The paper demonstrates that Parmenides’ monism is a logical consequence of his criteria for philosophy, in conjunction with the logical operators he uses, and their holistic connection. Parmenides, I argue, is the first philosopher to set out explicit criteria for philosophy, establishing as criterion not only consistency, but also what I call rational admissibility, the requirement when giving an account of something that the account be based on rational analysis and can withstand rational scrutiny. I give a detailed account of (...) the logical operators Parmenides uses in his argument and of the way in which his notion of being is tailored to fit both them and his criteria for philoso-phy. (shrink)

Tales de Mileto (VII–VI a.C.), además de ser uno de los siete Sabios, es considerado el primer filósofo precisamente por haber sido el primero en intentar dar razón de la estructura y formación del universo. El punto nuclear de la tesis de Tales afirmaba que el agua es el principio o materia originaria de la que han surgido todas las realidades que componen el variopinto y complejo tejido cósmico. A esta tesis, que hoy bien pudiera parecer extravagante, le cabe el (...) mérito y el privilegio de haber sido el motor que puso en movimiento un conjunto de inquietudes, de recursos y de métodos, de base racional, encaminados a dar respuesta a cuestiones que los seres humanos venían planteándose desde la misma noche de los tiempos. En qué medida y en qué sentido Tales de Mileto es deudor de creencias, instrumentos y saberes de su entorno (las ciudades griegas de las costas turcas del Egeo), incluidos los procedentes del este (Mesopotamia) y del Sur (Egipto), en qué medida fue Tales un innovador radical, son cuestiones que serán abordadas en este artículo. (shrink)

Civilizations can be perceived as living human beings that are born, mature, age, and ultimately die and disappear, passing their legacy to the future generations. These transitions may be projected to the different stages of cognitive development of children. The Western Civilization, which embodies our current state of cultural advancement from the Classic Greek to the modern period, can be paralleled by the gradual transitions of human beings toward adulthood. From this perspective, the ancient Greek era resembles the toddler years (...) of humanity at which the first “why”-type questions are being asked. The theocratic period that followed until the Renaissance can be seen as our childhood, when people lived their lives under the tight boundaries set by religious authorities. The period spanning from the Enlightenment until almost the end of the 20th century can be considered as our teenage years when people rediscover their past, are liberated from superstition, and set the path forward based on reason by a manner at which the distinction between plausible and feasible is vague. Within this scheme, postmodernism also finds its place in our teenhood. The last few decades, from this perspective, signify our entrance to adulthood at which major questions are considered answered, or at least settled, and the only path forward perceived as feasible is the one that is followed already, a state that is bringing us closer to our intellectual aging and its inevitable death. Some signs of aging-related pathologies are already manifested in today’s technology-intensive society. By identifying our intellectual age and by appreciating our health status, we may be able to proactively delay or even avert our intellectual aging and death. (shrink)

Resumen En esta nota crítica presento un análisis de los materiales textuales que constituyen el capítulo 19 de la serie Early Greek Philosophy de A. Laks y G. Most dedicado a Parménides. Después de comparar cuantitativamente los textos de este capítulo con las ediciones de H. Diels y A.H. Coxon, así como de precisar cuáles son los textos "nuevos" que figuran en esta edición y las formas en que los editores decidieron presentarlos, ofrezco algunas consideraciones sobre el concepto mismo de (...) recepción y su operatividad en este capítulo, sobre la superación definitiva de la distinción entre testimonios y fragmentos y sobre las ventajas y desventajas que supone cortar los textos para la presentación esquemática y temática de los contenidos. Por último, examino el modo en que la doctrina de Parménides se presenta en este capítulo y muestro algunas de las decisiones que los autores tomaron sobre los innumerables problemas de transmisión textual del Poema.In this critical note, I will present an analysis of the textual materials that constitute the 19th chapter, dedicated to Parmenides, of the Early Greek Philosophy series by A. Laks and G. Most. After offering a quantitative comparison of the texts in this chapter and the editions of H. Diels and A.H. Coxon, and after specifying which "new" texts figure in this edition and how they are presented, I will provide considerations on the concept of reception and how it operates throughout this chapter, on the definite overcoming of the distinction between testimonia and fragmenta, and on the advantages and disadvantages of cutting out the texts for the schematic and thematic presentation of its contents. Finally, I examine how Parmenides' doctrine is presented and comment on some of the decisions that the authors made on a few of the innumerable problems related to the textual transmission of the Poem. (shrink)

Kirjoitus tarkastelee Martin Heideggerin myöhäisajattelussa esiin nousevaa olemisen ainutkertaisuuden (Einzigkeit, Einmaligkeit) teemaa ja sen edelleenkehittelyä Jean-Luc Nancyn ajattelussa. Teeman osoitetaan kytkeytyvän Heideggerin välienselvittelyyn filosofian esisokraattisen alun, erityisesti Parmenideen ajattelun kanssa. Parmenides ajattelee olemista kaikkia yksittäisiä ilmentymiään, "kuolevaisten" äärellisiä "näkemyksiä" (doksai) yhdistävänä absoluuttisen homogeenisena ja itseidenttisenä ilmeisyytenä (alētheia), todellisuuden puhtaana läsnäolona ajattelulle. Tätä vasten Heidegger ajattelee olemisen nimenomaan yksittäisten ilmentymiensä kontekstuaalisena ainutkertaisuutena, mielekkyystilanteiden ainutkertaistavana kontekstualisoitumisena. Nancy jatkaa ajatusta kuvailemalla olemista "ainutkertaiseksi-monikolliseksi" (singulier pluriel), mutta täydentää Heideggerin ajatteluun tunnetusti jäänyttä aukkoa soveltamalla ajatusta (...) yhteisön ajattelemiseen ainutkertaisuuksien yhdessäolemisena ja keskinäisyytenä. Näin avautuva "ainutkertaisuuden politiikan" teema onkin viime vuosikymmeninä noussut mannermaisen poliittisen ajattelun keskiöön. (shrink)

It is perhaps time to revivify our other name in Greek: phos. For although the Greeks named us anthrôpos, they also called us phos. And the Greeks used the word phos because we are like light. Indeed, our way of being light-like is illuminating, which illuminates being and the truth of being, so that it can be thought and said, imagined, and sensed—especially insofar as we are this illumination. Thus, it is time to reclaim phos as our name and so (...) rethink what it means to illuminate, whether we light up everything that is, as well as ourselves, or not. (shrink)

We shall revisit a debate which has been going on at least since pioneering British Indologists like William Jones first encountered the ‘Brahmanic theology’ we now know as Vedānta, namely, the nature of the relationship—if any—between certain forms of ‘western’ and ‘Indian’ idealisms, and how these metaphysical systems have influenced Christian theology. Specifically, we look at the question of possible thematic and conceptual convergences between Neoplatonism and Advaita Vedānta, and argue that significant parallels can be found in their common conception (...) of the Absolute as Being. Rather than attempt a comprehensive overview of the two systems, we take the divine ‘I AM’ revealed to Moses in Exodus 3.14 as the locus classicus of Christian philosophical interpretations of God as Being itself, and explore how four seminal figures read this passage in light of Neoplatonic and Vedāntic influences. We shall see that similarities and divergences in the readings of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Meister Eckhart and Henri Le Saux can be understood in terms of how they negotiate the relation between the One and the many, or between ‘being’ and ‘knowing’. The more these figures allow themselves to be influenced by Neoplatonism and Advaita Vedānta, the more we see any clear ontological distinction between creature and Creator start to break down. This verse, therefore, proves to be an unusually fruitful test case for exploring the relation between the underlying Neoplatonic and Vedāntic metaphysics which structure varying Christian interpretations of it. (shrink)

This essay aims to analyse the Parmenides’ interpretation that Laura Gemelli Marciano offered in the Eleatica lectures. The scholar represents the Parmenidean Poem as a mystical experience where sounds, words and images communicate and produce a real approach to the divine reality at the same time. This intriguing reading, which closely follows that offered by Kingsley, understimates the problems and cognitive structures of rational thought in the poem. Thus Parmenides appears to be a shaman rather a philosopher.

