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  1. The Monstrous Conclusion.Luca Stroppa - 2024 - Synthese 203 (6):1-24.
    This paper introduces the Monstrous Conclusion, according to which, for any population, there is a better population consisting of just one individual (the Monster). The Monstrous Conclusion is deeply counterintuitive. I defend a version of Prioritarianism as a particularly promising population axiology that does not imply the Monstrous Conclusion. According to this version of Prioritarianism, which I call Asymptotic Prioritarianism, there is diminishing marginal moral importance of individual welfare that can get close to, but never quite reach, some upper limit. (...)
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  • Believe in Pascal's Wager? Have I Got a Deal for You!Alexander Tabarrok - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (2):123-128.
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  • Discount-neutral utility models for denumerable time streams.Peter Fishburn & Ward Edwards - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (2):139-166.
    This paper formulates and axiomatizes utility models for denumerable time streams that make no commitment in regard to discounting future outcomes. The models address decision under certainty and decision under risk. Independence assumptions in both contexts lead to additive or multiplicative utilities over time periods that allow unambiguous comparisons of the relative importance of different periods. The models accommodate all patterns of future valuation. This discount-neutral feature is attained by restricting preference comparisons to outcome streams or probability distributions on outcome (...)
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  • An offer you can't refuse: systematically exploiting utility-maximisers with malicious gambles.Chalmers Adam - unknown
    Decision theory aims to provide mathematical analysis of which choice one should rationally make in a given situation. Our current decision theory norms have been very successful, however, several problems have proven vexing for standard decision theory. In this paper, I show that these problems all share a similar structure and identify a class of problems which decision theory overvalues. I demonstrate that agents who follow current standard decision theory can be exploited and have their preferences reordered if offered decision (...)
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