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  1. Wie individuell sind intentionale Einstellungen wirklich?Ralf Stoecker - 2000 - Metaphysica 1:107-119.
    So selbstverständlich es klingt, vom Geist, der Psyche oder auch der Seele eines Menschen zu reden, und so vertraut uns wissenschaftliche Disziplinen sind, die sich philosophisch oder empirisch damit beschäftigen, so schwer fällt es, ein einheitliches Merkmale dafür anzugeben, wann etwas ein psychisches Phänomen ist. Viele der potentiellen Merkmale decken eben nur einen Teil des Spektrums dessen ab, was wir gewöhnlich als psychisch bezeichnen würden, und sind damit bestenfalls hinreichende, aber sicher keine notwendigen Bedingungen des Psychischen. Im Mittelpunkt des folgenden (...)
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  • Mereological bundle theory and the identity of indiscernibles.Anthony Shiver - 2014 - Synthese 191 (5):1-13.
    Paul (Noûs 36:578–596, 2002; Noûs 40:623–659, 2006, The Handbook of Mereology, forthcoming) has argued for a bundle theory of objects that analyzes the bundling relation between properties and objects in terms of parthood relations. In this paper I argue that any mereological bundle theory with the explanatory power of Paul’s theory will entail the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII). This is problematic, since similar bundle theories seem to fall to Max Black’s two sphere counterexample to (PII). I argue, (...)
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  • Brute facts, the necessity of identity, and the identity of indiscernibles.Charles B. Cross - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):1-10.
    In ‘Two Spheres, Twenty Spheres, and the Identity of Indiscernibles,’ Della Rocca argues that any counterexample to the PII would involve ‘a brute fact of non-identity [. . .] not grounded in any qualitative difference.’ I respond that Adams's so-called Continuity Argument against the PII does not postulate qualitatively inexplicable brute facts of identity or non-identity if understood in the context of Kripkean modality. One upshot is that if the PII is understood to quantify over modal as well as non-modal (...)
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  • Strategies for defending the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles: a critical survey and a new approach.L. G. S. Videira - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Campinas (Unicamp)
    The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is the focus of much controversy in the history of Metaphysics and in contemporary Physics. Many questions rover the debate about its truth or falsehood, for example, to which objects the principle applies? Which properties can be counted as discerning properties? Is the principle necessary? In other words, which version of the principle is the correct and is this version true? This thesis aims to answer this questions in order to show that PII (...)
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  • The identity of indiscernibles.Peter Forrest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • The argument from almost indiscernibles.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3005-3020.
    What I call the argument from almost indiscernibles is an argument, put forward by Robert Adams in 1979, for the possibility of indiscernibles based on the possibility of almost indiscernibles. The argument is that if almost indiscernibles are possible, indiscernibles are possible, but since almost indiscernible are possible, indiscernibles are possible. The argument seems to be an improvement over the mere appeal to intuitions, like that suggested by Max Black, that situations in which there are indiscernibles are possible, for the (...)
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