In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, many economists have blamed economics for having failed to warn us. Paul Krugman, for example, in a well-known New York Times Magazine article, suggests that Classical economists were blinded by the beauty of mathematics, and that Keynesian economics is the path of the future. This paper argues that the evolution of economic thinking is much more nuanced than Krugman portrays it, and that instead of embracing what has become known as Keynesian (...) economics, macroeconomists should rather re-embrace the broader Classical economic tradition, of which Keynes was an important part. (shrink)

In his justly celebrated Expert Political Judgment, Philip E. Tetlock evaluates the judgment of economic and political experts by rigorously testing their ability to make accurate predictions. He finds that ability profoundly limited, implying that expert judgment is virtually useless, if not worse. He concludes by proposing a project that would seek to improve experts' performance by holding them publicly accountable for their claims. But Tetlock's methods severely underestimate the value of expert opinion. Despite their notorious disagreements, experts have highly (...) pertinent information and advice in many areas of public policy. The main problem with experts is that political actors seize on their most extreme views in one direction or the other, and overlook their areas of general agreement and the core of relatively reliable information that they provide. (shrink)

This paper aims (a) to provide characterizations of realism and instrumentalism that are philosophically interesting and applicable to economics; and (b) to defend instrumentalism against realism as a methodological stance in economics. Starting point is the observation that ‘all models are false’, which, or so I argue, is difficult to square with the realist's aim of truth, even if the latter is understood as ‘partial’ or ‘approximate’. The three cheers in favour of instrumentalism are: (1) Once we have usefulness, truth (...) is redundant. (2) There is something disturbing about causal structure. (3) It's better to do what one can than to chase rainbows. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The illusion of explanatory depth, which has been identified by cognitive psychologists, may play a prominent role in encouraging regulatory action. This special type of overconfidence would logically lead regulators to believe that they are aware of the relevant causes and consequences of the activities they might regulate, and of the unintended side effects of the regulatory actions they are contemplating. So, as with other cognitive biases, the illusion of explanatory depth is likely to lead to mistakes. And unlike (...) the biases that have been the focus of so much behavioral economics, the illusion of explanatory depth is uniquely resistant to correction by those who are aware of it as a general problem and rigorously attempt to keep it under control. (shrink)

In his justly celebrated Expert Political Judgment, Philip E. Tetlock evaluates the judgment of economic and political experts by rigorously testing their ability to make accurate predictions. He finds that ability profoundly limited, implying that expert judgment is virtually useless, if not worse. He concludes by proposing a project that would seek to improve experts' performance by holding them publicly accountable for their claims. But Tetlock's methods severely underestimate the value of expert opinion. Despite their notorious disagreements, experts have highly (...) pertinent information and advice in many areas of public policy. The main problem with experts is that political actors seize on their most extreme views in one direction or the other, and overlook their areas of general agreement and the core of relatively reliable information that they provide. (shrink)

In the social sciences, research on conspiracy theories is accumulating fast. To contribute to this research, here I introduce a computational model about the psychological processes underlying support for conspiracy theories. The proposal is that endorsement of these theories depends on three factors: prior beliefs, novel evidence, and expected consequences. Thanks to the latter, a conspiracy hypothesis might be selected because it is the costliest to reject even if it is not the best supported by evidence and by prior beliefs (...) (i.e., even if it is not the most accurate). In this way, the model implies a key role for motivated reasoning. By examining the social conditions that favour the success of conspiracy theories, the paper embeds the model, whose focus is primarily psychological, within the broader social context, and applies this analysis to probe the role of conspiracy theories within contemporary Western societies. Altogether, the paper argues that a computational outlook can contribute to elucidate the socio-psychological dynamics underlying the attractiveness of conspiracy theories. (shrink)

In the ongoing debate about the impact that studies of public ignorance should have on the study of culture, Mark Fenster and Bret Chandler assume that wider political participation must be our goal, because, to them, political ignorance is a culturally imposed, and therefore removable, obstacle—as if, without the baleful influence of culture, political participants would be well informed. Culture is indeed a primary influence on people's political opinions, so political scientists should indeed study the role it plays in the (...) formation of political beliefs. But such studies should begin with ignorance as people's default position, and should refrain from assuming that the source of ignorance is cultural domination or manipulation. (shrink)