Very few moral philosophers have written on climate change.1 This is puzzling, for several reasons. First, many politicians and policy makers claim that climate change is not only the most serious environmental problem currently facing the world, but also one of the most important international problems per se.2 Second, many of those working in other disciplines describe climate change as fundamentally an ethical issue.3.

The subject of this thesis is ethical aspects of risk management. It is argued that a model for risk management needs to be developed that acknowledges several ethical aspects and most crucial among these, the individual’s right not to be unfairly exposed to risks. Article I takes as its starting point the demand frequently expressed in the risk literature for a consistent risk management. Such consistency is often assumed to be in accordance with some kind of cost-benefit analysis. It is (...) maintained that such a model, here called the Standard Model, does not respect the rights of the individual. Two alternative models are outlined in order to better deal with this ethical weakness, the Model of Inviolable Rights and the Model of Procedural Justice. The arguments in the alternative models evolve around the separateness of individuals, rights and fair risk taking. It is claimed that the latter model, which focuses on a fair procedure, seems most fruitful to develop. Article II is a discussion of the NIMBY conflict, which is well known from situations of siting potentially risky facilities. Of special concern is to investigate what the ethical premises are behind the negative characterization of the NIMBY concept. It is argued that, contrary to the assumption that the total benefit should outweigh the individual’s cost, individuals in siting scenarios have rights not to be unfairly exposed to risks. Article III, which is co-authored with Professor Sven Ove Hansson, presents a three party model as a tool for ethical risk analysis. It is argued that ethical dimensions need to be acknowledged in the analysis of risks and that this is best done through a discussion of three parties that are involved in risk decisions – the risk-exposed, the beneficiary, and the decisionmaker. Seven crucial ethical questions are recognized and discussed regarding the relation between these parties. By using examples from the railway sector it is shown how the questions can be used to identify salient ethical features of risk management problems. (shrink)

Utilitarianism has a curious history. Its most celebrated founders—Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill—were radical progressives, straddling the worlds of academic philosophy, political science, economic theory and practical affairs. They made innumerable recommendations for legal, social, political and economic reform, often (especially in Bentham’s case) described in fine detail. Some of these recommendations were followed, sooner or later, and many of their radical ideas have become close to articles of faith of western liberalism. Furthermore many of these recommendations were made (...) expressly to improve the condition of the deprived, or of oppressed groups. Yet the moral theory which inspired this reforming zeal is, at least officially, utilitarianism, and when we teach this theory to our students we feel it our duty to point out the horrors that could be justified by any theory which assesses the moral quality of actions in terms of the maximization of good consequences over bad. No consequence is so bad that it cannot, in principle, be outweighed by a large aggregation of smaller goods. Hence there are circumstances in which utilitarianism can require slavery, the punishment of the innocent, and redistribution of resources from the poor to the rich, or from the disabled and the sick to the able bodied and healthy. Indeed, in the right circumstances, it can justify pretty much anything you can think of. For all their intelligence and imagination neither Bentham nor Mill seemed to recognise or discuss these catastrophic possibilities. (shrink)

Pre-natal-diagnosis technologies allow parents to discover whether their child is likely to suffer from serious disability. One argument for state funding of access to such technologies is that doing so would be “cost-effective”, in the sense that the expected financial costs of such a programme would be outweighed by expected “benefits”, stemming from the births of fewer children with serious disabilities. This argument is extremely controversial. This paper argues that the argument may not be as unacceptable as is often assumed. (...) In doing so, it sets out a more general framework for assessing the relevance of efficiency calculations to policy-making. The final section also investigates the relationship between the paper’s arguments and claims about parental responsibility for child-bearing and rearing, with reference to Scanlon’s work on “substantive responsibility”. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper, three objections to the precautionary principle are outlined: the principle requires some account of how to balance risks of significant harms; the principle focuses on action and ignores the costs of inaction; and the principle threatens epistemic anarchy. I argue that these objections may overlook two distinctive features of precautionary thought: a suspicion of the value of “full scientific certainty”; and a desire to distinguish environmental doings from allowings. In Section 2, I argue (...) that any simple distinction between environmental doings and allowings is untenable. However, I argue that the appeal of such a distinction can be captured within a relational account of environmental equity. In Section 3 I show how the proposed account of environmental justice can generate a justification for distinctively “precautionary” policy-making. (shrink)