Cet article s’interroge sur la corrélation qui a pu être établie dans la pensée présocratique entre grandes zones de l’univers et éléments. Il remet en question l’idée que l’univers aurait été archaïquement divisé en quatre parties et que l’innovation d’Empédocle aurait consisté à faire correspondre cette division préexistante et sa théorie élémentaire. Nous montrons plutôt que si Empédocle est le premier à établir une correspondance exacte entre niveau cosmologique et élémentaire, c’est aussi chez lui que nous trouvons pour la première (...) fois une division du monde en grandes zones distinctes et égales. Pour déterminer ce qui fait l’originalité d’Empédocle, nous examinons les diverses manières dont les penseurs ont structuré l’univers depuis Homère et quel genre de relation ils ont établi entre zones du monde et théorie élémentaire. (shrink)

Cet article examine le rôle joué par la notion d'intelligence dans la poésie de Xénophane et de Parménide. L'auteur soutient que ces deux philosophes, en modifiant les attributs traditionnels du noos humain et divin, répondent aux problèmes posés par le pessimisme gnoséologique de la tradition poétique archaïque, dans laquelle les mortels sont inéluctablement condamnés à l'ignorance. Comme le montre le cas d'Hésiode, même l'inspiration divine ne garantit pas d'acquérir la connaissance, parce que la divinité peut communiquer, à son gré, le (...) vrai ou le faux et que le poète est dépourvu de moyens pour établir la validité de la révélation. Chez Xénophane en revanche, la régularité de l'ordre naturel fondé sur l'immuable noos du dieu offre aux hommes la possibilité effective d'améliorer leur compréhension du monde, tandis que dans le poème de Parménide, la déduction des attributs de l'Être donne aux mortels l'accès à cette vérité qui était auparavant une prérogative exclusive des dieux. (shrink)

Against the traditional interpretation of Doxa as intrinsically and thoroughly deceiving and untrustworthy, the present essay examines the passages which follow the self-characterization of the goddess’ speech as ‘deceitful.’ The traits of an extensive cosmogony and cosmology open up the possibility for discerning two aspects of Doxa: first a presentation of mortal erroneous opinions, but then also their correction within the framework of the ‘appropriate world-arrangement’ presented by the goddess.

The extraordinary overall textual situation of Parmenides’ B1,1-3, due to complex, variegate and polymorphous causes, entailed and still entails diverse sorts of problematic issues so to constitute a true labyrinth of philological, hermeneutical and theoretical instances interwoven each other in almost inextricable way. In this analysis, a first substantial knot of philological type resulted necessary to a preliminary discrimination for making sure the textual reconstruction in order to argue then its most literarily clear and specifiable meaning. In this way it (...) was also possible to make sure its semantic and theoretical relevancies. This research leaded to outline and, hopefully, to demonstrate no textual corruption and following misunderstanding happened before sec. XIII, namely corresponding to the lecture present in the first available manuscript, the so-called cod. N, universally excluded and entirely misevaluated, even discarded; instead it is not only the principle, but the unique reliable codex. The detailed analyse including the autoptic exam is the result of enlightening the absolute goodness of this version and the reasons both philological and hermeneutical comparations, which allow to achieve its complete textual rehabilitation and so to grasp its real conceptual content. (shrink)

Abstract The great german Scholar, Eduard Zeller, suggested that the reference to male and female in Parmenides B12.5-6 was probably an allusion to the physical principles of `mortal opinion': Night and Light. This suggestion has been rejected by some scholars because such an association would lead us to admit that, in B12, male was associated with Night and female with Light, a theory which would be at odds with the supposed misogyny of Greek culture. However, Parmenides' account of `mortal opinion' (...) certainly associates male with coldness and density, the attributes of Night, and female with hotness and greater rarity, the attibutes of Light. The aims of this paper are, then, first, to show that the association of female with Light and of male with Night is in fact right; and secondly to investigate the main dualistic features of Parmenides' `mortal opinion' (embryology, sleep, death, knowledge) in relation to this theme. This will lead us, finally, to focus our attention on the Proem, which introduces us to a world full of female divinities, among whom - beyond the gates of the ways of day and night - is the unnamed goddess who will initiate her young male auditor into the two `ways'. (shrink)

