We have demonstrated, using the Cantor dust method, that the statistical distribution of appearance and disappearance of rodents species (Arvicolid rodent radiation in Europe) follows power laws strengthening the evidence for a fractal structure set. Self-similar laws have been used as model for the description of a huge number of biological systems. With Nottale we have shown that log-periodic behaviors of acceleration or deceleration can be applied to branching macroevolution, to the time sequences of major evolutionary leaps (global life tree, (...) sauropod and theropod dinosaurs postural structures, North American fossil equids, rodents, primates and echinoderms clades and human ontogeny). The Scale-Relativity Theory has others biological applications from linear with fractal behavior to non-linear and from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics. (shrink)

If the problem of the origin of life is conceptualized as a process of emergence of biochemistry from proto-biochemistry, which in turn emerged from the organic chemistry and geochemistry of primitive earth, then the resources of the new sciences of complex systems dynamics can provide a more robust conceptual framework within which to explore the possible pathways of chemical complexification leading to living systems and biosemiosis. In such a view the emergence of life, and concomitantly of natural selection and biosemiosis, (...) is the result of deep natural laws (the outlines of which we are only beginning to perceive) and reflects a degree of holism in those systems that led to life. Further, such an approach may lead to the development of a more general theory of biology and of natural organization, one informed by semiotic concepts. (shrink)

Crane envisions the speculative conjecture that intelligent civilizations might want and be able to produce black holes in the very far future. He implicitly suggests two main purposes of this enterprise: (i) energy production and (ii) universe production. We discuss those two options. The commentary is obviously highly speculative and should be read accordingly.

Jan Greben criticized fine-tuning by taking seriously the idea that “nature is quantum mechanical”. I argue that this quantum view is limited, and that fine-tuning is real, in the sense that our current physical models require fine-tuning. Second, I examine and clarify many difficult and fundamental issues raised by Rüdiger Vaas’ comments on Cosmological Artificial Selection.

The Metamorphosis of Plants, by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, by Rupert Sheldrake The Science of Leonardo: Inside the Mind of the Great Genius of the Renaissance by Fritjof Capra, by Rupert Sheldrake Quantum Aspects of Life, edited by Derek Abbott, Paul C. W. Davies, and Arun K. Pati, by Michael Levin Medicine, Miracles, & Manifestations: A Doctor’s Journey through the Worlds of Divine Intervention, Near-Death Experience, and Universal Energy, by John L. Turner, by Allan J. Hamilton Parsing the Turing Test: (...) Philosophical and Methodological Issues in the Quest for the Thinking Computer, edited by Robert Epstein, Gary Roberts, and Grace Beber, by Gregory Chaitin Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, by Malcolm Gladwell, by Larry Dossey The Seer in Ancient Greece, by Michael Attyah Flower MichaelGrosso Astrology off the Beaten Track: A Scientifi c Study of Planets and Personality, by Suzel Fuzeau-Braesch Robert Marks Haunted Greece and Rome: Ghost Stories from Classical Antiquity, by D. Felton, by Daniel Ogden Life and Mind: In Search of the Physical Basis, edited by Savely Savva, by Beverly Rubik Parapsychology and the Skeptics: A Scientifi c Argument for the Existence of ESP, by Chris Carter, by Michael Schmicker Soul Survivor: The Reincarnation of a World War II Fighter Pilot, by Bruce Leininger, Andrea Leininger, and Ken Gross, by Charles T. Tart Further Books of Note Journal Review. (shrink)

The theories of Darwinian evolution and Intelligent Design appear to be locked in an intractable debate, partly because they offer rival scientific explanations for the phenomenon of descent with modification in biology. This paper analyses the dispute in two ways: firstly, it seeks to clarify the exact nature of the logical flaw that has been alleged to lie at the heart of Intelligent Design theory. Secondly, it proposes that, in spite of this error, the Intelligent Design theory advocated by Michael (...) Behe takes at least one significant step in the right direction. Although Behe's suggestion is promising, it is shown to be not nearly radical enough. (shrink)

