Truth of x (independently of any description of x) that it is f. A property f which holds of x but is not per se of x is said to hold per accidens of x. The essence of an individual is the sum of its per se properties. We can formulate the following: doctrine a: concrete individuals do not have essences though abstract entities do. Doctrine b: concrete individuals have essences but they do not individuate, whereas abstract entities have essences (...) which do individuate. Assumption i: we shall say that a thing exists insofar as it has an essence. Assumption ii: we shall say that we know a thing when we know what its per se properties are. We argue that plato held doctrine a and aristotle doctrine b (with assumptions i and ii). (edited). (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the origins of Gettier-style epistemology, highlighting the philosophical and methodological debates that led to its development in the 1960s. Though present-day epistemologists assume that the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge began with Gettier’s 1963 argument against the JTB-definition, I show that this research program can be traced back to British discussions about knowledge and analysis in the 1940s and 1950s. I discuss work of, among others, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, A. J. Ayer, Norman (...) Malcom, and A. D. Woozley, showing how exchanges between different schools of analytic philosophy gave rise to new ideas about the nature of knowledge and analysis. Finally, I turn to Gettier's intellectual development and argue that his paper was influenced by some of these debates, suggesting that even his interpretation of Plato’s definition of knowledge can be traced back to discussions in this period. (shrink)

This paper is a review of the influence that lógos has had on ancient Greek, Jewish, and Christian writings. During the philosophical era known as Middle Platonism, the concept/ontology of the lógos played a unique role in enabling Pagan, Jewish, and Christian intellectuals to communicate on a small space of common ground.

AT the beginning of the third part of the Theaetetus, Socrates entertains an interesting theory of knowledge in the form of a ‘dream’. In Cornford's translation, it reads as follows: I seem to have heard some people say that what might be called the first elements () of which we and all other things consist are such that no account () can be given of them. Each of them just by itself can only be named; we cannot attribute to it (...) anything further or say that it exists or does not exist; for we should at once be attaching to it existence or nonexistence, whereas we ought to add nothing if we are to express just it alone. We ought not even to add ‘just’ or ‘it’ or ‘each’ or ‘alone’ or ‘this’, or any other of a host of such terms. (shrink)

AT the beginning of the third part of the Theaetetus , Socrates entertains an interesting theory of knowledge in the form of a ‘dream’. In Cornford's translation, it reads as follows: I seem to have heard some people say that what might be called the first elements () of which we and all other things consist are such that no account () can be given of them. Each of them just by itself can only be named; we cannot attribute to (...) it anything further or say that it exists or does not exist; for we should at once be attaching to it existence or nonexistence, whereas we ought to add nothing if we are to express just it alone. We ought not even to add ‘just’ or ‘it’ or ‘each’ or ‘alone’ or ‘this’, or any other of a host of such terms. (shrink)