It is usually assumed that Heraclitus is, exclusively, the philosopher of flux, diversity and opposition while Parmenides puts the case for unity and changelessness. However, there is a significant common understanding of things, not simply an accidental similarity of understanding. Both philosophers, critically, distinguish two realms: on the one hand, there is the one, common realm, identical for all, which is grasped by the ‘logos that is common’ or the steady nous that follows a right method in order to interpret (...) the real. On the other hand, the realm of multiplicity seen and heard by the senses, when interpreted by ‘barbarian souls’, is not understood in its common unity. Analogously, when grasped by the wandering weak nous it does not comprehend the real’s basic unity. In this paper I attempt to defend the thesis that both thinkers claim that the common logos or the steady intellect grasp and affirm the unity of the real. (shrink)

Cet article propose une interprétation de la relation entre l’aletheia et la doxa dans le poème de Parménide sur la base d’une analyse du voyage relaté dans le proème. À partir d’un examen précis du texte parménidien, il établit que l’hypothèse selon laquelle la citadelle de la nuit est la destination finale du voyage rend bien mieux compte de celui‑ci que l’hypothèse longtemps admise selon laquelle il s’agirait de la lumière. Cette lecture du proème permet non seulement d’établir un certain (...) nombre de parallèles avec d’autres œuvres poétiques qui décrivent le trajet du Soleil, mais surtout de mettre au jour une analogie entre le récit de voyage et la partition en deux du poème parménidien : notre monde, où alternent le jour et la nuit, représente le monde de la doxa, où être et non-être sont mêlés et qui est gouverné par deux principes correspondants, le feu et la nuit, tandis que l’unicité de la déesse de la Nuit dans l’au‑delà renvoie à celle de l’être. De plus, en distinguant deux étapes dans le voyage du narrateur, celle où il atteint de lui‑même le chemin de la nuit et du jour et celle où les filles d’Hélios le guident sur ce chemin, on peut expliquer l’existence même d’un discours sur les opinions des mortels : de même que le narrateur a besoin d’abord d’aller de notre monde quotidien jusqu’au chemin de la nuit et du jour pour avoir ensuite accès à la connaissance divine, de même il faut expliquer le monde de l’opinion en le faisant remonter à deux principes fondamentaux pour montrer aux mortels le chemin vers l’aletheia. L’article conclut en expliquant, à partir des fragments B14 et B15, pourquoi Parménide a recours à la déesse de la Nuit pour faire cette révélation : ce choix repose sur une critique de la lumière du soleil comme condition de la vision trompeuse. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders the debates around the interpretation of Parmenides’ Being, in order to draw out the preconceptions that lie behind such debates and to scrutinize the legitimacy of applying them to a text such as Parmenides’ poem. With a focus on the assumptions that have driven scholars to seek clarity within the notoriously ambiguous verse of the poem, I ask whether it is possible to develop an analysis of Parmenides’ Being that is sympathetic both to his clear interest in (...) argument, logic, knowledge and truth and to his ambiguous expression and cultural and literary resonances. (shrink)

