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Learning to Discriminate: The Perfect Proxy Problem in Artificially Intelligent Criminal Sentencing

In Jesper Ryberg & Julian V. Roberts (eds.), Sentencing and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford: OUP (2022)

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  1. Criminal Justice and Artificial Intelligence: How Should we Assess the Performance of Sentencing Algorithms?Jesper Ryberg - 2024 - Philosophy and Technology 37 (1):1-15.
    Artificial intelligence is increasingly permeating many types of high-stake societal decision-making such as the work at the criminal courts. Various types of algorithmic tools have already been introduced into sentencing. This article concerns the use of algorithms designed to deliver sentence recommendations. More precisely, it is considered how one should determine whether one type of sentencing algorithm (e.g., a model based on machine learning) would be ethically preferable to another type of sentencing algorithm (e.g., a model based on old-fashioned programming). (...)
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  • Three Lessons For and From Algorithmic Discrimination.Frej Klem Thomsen - 2023 - Res Publica (2):1-23.
    Algorithmic discrimination has rapidly become a topic of intense public and academic interest. This article explores three issues raised by algorithmic discrimination: 1) the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination, 2) the notion of disadvantageous treatment, and 3) the moral badness of discriminatory automated decision-making. It argues that some conventional distinctions between direct and indirect discrimination appear not to apply to algorithmic discrimination, that algorithmic discrimination may often be discrimination between groups, as opposed to against groups, and that it is (...)
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  • Sentencing, Artificial Intelligence, and Condemnation: A Reply to Taylor.Jesper Ryberg - 2024 - Criminal Justice Ethics 43 (2):131-145.
    In a recent article in this journal, Isaac Taylor warned against the unconstrained use of algorithms as instruments to determine sentences in criminal cases. More precisely, what he argued is that it is important that the sentencing process serves a condemnatory function, and that the introduction of sentencing algorithms threatens to undermine this function. In this reply to Taylor, it is argued that even though his considerations are interesting as they direct attention to the sentencing process and not merely the (...)
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