In this paper, I will present the empirical version of the slippery slope argument (SSA) in the field of genome editing. According to the SSA, if we adopt germline manipulation of embryos we will eventually end up performing or allowing something morally reprehensible, such as new coercive eugenics. I will investigate the actual possibility of sliding towards eugenics: thus, I will examine enhancement and eugenics both in the classical and liberal versions, through the lens of SSA. In the first part, (...) I will discuss the classical eugenics from a historical perspective and conclude that classical eugenics is morally deplorable; but by currently accepting genome editing I argue that it is not possible to ‘slip’ into classical eugenics. Then, I will analyze liberal eugenics: I will consider Habermas’ and Sandel’s objections to liberal eugenics and genetic human enhancement. Subsequently, I will reply to these arguments affirming that, although it is not possible to refuse any form of genetic enhancement, liberal eugenics would not consider the principles of justice, non-maleficence, and non-instrumentalization; hence, it should be considered not morally acceptable. In addition, I will support the thesis according to which the possibility of relapsing into liberal eugenics is more likely than relapsing into classical eugenics. Then, I will present a strategy that, while avoiding falling into the undesirable scenarios related to SSA, still accepts some application of germline genome editing of embryos and gametes. In such a way, I will show that even if we accept the plausibility of a certain slip into an undesirable scenario, SSA does not offer conclusive reasons to forbid any use of germline genome editing technique in both therapeutic and enhancement fields. (shrink)

The majority of German specialists in reproductive medicine opposes preimplantation sex selection for nonmedical reasons while recommending preimplantation sex selection for medical reasons, e.g. X-linked diseases like haemophilia.

Non-medical sex selection is premised on the notion that the sexes are not interchangeable. Studies of individuals who undergo sex selection for non-medical reasons, or who have a preference for a son or daughter, show that they assume their child will conform to the stereotypical roles and norms associated with their sex. However, the evidence currently available has not succeeded in showing that the gender traits and inclinations sought are caused by a “male brain” or a “female brain”. Therefore, as (...) far as we know, there is no biological reason why parents cannot have the kind of parenting experience they seek with a child of any sex. Yet gender essentialism, a set of unfounded assumptions about the sexes which pervade society and underpin sexism, prevents parents from realising this freedom. In other words, unfounded assumptions about gender constrain not only a child’s autonomy, but also the parent’s. To date, reproductive autonomy in relation to sex selection has predominantly been regarded merely as the freedom to choose the sex of one’s child. This paper points to at least two interpretations of reproductive autonomy and argues that sex selection, by being premised on gender essentialism and/or the social pressure on parents to ensure their children conform to gender norms, undermines reproductive autonomy on both accounts. (shrink)

The Sorting Society: The Ethics of Genetic Screening and Therapy. Edited by Loane Skene & Janna Thompson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008.

In a near-future world of bionics and biotechnology, the main ethical and political issue will be the definition of who we are. Could biomedical enhancements transform us to such an extent that we would be other than human? Habermas argues that any genetic enhancement intervention that could potentially alter ‘human nature’ should be morally prohibited since it alters the child’s nature or the very essence that makes the child who he is. This practice also commits the child to a specific (...) life project or, in any case, it puts specific restrictions on his freedom to choose a life of his own. Ultimately, genetic enhancement jeopardizes the very foundations of moral equality. I contend that Habermas’ argument is based either on a series of presuppositions that imply a gross misunderstanding of evolution or the relevant factual information cocerning the action we are about to morally assess is not empirically supported. Hence, the argument from human nature is based on a series of false or problematic assumptions, and, as such, it fails to play the normative role intended by Habermas. (shrink)

This paper examines dominant arguments advocating for the procreative right to undergo sex selection for social reasons, based on gender preference. I present four of the most recognized and common justifications for sex selection: the argument from natural sex selection, the argument from procreative autonomy, the argument from family balancing, and the argument from children’s well-being. Together these represent the various means by which scholars aim to defend access to sex selection for social reasons as a legitimate procreative choice. In (...) response, I contend that these justifications are flawed and often inconsistent and therefore fail to vindicate the practice. (shrink)