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Neither mentioning 'brains in a vat' nor mentioning brains in a vat will prove that we are not brains in a vat

Marian David

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):891-896 (1991)

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Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2289-2306.details Putnam’s vat argument is intended to show that I am not a permanently envatted brain. The argument holds promise as a response to vat scepticism, which depends on the claim that I do not know that I am not a permanently envatted brain. However, there is a widespread idea that the vat argument cannot fulfil this promise, because to employ the argument as a response to vat scepticism I would have to make assumptions about the content of the premises and/or (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Using Others' Words and Drawing the Limits of the Thinkable.Yitzhak Benbaji - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):125-.details Philosophers tend to presuppose a close relationship between language and thought. They express and defend this conviction in different ways. I shall focus on the relation between the thinkable and the expressible, as stated in the Inexpressibility Thesis. Download Export citation Bookmark
Externalism and skepticism.Keith Butler - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (1):13-34.details The argument that has inspired much of the recent discussion of the logical relationship between these views is found in Putnam : If externalism is true, then if S were a brain in a vat, S’s utterances of the sentence “I am a brain in a vat” would not express the proposition that S is a brain in a vat. S’s use of the words “brain” and “vat” would not refer to a real brain or vat, just as, in a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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