This article argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Xunzi’s and Hobbes’s understandings of human nature are qualitatively different, which is responsible for the difference in their respective normative political theory of a civil polity. This article has two main theses: first, where Hobbes’s deepest concern was with human beings’ unsocial passions, Xunzi was most concerned with human beings’ appetitive desires ( yu 欲), material self-interest, and resulting social strife; second, as a result, where Hobbes strove to transform the pathological (anti-)politics (...) of resentment into the politics of recognition by creating rational egalitarian citizenship under the all-encompassing constitutional sovereign power, Xunzi attempted to nourish human beings’ basic appetitive desires ( yu 欲) by instituting a li 禮 ordered civil entity. This article concludes by showing how Confucian civility that Xunzi reconstructed by means of the li 禮 can effectively deal with unsocial passions. (shrink)

This dissertation is based on Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action. Habermas uses communicative action as his main notion for distinguishing among four types of social actions: teleological, normatively regulated, dramaturgical and communicative action. The main characteristics of communicative action are: the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action, who try to reach an understanding about the interpretation of what constitutes the action situation, and who try to coordinate their actions by way of agreement, or "consensus." (...) ;Our main task is to apply the lessons learned about communicative action to two pre-Han Chinese traditions in the context of "words-deeds." I will emphasize the prominence of li, ritual action in the Confucian tradition, and te, potency, and tzu-jan, spontaneity in the Taoist tradition. ;I shall inter-relate the Confucian li, t'i, cheng-ming, and tao and similarly wu-wei, wu-chih, wu-yu, t'i$\sb4$ and tao for the Taoists and show how they form an "integrated" concept cluster. This will bring about a rapprochement between the Confucian and Taoist as a "fusion of horizons." We can take our stance between the two traditions to give us a better perspective to discover the shift in paradigm from a more yang to a more yin tradition. Correlatively, the main thrust of Taoism is a criticism of the Confucian ideology of the "tao of moral suasion." ;In general, the Confucian and Taoist sages are expert hermeneutic practitioners. They can explicate the relation between words and deeds, which abound in the Analects and in Mencius. They also can interpret the polarity between knowledge and action, which, in the Taoist case, becomes the "discarding of knowledge" , and wu-wei, of acting in a non-interfering way. ;We would also stress the side of "communicative receptivity," which builds upon the "passive" and "active" aspects of communicative action. In this regard, the Taoist concepts wu-wei, wu-chih, wu-yu, emphasize the non-contending, non-competitive aspects of our communicative receptivities. We will advance a concept of Chinese "sweet reasonableness" instead of the Western stress on "rationality." The clue to this reasonableness is the paradigm exemplified in Chuang-tzu's "goblet rationality," which is a metaphorical-evocative method of creating new and startling meanings, values, and significances. (shrink)

In the philosophy of Confucius, the concept _li_ is both central and elusive. While it is often translated 'ritual' or 'the rites,' I argue that there are numerous significant ways in which _li_ is as much an internal property of individuals as it is an external set of rules or norms. I discuss _li_ as deference, as developed dispositions, as embodied intelligence, and as personalized exemplary conduct. Finally, reflecting on the work of Fingarette, and Hall and Ames, as well as (...) Wilson's analysis of their work, I argue that the external _aspect_ of _li_, although reasonably understood under the rubric of 'traditional norms,' may nonetheless legitimately evolve, and that this coheres well with the notion that an internal sense-of-ritual is integral to the meaning of _li_. (shrink)

Volume 33, Issue 1, February 2023, Page 1-14.

While social-emotional learning as a specific education concept originated from North America, the thoughts on emotions and associated pedagogical practices have developed across cultures. Drawing on Confucian and Daoist perspectives, this paper aims to reconfigure an alternative of social-emotional learning, beyond the dominant framework rooted in Western liberalism. It argues that the Confucian and Daoist notions of self are ontologically interrelated and in this interrelatedness the uniqueness of all things is constructed and embedded, which expects one to be authentic and (...) appropriate in her/his emotional interactions with others. As elucidated by three selected pedagogical examples, the proposed alternative of social-emotional learning can be elaborated as cultivating a sense of interrelatedness which nurtures one’s unique emotional bonds with others and enabling one to authentically experience the emotional interrelatedness and appropriately respond to the fulfillment of others’ emotional life. This alternative may also inspire us to go beyond the social-focus as indicated in the current concept and achieve social-ecological wellbeing and harmonization, echoing many other indigenous worldviews. (shrink)