This paper reviews current debates in social epistemology about the relations ‎between ‎knowledge ‎and consensus. These relations are philosophically interesting on their ‎own, but ‎also have ‎practical consequences, as consensus takes an increasingly significant ‎role in ‎informing public ‎decision making. The paper addresses the following questions. ‎When is a ‎consensus attributable to an epistemic community? Under what conditions may ‎we ‎legitimately infer that a consensual view is knowledge-based or otherwise ‎epistemically ‎justified? Should consensus be the aim of scientific inquiry, and (...) if so, what ‎kind of ‎consensus? How should dissent be handled? It is argued that a legitimate inference ‎that a ‎theory is correct from the fact that there is a scientific consensus on it requires taking ‎into ‎consideration both cognitive properties of the theory as well as social properties of ‎the ‎consensus. The last section of the paper reviews computational models of ‎consensus ‎formation.‎. (shrink)

ArgumentA plagiarism charge in 1827 sparked a public controversy centered between Jean-Victor Poncelet (1788–1867) and Joseph-Diez Gergonne (1771–1859) over the origin and applications of the principle of duality in geometry. Over the next three years and through the pages of various journals, monographs, letters, reviews, reports, and footnotes, vitriol between the antagonists increased as their potential publicity grew. While the historical literature offers valuable resources toward understanding the development, content, and applications of geometric duality, the hostile nature of the exchange (...) seems to have deterred an in-depth textual study of the explicitly polemical writings. We argue that the necessary collective endeavor of beginning and ending this controversy constitutes a case study in the circulation of geometry. In particular, we consider how the duality controversy functioned as a medium of communicating new fundamental principles to a wider audience of practitioners. (shrink)

La oposición a una estricta separación entre las dimensiones dialéctica y retórica de la actividad argumentativa es una de las aportaciones más destacadas y peculiares de la denominada escuela holandesa sobre argumentación. Frans H. van Eemeren y Peter Houtlosser reaccionaron contra una separación estricta entre dialéctica y retórica en varios trabajos, pero uno de los más inspiradores es sin duda su artículo “William the Silent’s argumentative discourse” (1998) presentado en la ciudad de Ámsterdam con ocasión de la cuarta conferencia organizada (...) por la International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). Sobre este tema siguieron investigando para presentar un análisis de la perspectiva dialéctica inherente al caso de Guillermo I de Orange en un congreso de la Japan Debate Association en Tokio (van Eemeren y Houtlosser, 2000). (shrink)

A consensus in a scientific community is often used as a resource for making informed public-policy decisions and deciding between rival expert testimonies in legal trials. This paper contains a social-epistemic analysis of the high-profile Bendectin drug controversy, which was decided in the courtroom inter alia by deference to a scientific consensus about the safety of Bendectin. Drawing on my previously developed account of knowledge-based consensus, I argue that the consensus in this case was not knowledge based, hence courts’ deference (...) to it was not epistemically justified. I draw sceptical lessons from this analysis regarding the value of scientific consensus as a desirable and reliable means of resolving scientific controversies in public life. (shrink)

Well prior to the invention of the term ‘biology’ in the early 1800s by Lamarck and Treviranus, and also prior to the appearance of terms such as ‘organism’ under the pen of Leibniz in the early 1700s, the question of ‘Life’, that is, the status of living organisms within the broader physico-mechanical universe, agitated different corners of the European intellectual scene. From modern Epicureanism to medical Newtonianism, from Stahlian animism to the discourse on the ‘animal economy’ in vitalist medicine, models (...) of living being were constructed in opposition to ‘merely anatomical’, structural, mechanical models. It is therefore curious to turn to the ‘passion play’ of the Scientific Revolution – whether in its early, canonical definitions or its more recent, hybridized, reconstructed and expanded versions: from Koyré to Biagioli, from Merton to Shapin – and find there a conspicuous absence of worry over what status to grant living beings in a newly physicalized universe. Neither Harvey, nor Boyle, nor Locke (to name some likely candidates, the latter having studied with Willis and collaborated with Sydenham) ever ask what makes organisms unique, or conversely, what does not. In this paper I seek to establish how ‘Life’ became a source of contention in early modern thought, and how the Scientific Revolution missed the controversy. (shrink)

