Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. How much of commonsense and legal reasoning is formalizable? A review of conceptual obstacles.James Franklin - 2012 - Law, Probability and Risk 11:225-245.
    Fifty years of effort in artificial intelligence (AI) and the formalization of legal reasoning have produced both successes and failures. Considerable success in organizing and displaying evidence and its interrelationships has been accompanied by failure to achieve the original ambition of AI as applied to law: fully automated legal decision-making. The obstacles to formalizing legal reasoning have proved to be the same ones that make the formalization of commonsense reasoning so difficult, and are most evident where legal reasoning has to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Resurrecting logical probability.James Franklin - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (2):277-305.
    The logical interpretation of probability, or "objective Bayesianism'' – the theory that (some) probabilities are strictly logical degrees of partial implication – is defended. The main argument against it is that it requires the assignment of prior probabilities, and that any attempt to determine them by symmetry via a "principle of insufficient reason" inevitably leads to paradox. Three replies are advanced: that priors are imprecise or of little weight, so that disagreement about them does not matter, within limits; that it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • (1 other version)What is Doubt and When is it Reasonable?Paul Thagard - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):391-406.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Negative Liberty, Liberal and Republican1.Philip Pettit - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):15-38.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Case comment: Quantification of the ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ standard.James Franklin - 2005 - Law, Probability and Risk 6:159-165.
    Argues for a minimal level of quantification for the "proof beyond reasonable doubt" standard of criminal law: if a jury asks "Is 60% enough?", the answer should be "No.".
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation