge available to support practitioners to ‘do good’ in terms of addressing mental illness. Given the power and influence inherent within the nursing community, I propose that nurses ought to engage in critical reflection and action in an effort to better situate the health research and practice community to effectively address the mental health of populations. (shrink)

Many critics of medicalization express concern that the process privileges individualised, biologically grounded interpretations of medicalized phenomena, inhibiting understanding and communication of aspects of those phenomena that are less relevant to their biomedical modelling. I suggest that this line of critique views medicalization as a hermeneutical injustice—a form of epistemic injustice that prevents people having the hermeneutical resources available to interpret and communicate significant areas of their experience. Interpreting the critiques in this fashion shows they frequently fail because they: neglect (...) the ways in which medicalization may not obscure, but rather illuminate, individuals’ experiences; and neglect the testimony of those experiencing first-hand medicalized problems, thus may be guilty of perpetrating testimonial injustice. However, I suggest that such arguments are valuable insofar as they highlight the unwarranted epistemic privilege frequently afforded to medical institutions and medicalized models of phenomena, and a consequent need for greater epistemic humility on the part of health workers and researchers. (shrink)