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  1. Looking for a Psychology for the Inner Rational Agent.Robert Sugden - 2015 - Social Theory and Practice 41 (4):579-598.
    Research in psychology and behavioral economics shows that individuals’ choices often depend on “irrelevant” contextual factors. This presents problems for normative economics, which has traditionally used preference-satisfaction as its criterion. A common response is to claim that individuals have context-independent latent preferences which are “distorted” by psychological factors, and that latent preferences should be respected. This response implicitly uses a model of human action in which each human being has an “inner rational agent.” I argue that this model is psychologically (...)
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  • Obligation, Free Choice, and the Logic of Weakest Permissions.Albert J. J. Anglberger, Nobert Gratzl & Olivier Roy - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):807-827.
    We introduce a new understanding of deontic modals that we callobligations as weakest permissions. We argue for its philosophical plausibility, study its expressive power in neighborhood models, provide a complete Hilbert-style axiom system for it and show that it can be extended and applied to practical norms in decision and game theory.
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  • Reasoning with reasons: Lewis on common knowledge.Huub Vromen - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (2):397-418.
    David Lewis is widely regarded as the philosopher who introduced the concept of common knowledge. His account of common knowledge differs greatly from most later accounts in philosophy and economy, with the central notion of his theory being ‘having reason to believe’ rather than ‘knowledge’. Unfortunately, Lewis’s account is rather informal, and the argument has a few gaps. This paper assesses two major attempts to formalise Lewis’s account and argues that these formalisations are missing a crucial aspect of this account. (...)
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  • Institutions, rule-following and game theory.Cyril Hédoin - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (1):43-72.
    :Most game-theoretic accounts of institutions reduce institutions to behavioural patterns the players are incentivized to implement. An alternative account linking institutions to rule-following behaviour in a game-theoretic framework is developed on the basis of David Lewis’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein's respective accounts of conventions and language games. Institutions are formalized as epistemic games where the players share some forms of practical reasoning. An institution is a rule-governed game satisfying three conditions: common understanding, minimal awareness and minimal practical rationality. Common understanding has (...)
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  • Frames, reasoning, and the emergence of conventions.Nicola Campigotto - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (3):383-400.
    This paper examines the perceptual and reasoning processes that underpin regularities in behaviour. A distinction is made between situations as they are, or as described by an omniscient external observer, and situations as agents see or frame them. Different frames can stem from differences in culture, experience and personality, as well as from other context-specific factors. Drawing upon David Lewis’sConvention(1969), I show that consistency between reasoning and experience does not preclude individuals from understanding the same state of affairs differently, and (...)
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  • On David Gauthier’s Theories of Coordination and Cooperation.Robert Sugden - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (4):713-737.
    En 1975, David Gauthier a discuté la question desjeux de coordination purede Schelling et desjeux Hi-Lode Hodgson. Tout en proposant une analyse originale de la façon dont les joueurs rationnels se coordonnent sur des «points focaux», Gauthier a soutenu contre Schelling et Hodgson que dans ces jeux, une coordination réussie ne dépend pas de déviations par rapport aux principes conventionnels du choix rationnel individuel. J’avance que l’analyse de la maximisation contrainte proposée par Gauthier dansMorals by Agreement, qui s’éloigne de façon (...)
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  • On the use (and abuse) of Logic in Game Theory.Eric Pacuit - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):741-753.
    IntroductionA quick glance at the opening paragraphs in many of the classic logic textbooks reveals a common view: Logical methods highlight the reasoning patterns of a single agent engaged in some form of mathematical thinking.A sampling from my bookshelf: Shoenfield’s Mathematical Logic: “Logic is the study of reasoning; and mathematical logic is the study of the type of reasoning done by mathematicians”; Enderton’s A Mathematical Introduction of Logic: “Symbolic logic is a mathematical model of deductive thought”; and Chiswell and Hodges (...)
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