How does God govern the world? For many theists “laws of nature” play a vital role. But what are these laws, metaphysically speaking? I shall argue that laws of nature are not external to the objects they govern, but instead should be thought of as reducible to internal features of properties. Recent work in metaphysics and philosophy of science has revived a dispositionalist conception of nature, according to which nature is not passive, but active and dynamic. Disposition theorists see particulars (...) as being internally powerful rather than being governed by external laws of nature, making external laws in effect ontologically otiose. I will argue that theists should prefer a dispositionalist ontology, since it leads them toward the theory of concurrentism in divine conservation, rather than occasionalism, and revives the distinction between internal and external teleology. God on this view does not govern the world through external laws of nature, but rather through internal aspects of powerful properties. (shrink)

I'll show that the kind of analogy between life and information [argued for by authors such as Davies (2000), Walker and Davies (2013), Dyson (1979), Gleick (2011), Kurzweil (2012), Ward (2009)] – that seems to be central to the effect that artificial mind may represent an expected advance in the life evolution in the Universe – is like the design argument, and that if the design argument is unfounded and invalid, the argument to the effect that artificial mind may represent (...) an expected advance in the life evolution in the Universe is also unfounded and invalid. However, if we are prepared to admit (though we should not do so) this method of reasoning as valid, I'll show that the analogy between life and information to the effect that artificial mind may represent an expected advance in the evolution of life in the Universe seems to suggest some type of reductionism of life to information, but biology respectively chemistry, or physics are not reductionist, contrary to what seems to be suggested by the analogy between life and information. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to familiarize the reader with the concept of psychological energy, and the role it plays in deepening our understanding of psychosocial adaptation to traumatic life events and, more pointedly, the onset of chronic illness and disability. In order to implement this aim, the following steps were undertaken: First, a brief historical review of the nature of energy, force and action, as traditionally conceived in the field of physics, is provided. Second, an overview of PE (...) is presented, with a shared emphasis on both its historical underpinnings and its present conceptualizations in the fields of social, health and rehabilitation psychology. Particular emphasis is placed upon applications of PE in the domains of adaptation to stress, trauma and CID onset. Third, reviewed are measuring instruments that have been traditionally applied to the assessment of the nature, content and magnitude of PE and its dynamics. Finally, new perspectives are offered on the dimensional structure, processes and dynamics, assumed to undergird PE, its underlying conceptual similarities to physical energy, and its potential and deeper link to the process of psychosocial adaptation in the aftermath of experiencing trauma and CID. (shrink)

This paper is a sequel to my 'Theological Misinterpretations of Current Physical Cosmology' (Foundations of Physics [1996], 26 (4); revised in Philo [1998], 1 (1)). There I argued that the Big Bang models of (classical) general relativity theory, as well as the original 1948 versions of the steady state cosmology, are each logically incompatible with the time-honored theological doctrine that perpetual divine creation ('creatio continuans') is required in each of these two theorized worlds. Furthermore, I challenged the perennial theological doctrine (...) that there must be a divine creative cause (as distinct from a transformative one) for the very existence of the world, a ratio essendi. This doctrine is the theistic reply to the question: 'Why is there something, rather than just nothing?' I begin my present paper by arguing against the response by the contemporary Oxford theist Richard Swinburne and by Leibniz to what is, in effect, my counter-question: 'But why should there be just nothing, rather than something?' Their response takes the form of claiming that the a priori probability of there being just nothing, vis-à-vis the existence of alternative states, is maximal, because the non-existence of the world is conceptually the simplest. On the basis of an analysis of the role of simplicity in scientific explanations, I show that this response is multiply flawed, and thus provides no basis for their three contentions that (i) if there is a world at all, then its 'normal', natural, spontaneous state is one of utter nothingness or total non-existence, so that (ii) the very existence of matter, energy and living beings constitutes a deviation from the allegedly 'normal', spontaneous state of 'nothingness', and (iii) that deviation must thus have a suitably potent (external) divine cause. Related defects turn out to vitiate the medieval Kalam Argument for the existence of God, as espoused by William Craig. Next I argue against the contention by such theists as Richard Swinburne and Philip L. Quinn that (i) the specific content of the scientifically most fundamental laws of nature, including the constants they contain, requires supra-scientific explanation, and (ii) a satisfactory explanation is provided by the hypothesis that the God of theism willed them to be exactly what they are. Furthermore, I contend that the theistic teleological gloss on the 'Anthropic Principle' is incoherent and explanatorily unavailing. Finally, I offer an array of considerations against Swinburne's attempt to show, via Bayes's theorem, that the existence of God is more probable than not. (shrink)

