The purpose of this article is to consider critically the humanistic potential of Olympism. We consider the concepts ‘human’ and ‘humanism’ from an existential perspective. Existentialism argues that human beings exist in a state of freedom. Freedom, as the basis of being human, holds a human fully responsible for his or her own existence. This responsibility assumes an active mode of behaviour, predicated on human effort. It can also include the making of specific artifacts such as creating creations. According to (...) Mamardashvili, creating creations are unique cultural mechanisms that remain in the boundaries of morality, beauty, thought and so on, adding quality to human existence. The article argues that the desire to be fulfilled as a human being is the moral basis to which Olympism directs Olympic athletes. Moreover, Olympism expresses the human’s need of self-overcoming, constant self-perfection which is necessary aspect of the humanity. Thus, the humanistic potential of Olympism lies in the fact that it allows for the creative space in sport which is itself a place for human realization. Therefore, Olympism can be characterized as opera operans, creating creation. (shrink)

This work is an investigation into philosophical method and rational argument in moral philosophy. It makes an original contribution to human understanding, by taking some of the tools and techniques that Gordon Baker identifies in the later work of Wittgenstein, and using them as a way of fending for oneself in an area of philosophy that neither Baker, nor Wittgenstein, wrote on. More specifically, a discussion of some different aspects of the contemporary literature on Dancy’s moral particularism is used as (...) a vehicle for illustrating how Baker’s therapeutic conception of philosophy offers alternative possibilities for how we can do philosophy, and what counts as rational argument in moral philosophy. I maintain that, by considering some indicative ways in which Baker’s therapeutic approach to philosophy can dissolve, rather than solve, the kinds of perplexities found in the existing literature on Dancy’s moral particularism, we can liberate ourselves from the traditional/theoretical view of how we ought to do philosophy, and an understanding of rational argument in moral philosophy, to which we need not be committed. (shrink)

This paper builds on a previous discussion of Stephen Mumford’s rejection of what he takes to be David Best’s argument for a distinction between purposive and aesthetic sports. That discussion concluded that Mumford’s argument misses its target, but closed by introducing a possible alternative argument, not made by Mumford, that might be thought to have the potential to secure Mumford’s conclusion. This paper considers that alternative argument, namely, the thought that the ascription of psychological predicates conceived of in terms of (...) defeasible criteria that constitute logically good evidence could preserve Best’s claim to be making a logical point while allowing a place for intention in relation to aims and purposes in sport. It is argued that the relationship between rules and intention is such that this alternative argument cannot secure Mumford’s conclusion. (shrink)