The importance of infinity for Spinoza's philosophy can hardly be overstated. Understanding Spinoza means understanding (Spinoza's take on) infinity. In this paper, I present a deflationary account of Spinoza's infinity: Infinities across ontological states (modes, attributes, substance) follow the same general trajectory: From an indeterminate essence, infinitely many things follow. And as a consequence, Spinoza's universe is infinite all the way down. Some think that to Spinoza, infinity is indeterminacy (acosmism). Others say that infinity in substance follows from the essence (...) of substance, while infinity in modes does not. I argue that both views are false. Instead, infinity in modes and infinity in substance emerges from the numerical indeterminacy of essences. I show that this view can be traced back to Descartes' famous wax example and that it is manufactured to avoid a particular contradiction. In order to specify my point, I demonstrate that both ‘absolute infinity’ (God) and ‘in suo genere infinity’ (attributes) must be read through the deflationary account of infinity. I also argue that we do not need an additional qualitative indeterminacy and that causation and conception are not always parallel (such as in reductio proofs). (shrink)

Scotus’ theory of identity and distinction is a unique and central aspect of his thought, as he applies it throughout his metaphysics. On Scotus’s account of identity, the indiscernibility of identicals fails—i.e., A and B can be identical but not share all the same properties. As Ockham objected, Scotus is now in the difficult position of needing to provide alternative necessary and sufficient conditions for being identical, rather than simply invoking indiscernibility. The secondary literature has argued that the lack of (...) actual or potential separation is both necessary and sufficient for identity. I argue that is incorrect and provide alternative necessary and sufficient conditions for identity and real distinction, along with an analysis of Scotus’s theory of identity and distinction more broadly. Scotus thinks instead that the lack of actual, potential, and proportional separation are necessary and sufficient conditions for identity. The deeper root of this view is that identity corresponds to a certain degree of unity, and is accompanied by a sharing of esse. (shrink)

Étienne Gilson juxtaposes what he calls Aquinas’s “existentialism” to what he calls Scotus’s “essentialism.” For Gilson, “existentialism” is philosophical truth, the only view compatible with an authentically Christian metaphysic, while “essentialism” is a Hellenic mistake that seduces Christian philosophers by appealing to the idolatrous desire to reduce reality to what is intelligible. In this paper, the author attempts to describe the difference between “essentialism” and “existentialism” as understood by Gilson. Then, he assesses the case for attributing “essentialism” to Scotus, based (...) on an assessment of Scotus texts and secondary scholarship. (shrink)