This paper introduces a refined approach to conceptualising the commons in order to shed new light on cooperative practices. Specifically, it proposes the novel concept of Common-Property Assets. CPAs are exclusively human-made resources owned under common-property ownership regimes. Our CPA model combines quantity and quality. While these two dimensions are largely pre-existing in the conventional case of natural common-pool resources, they directly depend on members’ collective action in CPAs. We apply this theoretical framework to farm machinery sharing agreements—a widespread grassroots (...) cooperative phenomenon in agriculture—using a systematic literature review to generalise the findings from a sample of 54 studies published from 1950 to 2018. Our findings show that in successful CPAs, members endorse and do not deviate from a quantity-quality equilibrium that is collectively agreed upon. Despite the existence of thresholds for both quantity and quality due to membership heterogeneity, qualitative changes in respect of the common good are possible in CPAs that promote democratic practices. Our study has potentially strong implications for developing ethics in cooperatives and the sustainable development of communities worldwide. (shrink)

he subject of this thesis is ethical aspects of decision-making concerning social risks. It is argued that a model for risk management must acknowledge several ethical aspects and, most crucial among these, the individual’s right not to be unfairly exposed to risks. Article I takes as its starting point the demand frequently expressed in the risk literature for consistent risk management. It is maintained that a model focusing on cost-benefit analysis does not respect the rights of the individual. Two alternative (...) models are outlined. They evolve around the separateness of individuals, rights, and fair risk taking. It is claimed that a model that focuses on a fair procedure for risk decisions seems most fruitful to develop. Article II discusses the NIMBY conflict. The ethical premises behind the negative characterization of the NIMBY concept are investigated. It is argued that a collective weighing of risks and benefits ignores individuals’ rights not to be unfairly exposed to risks in siting scenarios. Article III presents a three-party model tool for ethical risk analysis. The focus in such analysis is a discussion of three parties that are involved in risk decisions: the risk-exposed, the beneficiary, and the decision-maker. Seven crucial ethical questions are discerned by combining these parties pairwise. Article IV discusses a model for procedural justice for risk decisions. Two theories of deliberative democracy are explored. The first focuses on a hypothetical contract, the second argues for the actual inclusion of affected parties. It is maintained that hypothetical reasoning should mainly serve as a guide concerning risk issues that affect people who cannot be included in the decision-making process. Otherwise an interactive dialogical reasoning is to be preferred. Article V explores the claim that there are no real, objective risks – only subjective descriptions of them. It is argued that even though every risk can be described in different ways, involve value judgements and emotions, the ideal of objectivity should not be abandoned. (shrink)

Regulatory agencies aim to protect the public by moderating risks associated with innovation, but a good regulatory regime should also promote justified public trust. After introducing the USDA 2020 SECURE Rule for regulation of biotech innovation as a case study, this essay develops a theory of justified public trust in regulation. On the theory advanced here, to be trustworthy, a regulatory regime must (1) fairly and effectively manage risk, must be (2) “science based” in the relevant sense, and must in (...) addition be (3) truthful, (4) transparent, and (5) responsive to public input. Evaluated with these norms, the USDA SECURE Rule is shown to be deeply flawed, since it fails appropriately to manage risk, and similarly fails to satisfy other normative requirements for justified trust. The argument identifies ways in which the SECURE Rule itself might be improved, but more broadly provides a normative framework for the evaluation of trustworthy regulatory policy-making. (shrink)

. The potential for financial conflicts of interest to influence scientific research has become a significant concern. Some commentators have suggested that the development of standardized study protocols could help to alleviate these problems. This paper identifies two problems with this solution: scientific research incorporates numerous methodological judgments that cannot be constrained by standardized protocols; and standardization can hide significant value judgments. These problems arise because of four weaknesses of standardized guidelines: incompleteness, limited applicability, selective ignorance, and ossification. Therefore, the (...) standardization of study designs should not serve as an alternative to addressing the interests and power relations that pervade science policy-making. Policy makers should take at least two steps to prevent powerful interest groups from co-opting standardized guidelines. First, their development and review should be made as transparent as possible and should be subjected to broadly-based deliberation. Second, standardized guidelines should be supplemented with efforts to scrutinize the conditions under which financial COIs tend to have the most worrisome effects so that additional steps can be taken to eliminate and mitigate those conditions. (shrink)