The paper discusses the sense in which the changes undergone by normative economics in the twentieth century can be said to be progressive. A simple criterion is proposed to decide whether a sequence of normative theories is progressive. This criterion is put to use on the historical transition from the new welfare economics to social choice theory. The paper reconstructs this classic case, and eventually concludes that the latter theory was progressive compared with the former. It also briefly comments on (...) the recent developments in normative economics and their connection with the previous two stages. (Published Online April 18 2006) Footnotes1 This paper suspersedes an earlier one entitled “Is There Progress in Normative Economics?” (Mongin 2002). I thank the organizers of the Fourth ESHET Conference (Graz 2000) for the opportunity they gave me to lecture on this topic. Thanks are also due to J. Alexander, K. Arrow, A. Bird, R. Bradley, M. Dascal, W. Gaertner, N. Gravel, D. Hausman, B. Hill, C. Howson, N. McClennen, A. Trannoy, J. Weymark, J. Worrall, two annonymous referees of this journal, and especially the editor M. Fleurbaey, for helpful comments. The editor's suggestions contributed to determine the final orientation of the paper. The author is grateful to the LSE and the Lachmann Foundation for their support at the time when he was writing the initial version. (shrink)

The paper uses the controversy about liberty between the philosopher Thomas Hobbes and Archbishop John Bramhall to illustrate the conflict between the rhetoric of philosophy and the rhetoric of religion. The first part of the paper introduces initial definitions of these two types of rhetoric. The following three parts deal with three distinct parts of the controversy, as Hobbes and Bramhall define them: to the reader, arguments from scripture, and arguments from reason. The fact that Hobbes and Bramhall themselves divide (...) the arguments into those from scripture and those from reason makes this controversy a good illustration of the conflict between rhetoric of philosophy and rhetoric of religion. The rhetorical perspective exposes the epistemological conflict between philosophy and religion that the philosophical discourse often blurs. It is a conflict that concerns the basic attitude of an individual towards the truth as a believer or as a thinker. The rhetoric of philosophy assumes that human understanding defines the truth and therefore gives priority to arguments from reason as they address that understanding. The rhetoric of religion assumes that truth is beyond human understanding and can only be revealed by faith and therefore gives priority to arguments from scripture as they address human faith. The reader may join the opponents in asking whether human liberty is a philosophical issue and therefore subject to arguments from reason or a theological one, subject to arguments from scripture. (shrink)

The laser, first operated in 1960, produced light with coherence properties that demanded explanation. While some attempted a treatment within the framework of classical coherence theory, others insisted that only quantum electrodynamics could give adequate insight and generality. The result was a sharp and rather bitter controversy, conducted over the physics and mathematics that were being deployed, but also over the criteria for doing good science. Three physicists were at the center of this dispute, Emil Wolf, Max Born’s collaborator on (...) a canonical text on optics as a branch of classical electromagnetism, Roy J. Glauber, a student of Julian Schwinger and a high-energy particle theorist, and Leonard Mandel, both experimentalist and theorist and versed in the physics of photodetection. The story told here is thus one of three distinct research trajectories and of the explosion that occurred when, pushed into the well-financed field of laser studies, these trajectories collided. (shrink)

One of the features of John Locke’s moral philosophy is the idea that morality is based on our beliefs concerning the future good. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, xxi, §70, Locke argues that we have to decide between the probability of afterlife and our present temptations. In itself, this kind of decision model is not rare in Early Modern philosophy. Blaise Pascal’s Wager is a famous example of a similar idea of balancing between available options which Marcelo Dascal (...) has discussed in his important 2005 article “The Balance of Reason”. -/- Leibniz, however, was not always satisfied with this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke’s Essay, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, xxi, §66, he presented an alternative model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits well with Leibniz’s theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different inclinations to different goods. -/- I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the practical rationality of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. The topics include Leibniz’s criticism of Lockean hedonism and the discussion of akratic behaviour in II, xxi of Essay and Nouveaux essais. (shrink)

Cette contribution esquisse un cadre méthodologique pour l'étude des controverses en histoire de la philosophie. Il se construit autour de quatre composants fondamentaux: textes, contextes, prétextes et circonstances. Nous montrons comment, une fois ces éléments identifiés et systématiquement distingués et distribués, une controverse est localisée et circonscrite. En outre, nous montrons comment, formellement, les controverses sont reliées entre elles par le biais de la migration des textes d'un contexte à un autre. Ensuite, nous prenons pour exemple une controverse clé dans (...) l'histoire de la philosophie politique, la controverse à l'âge classique sur le jus circa sacra, « le droit des affaires sacrées », en nous penchant en particulier sur les travaux de Grotius, de Hobbes et de Spinoza. (shrink)

If we had a balance of reasons, where the arguments presented in favor and against the case were weighed precisely and the verdict could be pronounced in favor of the most inclined scale ... [we would have] a more valuable art than that miraculous science of producing gold.

