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A new argument for moral error theory

Christopher Cowie

Noûs 56 (2):276-294 (2022)

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Impossible Ethics: Do Population Ethical Impossibility Results Support Moral Skepticism and/or Anti‐Realism?Victor Moberger - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (3):370-391.details In this paper, I discuss two different metaethical challenges based on population ethical impossibility results. According to the anti‐realist challenge, the results pose a serious threat to the existence of objective moral facts. According to the skeptical challenge, the results pose a serious threat to the reliability of our moral intuitions. My aim is to systematically explore and evaluate these challenges. In addition to clarifying the issues, I argue that population ethical impossibility results do not in fact support any anti‐realist (...) or skeptical conclusions. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark
Impossible Ethics: Do Population Ethical Impossibility Results Support Moral Skepticism and/or Anti-Realism?Victor Moberger - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (3):370-391.details In this paper, I discuss two different metaethical challenges based on population ethical impossibility results. According to the anti-realist challenge, the results pose a serious threat to the existence of objective moral facts. According to the skeptical challenge, the results pose a serious threat to the reliability of our moral intuitions. My aim is to systematically explore and evaluate these challenges. In addition to clarifying the issues, I argue that population ethical impossibility results do not in fact support any anti-realist (...) or skeptical conclusions. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark
Non-Archimedean population axiologies.Calvin Baker - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-22.details Non-Archimedean population axiologies – also known as lexical views – claim (i) that a sufficient number of lives at a very high positive welfare level would be better than any number of lives at a very low positive welfare level and/or (ii) that a sufficient number of lives at a very low negative welfare level would be worse than any number of lives at a very high negative welfare level. Such axiologies are popular because they can avoid the (Negative) Repugnant (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Wholesale moral error for naturalists.Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-13.details In this paper, I show how realist moral naturalists can provide an intra-theoretic explanation of the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. This is a requirement on metaethical theories that has been recently defended by Akhlaghi (2021). After clarifying Akhlaghi’s argument and responding to Evers’s (2021) recent rebuttal, I argue that even under the assumption that moral facts are grounded in an appropriate subset of natural facts (N-facts), there is still a non-zero probability of wholesale moral error. This is demonstrated (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations

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