In this paper, we develop a formalisation of the main ideas of the work of Van de Poel on responsibility. Using the basic concepts through which the meanings of responsibility are defined, we construct a logic which enables to express sentences like “individual i is accountable for φ”, “individual i is blameworthy for φ” and “individual i has the obligation to see to it that φ”. This formalization clarifies the definitions of responsibility given by Van de Poel and highlights their (...) differences and similarities. It also helps to assess the consistency of the formalisation of responsibility, not only by showing that definitions are not inconsistent, but also by providing a formal demonstration of the relation between three main meanings of responsibility. The formal account can be used to derive new properties of the concepts. With the help of the formalisation, we detect the occurrence of the problem of many hands by defining a logical framework for reasoning about collective and individual responsibility. This logic extends the Coalition Epistemic Dynamic Logic by adding a notion of group knowledge, agent ability and knowing how to its semantics. (shrink)

Hamblin's Action-State Semantics provides a sound philosophical foundation for understanding the character of the imperative. Taking this as our inspiration, in this paper we present a logic of action, which we call ST, that captures the clear ontological distinction between being responsible for the achievement of a state of affairs and being responsible for the performance of an action. We argue that a relativised modal logic of type RT founded upon a ternary relation over possible worlds integrated with a basic (...) tense logic captures intuitions of the Hamblinian model of imperatives. The logic implements a direct mapping of each of Hamblin's key concepts: strategies, partial strategies and wholehearted satisfaction. (shrink)

Hamblin’s Action-State Semantics provides a sound philosophical foundation for understanding the character of the imperative. Taking this as our inspiration, in this paper we present a logic of action, which we call ST, that captures the clear ontological distinction between being responsible for the achievement of a state of affairs and being responsible for the performance of an action. We argue that a relativised modal logic of type RT founded upon a ternary relation over possible worlds integrated with a basic (...) tense logic captures intuitions of the Hamblinian model of imperatives. The logic implements a direct mapping of each of Hamblin’s key concepts: strategies, partial strategies and wholehearted satisfaction. (shrink)

This paper tackles the problem of inference in normative systems where norms concerning actions and states of affairs appear together. A deontic logic of actions and states is proposed as a solution. It is made up of two independent deontic logics, namely a deontic logic of action and a deontic logic of states, interlinked by bridging definitions. It is shown at a language and a model level how an agent should look for norms to follow in a concrete situation. It (...) is pointed out that such specific norms are obtained by finding the most specific obligation and the most general prohibition. They are to be derived from all norms applicable to the situation by using the principles of the logic presented in this paper. (shrink)

One way to allocate tasks to agents is by ascribing them obligations. From obligations to be, agents are able to infer what are the forbidden, permitted and obligatory actions they may perform, by using the well-known Meyer’s reduction from obligations to be to obligations to do. However, we show through an example that this method is not completely adequate to guide agents’ decisions. We then propose a solution using, instead of obligations, the concept of ‘responsibility’. To formalise responsibility we use (...) a multiagent extension of propositional dynamic logic as framework, and then we define some basic concepts, such as ‘agent ability’, also briefly discussing the problem of uniform strategies and a possible solution. In the last part, we show that our framework can be used in the specification of normative multiagent systems, by presenting an extensive running example. (shrink)