This article offers an in-depth analysis of Carl Schmitt's social ontology to explain how and why he came to reject exceptionalist decisionism. To this end, the authors unearth the considerable shifts in terms of social ontology that paved the way for this conceptual turn. The gist of their argument is that Schmitt's Political Theology (1922) espoused a Hobbesian conception of the political as the possibility condition for stable patters of social interaction. Though the first three chapters of Political Theology were (...) originally designed for and published in a posthumous Festschrift for Max Weber, his understanding of the social was indebted to a Hobbesian legacy. Nonetheless, shortly thereafter, he began to revise his conception of the social and to put stress on the organisational dynamics of social institutions as independent of there being a political authority. From 1927 through to 1950, Schmitt never got back to his 1922 exceptionalist view of politics and rather sought to make sense of how the state could and should draw the contents of the legal order from the normative life of social institutions. (shrink)

German lawyer and political scientist Karl Loewenstein is generally regarded as the originator of the militant democracy paradigm. In a series of articles in the mid and late 1930s, he argued that constitutional democracies should pre-emptively defend themselves against movements and parties that were seeking to undermine them. More recently, another father of the paradigm has been identified in the controversial figure of Carl Schmitt. Before his despicable and opportunistic support for the Nazi regime at the end of 1933, he (...) advocated a model of authoritarian democracy based on fundamental constitutional contents that should be made impervious to legislative change. This article examines the different models of disciplined and authoritarian democracy proposed by these authors. While both advocated measures that could inhibit the activity of parliamentary majorities composed mainly of parties opposed to the state constitutional structure, Schmitt, more than Loewenstein, made the point that the defence of democracy requires subscribing to substantive values and principles and entrenching them. The juxtaposition of these models makes it clear that militant democracy not only recommends the protection of certain procedures but also entails a normative standard comprising substantive contents. This helps to highlight the unstated normative burdens of democratic militancy. (shrink)