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Epistemic Paternalism and the Service Conception of Epistemic Authority

In Michel Croce & Maria Silvia Vaccarezza (eds.), Connecting Virtues: Advances in Ethics, Epistemology, and Political Philosophy. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 107–128 (2018)

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  1. False Authorities.Christoph Jäger - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-19.
    An epistemic agent A is a false epistemic authority for others iff they falsely believe A to be in a position to help them accomplish their epistemic ends. A major divide exists between what I call "epistemic quacks", who falsely believe themselves to be relevantly competent, and "epistemic charlatans", i.e., false authorities who believe or even know that they are incompetent. Both types of false authority do not cover what Lackey (2021) calls "predatory experts": experts who systematically misuse their social-epistemic (...)
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  • Epistemic Smothering is Not a Form of Epistemic Paternalism.Johannes Stoffers - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
    This paper argues that epistemic smothering is not a form of epistemic paternalism. In this sense, it refutes the claim recently made by Valerie Chock and Jonathan Matheson, who defend epistemic smothering as epistemically permissible form of epistemic paternalism. After an outline of what is meant by epistemic paternalism and epistemic smothering, based on the work by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Kristie Dotson on these topics, the paper argues against the identification of epistemic smothering as a form of epistemic paternalism. In (...)
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  • Epistemic benevolence.Shane Ryan - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):1-12.
    I make the case that what gets called epistemic paternalism isn’t correctly labelled as such. This mislabelling is problematic for two reasons. First, paternalism in general faces strong challenges to its permissibility. Second, the scope for action of epistemic paternalism is somewhat narrow given the typical concerns of applied epistemology. Having clarified epistemic paternalism and discussed the above considerations, this paper introduces epistemic benevolence. The case is made that the epistemic benevolence-based approach can avoid some of the strong challenges that (...)
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