This paper has a twofold aim. The first is to offer a precise definition of soft fact. Without such definition it is impossible to assess the Ockhamist solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom in an accurate way. The second purpose is to identify the costs of such a solution, distinguishing them from some of the other costs usually ascribed to Ockhamism, which Ockhamism does not actually need to pay. In particular, it is argued that Ockhamism is (...) committed to the view that a true future exists and to a form of backward causation. (shrink)

I begin by briefly mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. Specifically, two (...) points of interest emerge from my analysis: first, temporal necessity turns out to be an inappropriate and ineffective tool for the fatalist to make use of; and, second, the dismissal of the argument from antecedent truth value turns out to be an over-hasty one. (shrink)

The concept of soft facts is crucial for the Ockhamistic analysis of the divine knowledge of future contingents; moreover, this notion is important in itself because it concerns the structure of the facts that depend—in some sense—on other future facts. However, the debate on soft facts is often flawed by the unaware use of two different notions of soft facts. The facts of the first kind are supervenient on temporal facts: By bringing about a temporal fact, the agent can bring (...) about these facts. However, on the one hand, the determination of the existence of these facts does not affect the past; on the other hand, assimilating divine knowledge into this kind of facts does not help the Ockhamist. The authors will argue that, to vindicate Ockhamism, another definition of “soft fact” is necessary, which turns out to be much more demanding from a metaphysical point of view. (shrink)

This is a survey of recent work on God and human freedom. A version of the "basic" argument for the incompatibility of God's omniscience and human freedom is presented. Various possible responses are developed and discussed.

در برابر «تقدیرگرایان کلامی»، که معتقدند علم پیشین الاهی با ارادة آزاد انسان در تعارض است، «سازگارگرایان» بر این باورند که علم پیشین خداوند با ارادة آزاد انسان سازگار است. «علامه طباطبایی» و «ویلیام کریگ» به گروه اخیر تعلق دارند و برای حل این مسئله راه‌حل ارائه می‌دهند. در این مقاله به بررسی تطبیقی «نظریة علم میانه»، به‌منزلة راه‌حل نهایی کریگ و دیدگاه علامه طباطبایی در باب این مسئله، می‌پردازیم. نتیجة نهایی آن است که با وجود تفاوت دیدگاه دو متفکر (...) در برخی موارد، هر دو اندیشمند ضمن پذیرش سازگاری علم پیشین الهی با اختیار انسان معتقدند معرفت خداوند به افعال اختیاری انسان ناشی از معرفت او به این نوع افعال با تمام شرایط و خصوصیات آن‌هاست. (shrink)