Controversies in science are an essential feature of scientific practice: defined here as current problems that are unresolved because there are no accepted procedures by which they can be resolved or there are differing assumptions that affect the interpretation of evidence. Although there has been much attention in science education literature addressing socio-scientific and historical controversies in science, less has been paid to the teaching of contemporary scientific controversies. Using semi-structured qualitative interviews with 18 teachers at different career stages in (...) England, we investigated teachers’ social representations of scientific controversies using the discourse of the collective subject. We found a lack of controversy in teachers’ responses. Whilst scientific controversies were seen as an essential feature of how science works, they were not viewed as essential in science education and were represented as a distraction and dealt with informally, outside the planned curriculum and in response to students’ questions. Subject knowledge was considered a barrier. We argue that teaching about carefully selected scientific controversies has the potential to contribute to teachers’ and students’ understandings of science and the nature of science. There are perceived to be few opportunities for teachers to exercise this in the English context. We suggest how the collective subject discourses might be used to open up a discussion about teaching controversies in professional learning situations. Materials to stimulate discussion of scientific controversies could be useful in future curriculum development in science, but these would need to address the barriers of subject knowledge, access to literature and conflict with assessment-related priorities and a perceived need to advocate for trust in science. (shrink)

The reorganization of the astronomical community during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, due to the rise of astrophysics, was seen by some scientists as an opportunity to join an international community of prestigious researchers. This was the case of astronomers such as Josep Comas i Solà, who publicly argued with Eugène Michel Antoniadi during the first decades of the twentieth century about the veracity of astronomical observations and theoretical conclusions on Mars and Jupiter. Their priority claims and public (...) disputes have to be understood in a new context that provided an exceptional opportunity for amateur and professional astronomers both to play an active role in the most interesting scientific debates of these years and to gain prestige, legitimacy and power. (shrink)

We outline three challenges involved in designing external representations that promote sustainable use of natural resources. First, the task environment of sustainable resource-use is highly unstructured, and involves many uncoordinated and asynchronous actions. Following from this complex nature of the task environment, more task constraints and task interactions are involved in designing representations promoting sustainability, compared to representations that seek to make tasks easier in structured task environments, such as aircraft cockpits and control rooms. Second, external representations promoting sustainable resource-use (...) need to motivate people to make decisions that sustain resources, and persist with this behavior, even though alternate behaviors are easier and commonplace. Third, external representations promoting sustainability also need to lower the cognitive load involved in sustainability decisions. This three-tiered function (meeting complex task constraints, providing motivation, lowering cognitive load) makes such representations challenging to design. However, some early prototype designs promoting sustainable resource-use have appeared recently, primarily addressing electricity use. Analyzing these digital prototypes, we outline three design principles they share, and show how these seek to address the complexities of the sustainability problem-space (complexity of task environments, goals, and representations). We then argue that at least two further cognitive scaffolds are required for effectively promoting sustainable resource use (action scripts, deconstruction). We close with some of the limitations of this approach to promoting sustainability, and outline future work. (shrink)

Some critical reactions hardly give clues to the arguer as to how to respond to them convinc-ingly. Other critical reactions convey some or even all of the considerations that make the critic critical of the arguer’s position and direct the arguer to defuse or to at least contend with them. First, an explication of the notion of a critical reaction will be provided, zooming in on the degree of ‘directiveness’ that a critical reaction displays. Second, it will be examined whether (...) and to what extent there is a normative requirement to strive after criticism that is more than minimally directive. In this paper, it is hypothesized that the com-petitiveness inherent in critical discussion must be mitigated by making the opponent responsible for providing her counterconsiderations, if available, thus assisting the proponent in developing an argumenta-tive strategy that defuses them. (shrink)