Von der Antike und der Spätantike bis ins Mittelalter und in die Neuzeit stellt die Kommentierung der aristotelischen Schriften eine der fundamentalen Formen philosophischer Tätigkeit dar. In diesem Sammelband werden wesentliche Etappen der griechischen Kommentartradition zu den Schriften des Aristoteles sowie ihre philosophische und kulturgeschichtliche Bedeutung an ausgewählten Beispielen analysiert und interpretiert. Die Autorinnen und Autoren setzen sich dabei sowohl mit den Manuskripten und der Überlieferung einzelner Schriften als auch mit der Rezeption und Weiterentwicklung der Aristotelischen Philosophie auseinander. Der Kernbestand (...) der hier versammelten Beiträge geht auf die dreitägige internationale Konferenz „Aristoteles-Kommentare und ihre Überlieferung in Spätantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance" (26.–28.10.2017) zurück, die dank der Förderung der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung an der Universität Hamburg am Centre for the Study of Manuscript Cultures stattgefunden hat. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 60, Issue 1, pp 3 - 39 This paper pursues a new approach to the problem of the relation between Alētheia and Doxa. It investigates as interrelated matters Parmenides’ impetus for developing and including Doxa, his conception of the mortal epistemic agent in relation both to Doxa’s investigations and to those in Alētheia, and the relation between mortal and divine in his poem. Parmenides, it is argued, maintained that Doxastic cognition is an ineluctable and even appropriate aspect (...) of mortal life. The mortal agent, however, is nonetheless capable of sustaining the cognition of Alētheia by momentarily coming to think with—or as—his divine soul. (shrink)

La Déesse de Parménide annonce toujours que les δόξαι sont un produit humain. Mais il y a un point qui n'a pas été en général remarqué dans les études consacrées à l'étude des δόξαι: elles décrivent une activité humaine qui consiste a expliquer la réalité par la présence de principes opposés, et qui est toujours en rapport avec la "nomination". Il y avait à l'époque de Parménide une école qui correspondait à ce portrait robot, ou s'agit-il d'un collage de Parménide? (...) Quoi qu'il en soit, il est attesté la présence d'une branche du Pythagorisme qui se caractérisait, précisément, pour "placer" des noms sur les choses. (shrink)

By convention epinician poetry claims to be both obligatory and truthful, yet in the intersection of obligation and truth lies a seeming paradox: the poet presents his poetry as commissioned by a patron but also claims to be unbiased enough to convey the truth. In Slater's interpretation Pindar reconciles this paradox by casting his relationship to the patron as one of guest-friendship: when he declares himself a guest-friend of the victor, he agrees to the obligation ‘a) not to be envious (...) of hisxenosand b) to speak well of him. The argumentation is:Xeniaexcludes envy, I am axenos, therefore I am not envious and consequently praise honestly’. Slater observes that envy may foster bias against the patron, but the problem of pro-patron bias remains: does the poet's friendship with and obligation to his patron produce praise at the expense of truth? (shrink)

The paper focuses on the character of the literary and contends that if, instead of accepting the legitimacy of the question “what is literature?” and trying to answer it, one were to subject the question itself to a critical scrutiny—i.e. in order to lay bare what the question presupposes about the literary—it becomes obvious that any attempt to answer the question by uncritically accepting the legitimacy of the puzzle it puts forward can only give rise to contradictions. For the question (...) requires and presupposes for an answer an ontologically independent foundation, and the latter, given its immutability, requires the positing of a reality/representation disjunction—where the latter of the pair permits of and accommodates the experience of change—thereby ensuring that representation, too, requires a foundation, which, due to the impossibility of a foundation being the foundation of its other, that is, mutability, ends up undermining the very possibility of a disjunction, and, hence, the coherence of the foundationalist enterprise. Given that the problem of incoherence is bound to recur in all attempts to explain the literary in a foundationalist framework and given that the logic of foundationalism is one with the logic of nihilism—for the incoherence necessitates the denial of the possibility of literature—a release from the contradictions and a reinstatement of the reality of literature can come about only if one is awakened to the incoherence of the foundationalist undertaking. The resulting turn away from foundationalist thinking to differential thinking—where the incoherence of the demand for coherence is grasped and the reality of time reinstated—sheds light on the twining of the destinies of the literary and the philosophical: if philosophy as differential thinking awakens us to the displacement of being in the flow of time, literature sets into work the displacement of meaning in the functioning of language. This confirms that not only are the attempts to unearth a ground for the literary a mistake, but denying the reality of the literary event—i.e. upon failing to find a ground—is equally a mistake. (shrink)