“Responsible lobbying” is an increasingly salient topic within business and management. We make a contribution to the literature on “responsible lobbying” in three ways. First, we provide novel definitions and, thereby, make a clear distinction between lobbying and corporate political activity. We then define responsible lobbying with respect to its content, process, organization, and environment, resulting in a typology of responsible lobbying, a conceptual model that informs the rest of the paper. Second, the paper provides a thematic overview of the (...) current literature underpinning lobbying and the responsible firm, and the underlying paradigms informing this literature. Third, the paper makes specific suggestions for a future research agenda, ending with a consideration of methodological implications of such research. (shrink)

This study investigates the pivotal policy question of whether a firm’s corporate governance influences its political spending disclosures. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms from 2011 to 2019, we find empirical evidence that a board of directors’ monitoring and resource provision roles affect a firm’s political spending disclosure. Extending agency theory-driven expectations, we provide evidence that measures of a board’s monitoring role such as female monitoring directors, shorter board tenure, audit committee size, audit committee meetings, and audit committee education (...) enhance a firm’s political spending disclosures. Second, drawing from resource dependence theory and examining a board’s resource provisions, we find evidence that female advisory directors, CEO duality, additional directorships, and audit committee characteristics (i.e., size, number of meetings, age, and education) promote political spending disclosures. The study contributes to corporate governance and corporate political activity literatures by outlining different types of governance that may drive a firm’s political spending disclosures, a key component of a firm’s political responsibility. (shrink)

Research on corporate political activity has considered a number of antecedents to a firm’s engagement in politics. The majority of this research has focused on either industry or firm-level motivations that lead to corporate political activity, leaving the role of the firm’s leader noticeably absent in such scholarship. This article combines ideas from Upper Echelons Theory with research in corporate political activity to bridge this important gap. More specifically, this research utilizes CEO demographic characteristics to determine whether a firm will (...) invest in political activity and how these characteristics influence the particular approach to political activity the firm undertakes. Considering 27 years of data from large U.S. firms, we find that a CEO’s age, tenure, functional, and educational backgrounds influence whether and how the firm invests in political activity. (shrink)

We investigate what determines a multinational enterprise’s propensity to engage in lobbying and bribing in host countries where the overall institutional development for market exchanges is insufficient, and thus, their governance systems are relatively weak. We extend the current literature on institutional strategies by theorizing and showing the persistent and significant impacts of home country institutions on an MNE’s choice of influencing activities to address institutional constraints overseas. More specifically, our results demonstrate that the MNEs from a home country with (...) a stronger governance system are less involved in bribery, but have a higher tendency to lobby in transition economy countries, which have been characterized by relatively weaker institutional development, particularly in the area of governance. This tendency still holds even when these MNEs rely more on the local market for sales. We draw theoretical and practical implications from these observations. (shrink)

Conversely to the United States, lobbying consulting in France is a relatively recent activity and is perceived negatively by a majority of the population. Influencing public decision-making is certainly a sensitive occupation at both managerial and societal levels. This is why ethics applied to business can play a central role while establishing the practice of lobbying in France. This paper examines the issues and the practices of ethics in lobbying consulting. The field for this exploratory study is a lobbying consultancy (...) firm based in France. Our research is developed through a 3-month participant observation and complemented with secondary data on the lobbying profession in France. The results of this research are developed along two lines: The practice of ethics in lobbying consultancy firms reveals its limits as well as a framework worth developing. The players and the represented client topics are potential dangers for ethical lobbying firms. This intervention research has nevertheless allowed us to observe the emergence of an effective regulation approach: the ethics of exemplarity as potentially illustrated by a representative actor of the French lobbying consulting profession. The stakes of ethics are both internal and external to lobbying consulting professionals in France. Internally, ethics act as a structuring element enabling this profession to establish itself with practices and deontological codes; externally, it clarifies the relationship between lobbying consultants and their major stakeholders including customers, government, and the civil society. (shrink)

Responding to calls for more substantive studies into ethical and responsible lobbying, we analyze data collected over a 5-year period in Brussels to explore how individual lobbyists understand the ethical dimensions of their work. Mobilizing insights from the sociology of the professions, we expose an emerging lobbying professionalism and unpack practitioners’ understandings of what being a professional lobbyist entails, focusing in particular on their espoused values of transparency and honesty. While expectations to lobby more transparently and honestly stem from political (...) institutions, we find individual lobbyists—acting as conduits—attempt to disseminate these expectations by setting limits that incite their clients to embrace what policymakers consider professional lobbying practice. Our study contributes to corporate political activity (CPA) scholarship by providing a professions-based understanding of ethical and responsible approaches to lobbying. We provide new insights into contextual and individual-level factors behind the emergence of such approaches, and elucidate implications of lobbying professionalism for business and European Union (EU) governance. (shrink)

This article connects the previously isolated literatures on corporate citizenship and corporate political activity to explain how firms construct political influence in the public sphere. The public engagement of firms as political actors is explored empirically through a discursive analysis of a public debate between the mining industry and the Australian government over a proposed tax. The findings show how the mining industry acted as a corporate citizen concerned about the common good. This, in turn, legitimized corporate political activity, which (...) undermined deliberation about the common good. The findings explain how the public sphere is refeudalized through corporate manipulation of deliberative processes via what we term corporate citizenspeak—simultaneously speaking as corporate citizens and for individual citizens. Corporate citizenspeak illustrates the duplicitous engagement of firms as political actors, claiming political legitimacy while subverting deliberative norms. This contributes to the theoretical development of corporations as political actors by explaining how corporate interests are aggregated to represent the common good and how corporate political activity is employed to dominate the public sphere. This has important implications for understanding how corporations undermine democratic principles. (shrink)

The number and scale of business associations focused on corporate responsibility and sustainability has grown dramatically in recent decades and they are becoming influential actors in both national and international governance. Yet surprisingly little research exists on such organizations and recognition of the organizational lineage they share with special interest groups is yet to be examined—are industry business associations merely lobbies for their members’ own interests or are they viable self-regulatory institutions capable of addressing contemporary social and sustainability issues? This (...) paper identifies and reviews fragmented insights from literatures that address this question. Drawing on various streams of research within the political science, economics and management disciplines that provide diverse lenses on the phenomenon of business associations, it juxtaposes and groups them into two broad perspectives: business associations as special interest groups that are detrimental to society ; business associations as self-regulatory institutions capable of addressing contemporary challenges. (shrink)

Research on corporate political connections has long focused on their strategic and financial outcomes. Yet, most of this research has avoided exploring the downstream risks associated with such connections, in particular, legal risks. The buffering nature of political connections, aimed at reducing sociopolitical uncertainty, as well as their potential to provide public policy benefits and protection, may cause politically connected firms to be more insular and less sensitive in their obligations and commitments to firm outsiders and thus be targeted for (...) lawsuits. Exploring the S & P 1000 firms for 16 years and controlling for other aspects of political activity, across different analytical approaches, I find consistent evidence that corporate political connections are associated with lawsuits and associated with corporate‐governance‐related lawsuits. I further document that the monitoring and disciplining presence of equity blockholders moderates the association between political connections and lawsuits. The findings shed a novel light on the need to explore downstream legal risks, associated with politically connected firms, and the potential legal costs of political ties. (shrink)