One of the most vigorously debated issues in attention labs concerns the nature of the coupling between the sensory-motor system and covert spatial attention. Proponents of the Premotor Theory of Attention (PToA) claim that attention should be accounted for in terms of motor preparation for goal-directed actions such as eye or hand movements. For others, it is a supramodal psychological entity that is independent of our sensorimotor machinery. Both parties also seek to articulate this controversy in terms of cognitive science (...) as a question of whether attention is embodied or disembodied cognition. The PToA is thought to advocate the embodiment of attention. We, however, are inclined to think that a more nuanced view of this conceptual framework is needed to yield some insights into how radical it actually is in terms of embodied cognition (EC). We argue that PToA still seems to bear some features of weak embodiment. Yet we suggest that it has the potential to build a stronger concept of attention as EC, but somewhat paradoxically this would require giving attention deflationary treatment and reconstructing it in other terms. We propose that the notion of pre-reflective intentionality might serve as an inspiration to this end. (shrink)