The idea that insight is by nature incompatible with concentration has been a long-term focus of scholarly discussion regarding the interpretation of some sūtra passages that could suggest the occurrence of insight within concentration. In the Prajñāpāramitā literature, the set of three samādhis is identified with insight, the prajñāpāramitā. Some scholars identify the experience of emptiness in these samādhis with a state of concentration, very likely the absorption of extinction. I highlight elsewhere a passage in the Prajñāpāramitā in which preceding (...) vows play an important role in the practice of emptiness, that is, the prajñāpāramitā and may apply to the moment just before entering into the absorption of extinction. However, the problem of how the prajñāpāramitā is by nature incompatible with concentration could be practiced in the absorption of extinction remains. In the Sāgaramatiparipṛcchāsūtra there is a passage which illustrates the significance and effect of dedications preceding the practice of the three samādhis. According to this passage, the set of three samādhis is sometimes described as some very deep concentrations; at their emergence there could be two different attainments: either nirvāṇa or all-knowing accompanied by all qualities of the Buddha. This paper looks into the several steps immediately before the attainment of all-knowing by revealing a new usage of “dedications” in the Sāgaramatiparipṛcchāsūtra. (shrink)

This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s new categorical imperative : it suggests that the new imperative is an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential part of moral philosophy, (...) and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge to be translated into right action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My interpretation of the new categorical imperative focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the old, Kantian one—self-evidence and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae. (shrink)

Though each of its four constituent essays has received scholarly attention in itself, Hume?s Four Dissertations (1757) has received virtually no consideration from scholars as a unified whole. This article offers such an assessment, and argues that two crucially Humean themes link the four texts. First, they show the applicability of Hume?s theory of the passions to a wide range of questions: to the philosophy of religion, to psychology, and to aesthetics. Second, they show Hume grappling with the tension between (...) his iconoclastic religious skepticism and his valorization of tolerant and sociable exchange between thinkers with differing views. (shrink)