If everything is in permanent change, can the Universe itself be fundamentally passive? Answering this question requires a clear concept of ‘activity.’ The nature of ‘action’ is a central and unsolved philosophical problem. Actions play a crucial role in the way we conceive of ourselves, life and the Universe, and the value we put on these. In four decades of research on solar activity, we found that activity is not a mere occurrence but a genuine activity of the Sun, initiated (...) globally by the Sun using quantum processes as tools that generates suitable primary mass flows locally in the solar core that are capable of producing a working dynamo. We argue that solar activity is initiated by biological causes given by the fundamental principle of biology. This universal activity is the basis of our life instinct and of logic too. (shrink)

. The linking of Michael Polanyi's name with a center at Baylor University that espoused intelligent‐design theory calls for examination of Polanyi's teleology. This examination attempts to put Polanyi's epistemology in the perspective of his total philosophical work by looking at the clarification of teleology in philosophy of biology and in the framework of three major features of Polanyi's thought: open and truth‐oriented, purposive but open to truth, and transcendent yet intelligible. The conclusion is that Polanyi would not support intelligent (...) design according to the nature of his own theory. (shrink)

In Darwin's Black Box: The BiochemicalChallenge to Evolution I argued thatpurposeful intelligent design, rather thanDarwinian natural selection, better explainssome aspects of the complexity that modernscience has discovered at the molecularfoundation of life. In the five years since itspublication the book has been widely discussedand has received considerable criticism. Here Irespond to what I deem to be the mostfundamental objections. In the first part ofthe article I address empirical criticismsbased on experimental studies alleging eitherthat biochemical systems I discussed are notirreducibly complex (...) or that similar systemshave been demonstrated to be able to evolve byDarwinian processes. In the remainder of thearticle I address methodological concerns,including whether a claim of intelligent designis falsifiable and whether intelligent designis a permissible scientific conclusion. (shrink)

For many natural scientists, design, conceived as the action of an intelligent agent, is not a fundamental creative force in nature. Rather, material mechanisms, characterized by chance and necessity and ruled by unbroken laws, are thought sufficient to do all nature’s creating. Darwin’s theory epitomizes this rejection of design.

A review was conducted of Crookes' lever experiments on the psychic force proposed by Daniel D. Home. The levers were 36"-long boards with a fulcrum at 1.5" and 4.5" from the left end in the first and second experiments, respectively, and had a spring-balance suspension at the right end. In the first experiment, Crookes did not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that the experimental results could not be explained using Newtonian mechanics. In the second experiment, direct contact between Home's hand (...) and the lever was prevented by a water vessel that had been set exactly over the fulcrum. If the gravity center of the vessel is assumed to have been off-center by even 5 mm to the right of the fulcrum, a force greater than 114 lbf would have been required to be exerted on the lever when Home's fingertips were dipped in the water to produce the observed increase in spring force (0.71 lbf); this is physically impossible. The analyses show that neither changes in the buoyant force on the dipped fingers nor water sloshing or external tremors can explain the experimental results. Additionally, some well-known paranormal phenomena are listed for a possible future extension of this study. (shrink)

Composer and musicologist Nicolas Slonimsky published a fascinating and delightful book entitled Lexicon of Musical Invective: Critical Assaults on Composers Since Beethoven’s Time (Slonimsky 1965). The book is a collection of what Slonimsky called “biased, unfair, ill-tempered, and singularly unprophetic judgments” (p. 3) about famous composers and their works. We find, for example, the Gazette Musicale de Paris on August 1, 1847, saying of Verdi, “there has not yet been an Italian composer more incapable of producing what is commonly called (...) a melody.” And this publication stuck to its guns. On May 22, 1853, it said of Rigoletto that it “lacks melody. This opera has hardly any chance to be kept in the repertoire.” The May 1804 issue of Zeitung für die Elegente Welt proclaimed Beethoven’s Second Symphony is a crass monster, a hideously writhing wounded dragon, that refuses to expire, and though bleeding in the Finale, furiously beats about with its tail erect................ (shrink)