Stephan Darwall (2006, 2010) claims that a conceptual connection exists between moral obligation and what he calls ‘second-personal reasons.’ In particular, he (2006) claims that, “moral obligation is an irreducibly second-personal concept. That an action would violate a moral obligation is…a second-personal reason not to do it.” A second-personal reason, according to him (2006), is “a distinctive kind of (normative) reason for acting,” a reason made on one’s will and purportedly given by an authority’s demand or address. This paper argues (...) that Darwall fails to establish the above conceptual connection between second-personal reasons and moral obligation. Since Darwall’s construal of the second-person standpoint is original and the best known version, if I am right, then it seems that there is no conceptual connection between second-personal reasons and moral obligations. The implication is that second-personal reasons at best account for only interpersonal morality. (shrink)